Hi!
Sorry, unless there wrote. Just accidentally hit
free channel site, but there free channel
for adults. Should be interesting to see - until free!
http://channel.batcave.net/freetv/
By!

Thanks, Adrian, for bringing us back to task. It's good to be in touch with all of you again.

While I do agree with many of the broader issues discussed here, I think the binding issue is the humanitarian crisis this presents. I say this not because it has struck a chord with all of us, but because if ever there was a chord to strike in the face of USG's (and many of the governments in the West) overwhelming affinity for securing allies in fights against terrorism, it is that humanitarian responsibility to protect. R2P has unfortunately largely been ignored, but I have to believe it's due more to lack of a media "hook" than its deviation from a "moral center."

I had the good fortune to talk with Ishmael Beah ("A Long Way Gone") the other day, and he talked about how Western media doesn't find children's issues engaging enough to report on (even in America, re: healthcare), partially because of the normalization factor. Children tend to be more resilient and quieter, and we often use that as an excuse not to act. It may seem true that many people in northern Uganda have "gotten used to" guns, or fear, or camps, but that should not be miscontrued as acceptance and certainly not as "normal" for a part of the world most haven't cared to learn enough about.

Congrats to the U.S. Senate and Senators Feingold and Brownback on their resolution. How do we make them now resolve to act?

Peter has it right when he closes with "...it is the people of northern Uganda who suffer as elites jockey for position. In a globalized world, accountability has become almost a myth."

I wouldn't say almost. It is a myth.

And as we 'jockey' on this blog, thousands die. As we lend our voice on this platform, that of the Acholi remains muted, dare I say ignored.

The fact that the victims of this conflict have no side and little representation says so much about what is really at work in Juba and beyond - - self-interest. It's basic and does little justice to the complexities of the region, but it is the driving force. Not peace. Not human rights. Not the abandoned children, who we are willing to sacrifice for geo-political interests.

This conflict and its consequences are clearly not politically expensive enough for international action. Continuing to play games with peace by dangling regional interests or the war on terrorism is a shameful public display of how clearly lacking of morality our foreign policy truly is.

Don’t get me wrong, all of these avenues for peace need to be explored, but not at the expense of the humanitarian emergency in the camps.

As this blog and newspapers worldwide are littered with stories on the prospects for peace, where is the voice for the Acholi, who all of this peace is supposed to be for?

Peter, you mention that current USG policy in East Africa and the Horn of Africa seems to prioritize counter-terrorism interests over humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts. One avenue that advocates for a more responsible and engaged USG involvement in the Juba peace process might take is to emphasize the regional security threat that the LRA poses and couch support for the Juba talks not only in the interest of humanitarianism and peacebuilding, but also in the language our strategic security interests, especially in Sudan. Of course, this is no new idea (or silver bullet), but it’s worth exploring.

In the past several years the USG has invested significant political will and resources in securing the CPA between the SPLM/A and the GoS and now in (so far unsuccessful) efforts to end the crisis in Darfur. This is no small part due to the USG’s concern that the influence of the hard-line Islamist regime controlling the GoS may serve as an incubator for terrorist activity. These are strikingly similar motivations to our current prioritization of securing Ugandan peacekeepers to help consolidate (non-UIC!) stability in Somalia over any wishes for the GoU to take the Juba talks seriously. However, can we make it clear to the USG that success in Juba is just as important to these counter-terror goals?

The CPA is in trouble. It seems evident that the GoS is not committed to the CPA, which provides for 2011 referendum that would allow southern Sudan and its rich oil fields to secede from Sudan. The SPLM/A-dominated GoSS has yet to establish effective civilian administrative structures, tackle corruption, participate meaningfully in the Government of National Unity or truly access oil revenues still tightly controlled by the GoS. Clashes between GoS armed forces and SPLM/A forces, especially the Malakal incident in November 2006 in which hundreds died, may foreshadow a more widespread return to violence.

LRA activity - looting, abduction and killings - in southern Sudan has intensified the climate of insecurity in the area. Despite the Nairobi Accord of 1999 and subsequent agreements to allow the UPDF to pursue LRA rebels within southern Sudan, elements of the GoS armed forces still allegedly support the LRA (and other militia groups), possibly (probably?) with the intention of weakening the GoSS and undermining the CPA.

