Secondly, what is moderate Islamism? Is Saudi Islamism moderate as is usually claimed? If so, is this a function of Saudi domestic arrangements and Wahhabism, or because of Saudi foreign policy that does not challenge the order of things in the world? If the former, how can Saudi Arabia be considered moderate? It would be a good thing to assess a political phenomenon on its own merits and not peg it always to its rapport or its beneficial relations with America or American policies.

Yes, the religiosity of its people is much more visible in Turkey these days, but their political choices are determined by very secular, mundane concerns such as the economy, rate of inflation, prospects of a better life. The outcome of Turkey's July 22 elections was a victory of hope over fear, of civilian power over military tutelage, and of openness over introversion. It was also an almost predictable reaction to the army meddling that has featured prominently in the country's modern history. The voters' strong support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was more than anything else a democratic slap down of the military after an ominous warning about the Islamization of Turkish politics appeared on the General Staff's website on April 27. The Turkish electorate showed itself true to its tradition of supporting whatever party was most opposed by the military. That reaction followed more overt military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980. This time, a website posting was enough to trigger it -- evidence of the democratic maturity of the Turkish electorate.

What these elections were not about was the choice between an Islamist Turkey and a secular modern one, as suggested by the tired metaphor foreign observers always trot out of one veiled woman and another in a bikini. Turkey has emphatically not backtracked to "the road not taken" and given up on its quest for modernization. But it has struck out on a very different modernization track, one embedded in a cultural conservatism that seeks an appropriate synthesis between Islam, capitalism and liberal democracy.

The vote revealed the AKP as the only party whose support is not confined to a specific region or social class; it even fared well in many predominantly Kurdish provinces in southeastern Turkey. The founding party of the Republic, the sclerotic Republican People's Party (CHP), got essentially nowhere by allying itself with the military to wage a campaign based on fear that Turkish secularism was at risk. The voters refused to support the CHP's project of maintaining a status quo that privileged non-elected officials over elected representatives and fostered xenophobia.

To be sure, that xenophobic vote didn't fade away. Enough voters migrated to the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) to put it over the 10% threshold it missed last time and into parliament, with 14% of the vote.

So the so-called moderation in Turkey's politics is a function of the country's level of development, the existence of independent societal actors, an entrepreneurial class, a history of democratic politics however incomplete or illiberal it may have been -- and yes, secularization of public life not unlike the way Weber described it for Calvinist societies. And Turkey's Islamists have operated in this unfolding environment for over 35 years, joining the government for the first time in 1974 and serving as legitimate actors in Turkey's restricted political system, ousted from power once by the military just like their center-right counterparts on three earlier occasions.

Turkey is the unique example of a secular, democratic, capitalist Muslim country with institutional ties to and an alliance framework with the West. Its Islamists have continued and accelerated the process of European integration. If there is anything to fear about the country's orientation it would come from Turkey's Western partners. The European Union has members that are demolishing the credibility of the Union by trying to renege on their commitment to negotiate in good faith with Turkey. Suddenly Turkey's non-Europeaness, its "cultural" (read religious) differences, are remembered and are cause for denying the country membership even if it fulfills all the objective criteria. No wonder then that Turks from all walks of life feel betrayed, cheated by Europe and no longer able to believe in its liberal principles or its commitment to the set rules of the game. The net result of this is a weakening on the part of Turks of their commitment to make their country a bona fide liberal democracy. Should that trend be fortified, Islamism of any kind mild or radical would not be the only outcome to fear. More alarmingly a fierce anti-Western, xenophobic nationalism could emerge.

In its turn the United States would not take any steps against the PKK, which it deems a terrorist organization in northern Iraq, for fear of alienating Iraqi Kurds. Rightly or wrongly the Turks feel betrayed by their main ally, believe that it has failed to live up to its own principles and deserted Turkey in the fight against Turkey's terrorism problem. No wonder then that the United States' popularity is lowest in Turkey (according to a recent Pew survey).

My final point, in fact my suggestion, is to start looking at Muslim countries and their politics with the tools of political analysis and stop reducing these politics to the politics of faith alone.