The crisis over the British combatants taken into captivity by Iran, as well as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s almost obsessive commitment to make Iran a nuclear power, reflect a deep division and fierce power struggle within Iran's political and religious establishment.

True, Ahmadinejad's foreign policies – especially the desire to become a nuclear and military power – are shared by most of the country’s past and present leaders. Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons are anchored in its history; acquiring the bomb is an Old Iranian dream. The effort began under the Shah nearly forty years ago, with assistance from the United States, France and Germany. It was the Shah who prepared the scientific and technological infrastructure for the nuclear plan, which would probably have reached fruition had he remained in power. The old dream evolved into new aspirations after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, although it was interrupted by the eight-year war with Iraq. Interrupted, but not forgotten.

On this issue, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is no different from the Shah or his presidential predecessors Ali Khamenei, Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom the West regards as “moderates.” Rafsanjani said in 2001, “If one day the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now [i.e. nuclear weapons], then the imperialist strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.”

For Iranians, monarchists and ayatollahs alike, nuclear power means boosting national pride, enhancing Iran's scientific posture, making the nation a regional and global power, and above all securing the survival of Iran in 21st century terms as an Islamic Republic. If it was up to Ahmadinejad, Iran would never compromise its right to enrich uranium on its own soil. He perceives himself as a man of destiny who is leading his nation to the scientific and technological Promised Land.

Since he came to power almost two years ago, Ahmadinejad has positioned himself as the vanguard of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and has consistently used inflammatory rhetoric – hoping to see Israel wiped from the face of the earth and denying the Holocaust – which causes concern around the world. But, luckily for global stability, he is not in charge of the nuclear program. The man who calls the shots, the one who holds ultimate authority, is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

Yet the fact that Ali Khamenei allows Ahmadinejad to speak his mind is significant. On the surface, there are several explanations for this license. One is that Khamenei doesn't care, because ultimately he has the final word. Two, what the president has been saying is to the Supreme Leader's liking, because he, too, believes that Iran should take a tough negotiating stance on the nuclear issue. The third is that Khamenei doesn't have enough power to restrain Ahmadinejad, or that reining him in would come at the price of other political concessions that are more important to Khamenei than Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric.

Years of political experience, first as president and then as Khomeini’s successor, taught Khamenei not to be as irrational, messianic and single-minded as Ahmadinejad. One should not be disillusioned; like any other Iranian leader, Khamenei wants Iran to have nuclear technology for civilian purposes and probably for a bomb too. The difference is that while Ahmadinejad is ready to pay any price, including military confrontation, Khamenei seems more cautious. If there is any chance of reaching a compromise that would avoid additional sanctions and an American/British/Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, the final decision to offer such compromise is in the hands of Khamenei. In other words, the prospect of crisis management to avoid a military confrontation which could turn into a global crisis is within the confines of Iran’s domestic politics.

Ahmadinejad, despite his fiery bravado and visible presence, only constitutes one side of Iranian politics. The other side is comprised of moderate conservatives and reformists, who stand against Ahmadinejad and his ultra-conservative ideological allies. Even though currently Ayatollah Khamenei seems to be granting the higher platform to Ahmadinejad and his allies, he would never allow the moderate and reformist side of Iranian politics to disappear. The Supreme Leader is a master at balancing political forces. To him, the Islamic republic is a bird which needs two wings to fly.

If and when Ahmadinejad’s actions and politics start to become counterproductive, Ayatollah Khamenei will shift power away from him. It seems that we may be getting closer to that time.