However, a peaceful settlement of the LRA rebellion through GoSS mediation at the Juba talks would not only improve security, but serve to greatly strengthen the GoSS and its ability to counter efforts cooked up in Khartoum to permanently destabilize the region and wield its fundamentalist power with regional impunity. Stability in southern Sudan and northern Uganda may prove to be just as crucial a piece to the anti-terror puzzle the USG is frantically trying to construct in the region as stability in Somalia.

I think Okello raises some reasonable points in his blog entry, however many (including myself) would be more skeptical that the Govt. of Uganda has made a 180-degree turn to fully embrace peace talks. In addition, our sources in Washington give us little indication that the USG has put any significant pressure on Kampala to make such a policy shift.

In fact, the USG seems intent on avoiding any friction in U.S.-Uganda relations. There is concern that promoting the peace talks could create such friction. This may be especially true with Uganda taking a lead role in the new AU "peacekeeping" force in Somalia: a mission that is a key focus of USG strategic thinking in Africa at present. As new attention is given to counter-terrorism in Africa, is this limiting the USG willingness to pursue humanitarianism, peacebuilding and good governance?

In the meantime, it is the people of northern Uganda who suffer as elites jockey for position. In a globalized world, accountability has become almost a myth.

I agree with several commentators above that the United States has been conspicuously absent in public support for the now failing talks. However, I can't shake the feeling that President Museveni's recent determination to end this war, one way or another, is a rather direct product of pressure from the U.S. and other donors. In fact, I would go so far as to say that the U.S. has been instrumental in bringing the talks as far as they have come.

The breakdown of the talks, I believe, is not due to the U.S. government's public silence (though it didn't help), but to strong incentives on both sides of the negotiating table to avoid a final agreement when the ICC is involved.

Kony's incentive to avoid a peaceful agreement that doesn't include amnesty and protection from the ICC is obvious. The government of Uganda has similar incentives. If Kony is arrested and brought to trial, there are a number of glaring misdeeds committed by the government during the conflict with the LRA that might come to light in the Hague and jeopardize key political figures. If the government protects Kony it will draw loads of international criticism for involving the ICC and then blocking its efforts, criticism that will come in part from key donor countries. In this context, it's easy to see why the government of Uganda began lacing its rhetoric with inflammatory statements about military solutions before the talks showed signs of breaking down.

And here we might even find the cause of the U.S. government staying quiet about the talks publicly. Certainly they are privy to some of this information and, by allowing the government of Uganda to abandon the talks, are protecting the geopolitical interests aptly outlined in Michael's first post on this page.

So what we are seeing now are stall tactics. The international pressure to end the war is now such that President Museveni can't ignore it, but nor can his government bear a peaceful solution. Kony knows that the UPDF is finally ready to fight and knows that his waning military power won't withstand the assault, so he is drawing the hopeless talks out as long as he can with subtle signs of hope like requests for new venues and mediators. If he gets it, it's another few months of interim amnesty. He won't get it, though. I count two possible solutions: One, the much feared military solution. Two, a quiet agreement between Kony and the GoU in which Kony disappears, the LRA fortuitously disbands, and Vincent Otti is spotted in 8 years on a boat in the south of France.

I understand that geopolitical posturing was a major part of the Ugandan decision to send troops to Somalia. In the month leading up to the decision, the Uganda Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Secretary of State Rice in Washington and President Museveni received a call from President Bush. However, a realist foreign policy approach can have several merits. In this case, its clear that an unstable Mogadishu will help continue the steady flow of small arms to the conflict areas in East Africa.

The more frightening theory says the Bush administration looked the other way on northern Uganda in order to give incentive to the Ugandan Government to help in Somalia. If this is the case (and it is only one theory, the State Department has been mute on this point), I am deeply distressed and disappointed because the Americans could have made a serious impact on the stalled northern Uganda peace talks in Juba.

Thoughts?

I see this site doesn't like html. The blog is Obsidian Wings; the post on Uganda is presently the top post.

