Musharraf's main fault seems to have been his failure to develop a coherent, long-term plan for economic and political development that can -- and should -- pave the way for growing secularization of Pakistan with help from the United States. His country's position in the frontline of the war against terrorism has ensured an almost limitless amount of aid needed for this course of action, and yet he blew this chance. Instead of mapping out a comprehensive nation-building program based on popular aspiration for development and against poverty, he has allowed hubris to take over his leadership.

It has been observed in several countries that a military-based authoritarian system can sometimes be effective in pursuing modernization (consider the examples of Turkey, South Korea, even Japan at one phase of its recent history). But it is never capable of providing regime stability ad infinitum.

When Musharraf goes, he will most probably be followed by another general who will depend on the same instruments of power -- military intelligence, in this case -- to maintain his government. And like all of his predecessors, this general will most likely go on ignoring the burning needs for modernization under the excuse of protecting "the idea of Pakistan" and maintaining a grip on neighboring Afghanistan.

But no military dictator survives without outgrowing his barracks vision. As for the question of democracy, it is doubtful how much of Pakistan's civilian populace really craves a civilian government. Can a self-sustaining civil society develop in a country hobbled by religious zealotry and socio-economic feudalism?

One of Musharraf's most grievous mistakes has been his inability to build a secular movement strong enough to offset the entrenched power of the civilian opposition as well as that of the military establishment. Picking a fight with the alienated judiciary in the absence of his own civilian power base -- a strong civil service, media and business community sympathetic to the worldviews of top leadership -- amounted to an open invitation to anti-government agitations.

The question the opinion leaders in Pakistan should ask is this: should they allow the revolving-door kind of military governments to continue or should they give Musharraf a chance to create a base for achieving a measure of political and economic development that his successors can continue? It's a question only the enlightened segment of Pakistan's population can answer.