The U.S. can't win the war in Iraq. But the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops would not guarantee stability. On the contrary, it may only further destabilize Iraq. The risks are tremendous and the ramifications for the rest of the region are terrifying.

Iraq could disintegrate into three sectors – Kurdish in the north, Shiite in the center and south and Sunni in the rest of the country, with dozens of other fiefdoms and independent warlords and gangs. The division of Iraq could create a domino effect in other parts of the Middle East. If Iraq’s sovereignty is challenged today, tomorrow could see battles over borders and internal instability in countries like Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia.

This potential exists because most of the nations in the region as well as their borders are inventions of 19th and early 20th century colonial powers. The colonialists drew the borders and divided the Middle East according to their economic or religious interests. Some of the decisions were simply based on their capricious behavior and emotions. Thus, the division of the Middle East into political and national units does not necessarily match ethnic, geographic or political logic. Yet, as in Africa, the colonial borders have been accepted and sanctioned by the local authorities for one major reason: the alternative is worse.

The reality that both options – to withdraw or to stay – are bad ones forces the U.S. to choose not between good or better but between bad or worse. To remain in Iraq is the worst decision possible. But improvement can be achieved only by dialogue and engagement with all the major players – above all Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria and, yes Iran.

The Bush administration has to acknowledge that its policies so far have failed. It has to admit that it needs Iran and Syria to neutralize the Iraqi minefields. Tehran and Damascus hold important keys to defuse the tension. Of course it will require the U.S. to be ready to pay a certain price for both countries’ cooperation, and to make concessions. In return for Syria’s consent to tighten security at its border with Iraq to end its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, the U.S. will have to promise President Bashar al-Assad to improve relations with him, provide economic incentives and bring Israel to negotiate a peace agreement with him, with the ultimate goal of returning the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Such a deal is possible. It is within U.S. power. And securing a deal with Syria to help save America’s face in Iraq would not necessarily be a counterproductive move for Israel’s interests either.

As far as Iran is concerned, the chances of a deal are less promising. A deal with Iran has to be comprehensive: not only about reducing Tehran's intervention in Iraqi politics and its support for Shiite militias. The deal will have to cover Afghanistan and the most sensitive issue of all – Iran's desire to have nuclear weapons. How to achieve this after nearly thirty years of mistrust, hard feelings, bad blood, conflicting interests and distorted messages between Iran and the U.S.? Easier said than done.

And still one has to try. The Sharm el-Sheikh summit offers a good opportunity. It is a good launching pad. The expected meeting between the U.S. Secretary of State and Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs shows that there is no alternative to talking.