Hi -- I posted a piece about this situation and the collapse of the talks on my blog, here. Some of my readers are asking what they can do to help. If anyone wants to offer suggestions (or to correct any errors), feel free.

Thanks for all you are doing.

I do not disagree that Martin Ojul et al are the official LRA delegation at the talks, but was basing my comments on Kony and Otti's occasional phone calls to discount/deny what their delegation was presenting. How does one find the delegation's 32 paragraph list of complaints?

Sverker, you are right in noting the minimal support given to these talks by the international community. The process launched by Betty Bigombe in 2004 had even less support, but she was acting alone as an unofficial mediator with no government or organizational leverage. Surprising that with the GoSS involved, there is still so little support. Both processes have been marked, as you put it well, by many cooks flocking in to make the soup -- not a recipe for good soup or peace. (Thanks for your excellent book, Living in Bad Surroundings, that is so helpful to understanding the situation in the north.)

Would the LRA have asked for a peace process to be launched in 2004 had the ICC not started investigations? Not clear.

Uganda can go to the UN Security Council to request a freezing of the process. It seems unlikely that the international community will want to be seen as granting even temporary immunity to Kony and others If there is no very serious movement on their part.

Beth, the indictments only apply to 4 individuals at this point, so most LRA will be able to rejoin society at some point -- if their communities want them back -- it appears that many former LRA are finding a cold reception in their communities. For such people, much more assistance is needed than is provided. For the 4 indictees, it is doubtful that Kony, Otti or the others would ever feel safe returning, even if they were allowed to do so.

http://www.geeskaafrika.com/somalia_15feb07.htm

The new Somali warlords are regional threat
Nairobi (HAN) February 15, 2007 - The rising violence and a power vacuum caused by the ousting of Somali Islamist militias by the Somalia TNG could lead to a return of the chaos that plagued Somalia for seventeen years, the United Nation's monthly report said.

The new Somali warlords are dangerous and pose a threat to the International oil routes, ships and humanitarian aid deliveries to the needy, the UN warned today, as the Somalia TNG struggles to quell growing unrest in Southern Somalia.

The spiraling violence is also likely to undermine attempts to deploy an African Union peacekeeping mission designed to protect the country's weak, Ethiopian-backed government and train a new army for the lawless nation.

To know more Uganda Mission in Somalia log in:
http://www.geeskaafrika.com/

Hi everyone, thanks for your very interesting posts. I am just wondering, particularly looking for opinions from the experts here, what your perspective on the ICC in northern Uganda is? I know perspectives on this issue differ sharply, with some argueing that the current peace talks are only happening because of the ICC, while others counter that they are a huge obstacle on the road to peace. The ICC is, by definition, an international institution. While it is not supported by the US, I am wondering if you guys think this is the type of international involvement that is needed? Does the judicial hegemony of the ICC present a realistic solution? Is amnesty for Kony and the others under indictment justified if it means peace? Can peace in and of itself be justice? Where does Museveni stand right now with this issue? Sorry, I know it is a lot of questions, but I have been trying to figure this stuff out for a while. Thanks!

Hi everyone, thanks for your very interesting posts. I am just wondering, particularly looking for opinions from the experts here, what your perspective on the ICC in northern Uganda is? I know perspectives on this issue differ sharply, with some argueing that the current peace talks are only happening because of the ICC, while others counter that they are a huge obstacle on the road to peace. The ICC is, by definition, an international institution. While it is not supported by the US, I am wondering if you guys think this is the type of international involvement that is needed? Does the judicial hegemony of the ICC present a realistic solution? Is amnesty for Kony and the others under indictment justified if it means peace? Can peace in and of itself be justice? Where does Museveni stand right now with this issue? Sorry, I know it is a lot of questions, but I have been trying to figure this stuff out for a while. Thanks!

I am wondering how the ecotourism industry feels about what is happening in Uganda. Tourism has become an important part of the country's economy and a boycott on tourism could perhaps get the government's attention and influence it to finally settle the LRMA problem.

I just read the postings about the talks mediated by the south Sudanese, and I want to a few aspects from my horizon. First, it is only too easy to blame only the LRA/M side for the lack of progress in Juba. Secondly, we must remember that Kony did appoint an official delegation to the talks with Mr Martin Ojul as chairman. Thus Ojul et al are officially representing the LRA/M, regardless if they are from the diaspora or not. Today’s wars are global anyway, as we all know. Therefore, if we really want the talks to proceed (and here I mean the talks regardless of venue and/or mediator rather than Juba as such), I think more confidence building must be built with Ojul and his team. As long as Ojul et al are the official representatives (and as far as I know they are), anything should go through them. Too many cooks have flocked Juba to assist in preparing the soup.

I am also of the opinion, that these talks have not been given consistent political and diplomatic support from the international community. Obviously several factors behind this lack of consistent political support, e.g. the ICC indictments. Sure, money has been given to facilitate the talks, but again, the talks have lacked any consistent diplomatic backing. One thing could for example have been to provide both sides and the mediators with experienced observers, military and diplomatic, to facilitate a proper following-up of the various complaints from both sides. With this in mind, I am surprised how little the outside world has engaged and commented upon, or critically assessed, the 32 paragraph long list of complaints raised recently by the LRM/A, in which they outline their frustrations with the talks so far.

Thanks, everyone, for the wonderful posts. I'd like to respond in part to Paco de Onis' remarks on the ICC.

In discussing the role of the international community in strengthening the peace process, it is indeed important to consider the ICC warrants and their possible execution or deferral. Kony has cited these warrants as a reason for refusing to meet in Juba, and President Museveni has undergone both criticism and praise for his offer of amnesty. Foreign leaders have largely abstained from the debate, but the ICC has reiterated its desire to maintain the warrants in spite of the peace process.

The Rome Statute, the treaty which ratified the Court, emphasizes taking into account the "interests of victims" and contains measures for deferral in the event of "new facts or information." The current peace talks and the desire of northerners to return to their land certainly necessitate the employment of these stipulations. Throughout this peace process, northerners have cried out for 'peace first, justice later.'

The difficulty with this case is that while pursuing the warrants may lend legitimacy to the Court in future prosecutions, it is unlikely to bring lasting peace to Uganda. Arresting Kony may (or may not) stall violence, but it will not promote the sustainable and permanent conflict transformation that northern Uganda needs. Through a peace process, the people must be able to accept former LRA soldiers back into their communities and execute justice as they feel it must be done. The world cannot dictate how a society or group perceives justice, and restoring a community (at least temporarily) through traditional institutions is by no means letting the perpetrators free. The Acholi people of northern Uganda have a very strong traditional justice system, and while it is ill-equipped to deal with such catastrophic problems, their cultural norms dictate a commitment to some form of restorative justice and reconciliation. Mr. Atkinson can speak to this topic far better than I.

The ICC is new, and the lack of an enforcement mechanism and the inability of the Court to be flexible on matters of humanitarian concern justify the use of amnesty. Of course the perpetrators must be held accountable in some fashion, but it is in the interest of northern Uganda that the ICC defers its arrest warrants and allows the peace talks to proceed.

If Kony and the LRA are on their way to the Central African Republic to join forces with the APRD as recent press reports suggest, this would be one more sign that Kony is not really serious about peace. I spent the month of December 2006 in the IDP camps in Gulu district, and most of the people I spoke to in the camps were very skeptical that Kony would ever sign a peace agreement - many mentioned that the best hope for peace would be to capture him and the other LRA leaders and "put them behind bars". I'm perplexed that northern Ugandan leaders haven't put more pressure on the international community (especially on the African member states that are signatories to the Rome Statute) to help get the ICC arrest warrants executed, rather than rescinded. There have been so many efforts to accommodate Kony over the past months, and he has not reciprocated - maybe it's time to focus on finding a way to arrest him rather than appease him.

Joyce, you make a good point that LRA leader Kony is "being fed different ideas and advice," including some 'spoilers' in the LRA external wing who want him to abandon the peace talks. I know there was some exploration of the UN or AU setting up a 'panel of experts' or form of sanctions regime to expose these elements. Is there any feasibility to these ideas? Of course, this again brings us back to the will of the international community to seriously strengthen the peace process. Will that has been weak at best.

Hi Peter, Michael, Adrian, and Ron,

The peace process that started in Juba last summer is not what many would think of as a "formal" peace process. A formal peace process would be one that would include all of the parties to the conflict; this one does not. The LRA delegation is made up mostly of Acholis from the diaspora. Having stand-ins for the leaders complicates the process no end, when it is complicated enough without such a dilemma. Changing the venue and the mediator, in my opinion, will not make much/any difference unless the LRA delegation at the talks truly represents Kony and has the power to implement any agreements they reach. It is not clear that anyone but Kony has this power.

During the Dayton peace talks to end the war in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs were not at the talks at all -- they were represented (through a signed agreement) by the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic was the puppet master of the Bosnian Serbs who carried tremendous weight internationally and domestically (I'm not saying this was positive, but it permitted him to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs) and to see to it that the agreement was implemented (albeit slowly and painfully).

Is there anyone like a "Milosevic" who would wield power over Kony? Someone he respects (and maybe fears)? Perhaps someone who has more experience with spirits and more powerful spirits than he has?

This peace process also has its share of spoilers. War is lucrative and it's been good to a select few in the Ugandan military and government while up to a thousand people die each week in the IDP camps. Diasporas help invest and rebuild after war. But sadly, during a war, some may play a destructive role. Some Acholis outside Uganda have maintained such a white hot hatred of Museveni that they seem to find a way to rationalize supporting the LRA even if it means their own people are the victims.

Kony is being fed different ideas and advice. He may believe the Juba talks were not favorable to his side so he is shopping for a more favorable negotiating table. To his credit, Riak Machar, the chief mediator, has been persistent and tried to build faith with Kony by spending large chunks of time in the bush to meet with them. How many international mediators would do this to build confidence?

The members of the diaspora and international NGOs on the periphery of the talks have the opportunity to advance peace by helping Kony understand that if he shuns this opportunity for talks, next time, he may be even more removed from a say in his future.

Peter, Michael, and Adrian--

Yes, the role of international (and especially U.S.) diplomacy has consistently left a great deal to be desired concerning the long war in northern Uganda, as well as and in the current (and stalled) peace talks. To be fair, however, the talks would not have made the progress that has been achieved without substantial financial support from several European governments and the UN.

And despite the obstacles, stumbles, and now stalemate the talks have made important progress, and still hold out the realistic possibility of more to come. Progress so far is clearly visible in northern Uganda, where there have been almost no rebel attacks since the possibility of talks hosted by the Government of Southern Sudan were made public in May of last year. Hundreds of thousands of people in the north, primarily in districts occupied by Langi and Teso, have left the camps and gone home. And even in Acholi, where people have not started returning home on a large scale, they planted and harvested much farther from the camps last season than they had in many years and generally move about much more freely and widely than just six or eight months ago.

There are certainly reasons for concern. The longer that the talks remain in hiatus; the longer the rebels’ refuse to accept any longer the Government of Southern Sudan as mediators and Juba as the venue for the talks, and the longer the Government of Uganda’s loudest voices reject outright the rebels’ demands (and the legitimacy for them), and revert back to the tendency to emphasize a military solution, the talks are in ever greater danger.

But these are not the only dynamics going on. The dynamic and politically savvy Gulu District Chairman, Norbert Mao, has sought various compromises and ways to get the talks started again, including attempts to organize a preliminary meeting of the two negotiating teams in Nairobi, without accepting that as a long-term venue. In addition, the UN Special Appointee to the talks, Joaquim Chisano (the former president of Mozambique), religious leaders from Acholi, Mao and other Acholi political leaders, a range of speakers at a recent Ugandan conference on national reconciliation, and the Catholic Church in Kenya have all urged the Ugandan government to consider a change of venue. The head of the Uganda government’s delegation, Ruhakana Rugunda, has been publicly conciliatory, even softening the government’s stance on not considering an alternate site for the talks. And just today, the Ugandan independent English-language Daily Monitor reported that the chief mediator in the Juba talks, the Government of Southern Sudan’s Vice-President Riek Machar, had been in touch with the LRA peace delegation and they had assured him that they would in fact return to the talks in Juba.

So, to end by offering a response to your final question, Peter: even with all the obstacles, and against all the odds, a formal peace process for northern Uganda can work. Not because (and in some ways even in spite of) the role of the international community. But rather because all three parties most centrally involved – the Government of Southern Sudan, the LRA, and (least reliably) the Government of Uganda – have powerful self-interests in the talks resuming, and succeeding. There is hope.

I think you both raise good points about international neglect influencing the intractibility of the current peace talks, but what about the parties at the talks? Surely, the LRA rebels' refusal to return to Juba for negotiations is about more than the venue. And the Government of Uganda has always privileged a 'military solution.' Against those odds, could a formal peace process even work for northern Uganda?

Michael & Peter…

It easy, and certainly justified, to point the finger at the United States for their complete abandonment of the Acholi of northern Uganda. As you both so clearly pointed out, geo-political interests continue to trump that little thing called ‘human rights’.

Problem is, you may also wonder if it’s the United States’ indifference that’s the problem here or is it the lead coming from the UN.

That ‘leadership’ was made clear last week during UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s first, albeit brief, stopover in Uganda’s capital, Kampala.

Did he address the humanitarian emergency in the north? The commitment to peace?

“We appreciate the role Uganda has played in assisting to resolve conflicts, especially in the Great Lakes region,” shared the UN Secretary General.

He didn’t stop there. In addressing the local media, Ki-Moon went on to express his focus on the military and political challenges in Somalia and his attention to Sudan’s Darfur region, where he stated, “I am deeply concerned about the continuing violence and the suffering of the civilians there. This time we need action and real progress.”

Not one mention of the conditions just 200 miles north, in the country he was spending the afternoon.

It’s puzzling how the UN Secretary General can pepper his statements regularly with a push for the international community to adopt the ‘responsibility to protect’, but stop short in Uganda.

Who can the Acholi turn to for their hope, for their strength to go on?

Better yet, where is this “serious investment” in peace going to come from? Is there a nation out there willing to step outside the self-interest bubble and stroll, in solidarity, through the squalid displacement camps of northern Uganda?

That’s not a query. That’s a challenge.

In the seven months since the negotiations process was initiated, the U.S. State Department has made only two statements about it, where they welcomed the ceasefire and expressed gratitude for the mediation of the Southern Sudanese. They have not even articulated a full endorsement of the negotiations.

I think this fact provides us with a glimpse of the dynamics that have perpetuated this conflict for over twenty years now: calculated neglect. The U.S. government is more concerned with maintaining close ties with the Ugandan and Sudanese governments for purposes of combating terrorism (Uganda recently agreed to send 1000 troops to Somalia at the behest of the United States to help crack down on potential terrorist cells) than it is about the lives of two million people victimized by the war in northern Uganda.

When the primary perpetrators of this violence are not being held accountable, the violence continues. I think it is going to take a serious investment by the international community, proactively working with the Ugandan, Sudanese, and Congolese governments, to bring an end to this misery. The Juba talks provide us with an easy opportunity to do so. To miss this opportunity is to condemn two million people to continued displacement and gradual death.

President Bush and Secretary Rice should send an envoy to demonstrate serious U.S. support for this peace process before it is too late.

Last summer, the advent of negotiations between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Ugandan government gave many in northern Uganda hope that, after two decades of war, peace was finally near. The breakthrough Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) Agreement, reached in August and renewed in November, brought relative calm to northern Uganda, allowing 300,000 of the 1.7 million displaced persons to return home. This progress underlines the high stakes of ensuring the peace talks succeed.

However, in recent weeks, the talks have almost completely collapsed. The LRA has refused to return to peace talks until a new mediator and venue is found, something the Ugandan government refuses. In addition, both parties have violated the CoH Agreement, perpetuating mistrust. The international community, especially the U.S. Government, has remained largely passive, missing opportunities to strengthen the process.

With a week before the CoH expires, the future of northern Uganda is uncertain. What can be done to rejuvenate the peace talks? Why has the international community remained largely silent and what will it take to make this issue a higher priority? What role should external actors now play? If hostilities do resume, what next?