I am not sure this question has been worded correctly, though I do understand that that is entirely intentional. The implication here is that the problems Musharraf has today are mostly because he has been such a "stalwart" ally of the U.S. It would then follow that if he moderated, or nuanced his pro-U.S. policy, or even made a complete turnaround --which is not so impossible -- things would change for him. The protesting mobs would disappear and the current mood of anger and revulsion that cuts such a wide swathe in Pakistani society, from the Islamist clergy to Karachi's corporate aristocracy and Lahore's intellectual left chic, would return to appreciation of Musharraf's honeymoon years.
This, I am afraid, takes too simplistic a view of Musharraf's problems. It is also unfair to the people of Pakistan because it ignores the fact that after celebrating the departure of what they saw as corrupt, inefficient politicians, they are now driven by a genuine democratic impulse. Even if you took a more cynical view, you could argue that it is driven more by nostalgia and a yearning for change than any ideological democratic awakening. But it would be unfair to ascribe the current anger only to the fact that Musharraf's pro-Americanism clashes with the current anti-American mood in the Islamic world, particularly in Pakistan.
A pro-American policy was a given the moment Musharraf chose which direction he would take after 9/11. To be fair to him, he did not have more than two choices: either to be with Washington or against it. Given Pakistan's geography and history with the Taliban and the earlier, "noble" Afghan jihad, he had no flexibility. It would be unfair to suggest that another Pakistani leader could have made a different choice. The other likely incumbents at that point, Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto, would have been forced to make the same choice as well. Musharraf was only more decisive in doing so. And initially he and his country enjoyed the benefits that flowed from this, in terms of economic growth as well as international respect. But he then grew arrogant, preening and glowing with Washington's praise and attention. This is where he showed a complete ignorance of the basic principles of governance and of the need to reach out to his people.
Musharraf's problems are mostly because of his lack of understanding -- as well as respect -- for either the principles or institutions of democracy. This is reflected in the way he arm-twisted his political class, by exiling some and beating others into "king's party" type of alliances while fixing a no-contest election for himself. He subverted his constitution and then promulgated one so arbitrary that he enacted amendments to it while announcing it at a press conference. He set up a rootless, pointless parliament and then went after his judiciary, after just one adverse verdict. This after his judiciary has been so wonderfully compliant for so long.
Musharraf is paying for lacking the intellect to understand a fundamental contradiction of Pakistan's society. On the one hand, its democratic impulse is still weak. It has very little patience for the mess, the clumsiness, corruption and chaos of day-to-day democratic politics, particularly as it is practiced on the subcontinent. But on the other hand it is not entirely devoid of a democratic yearning. A clever Pakistani dictator would need to understand this and then steer his politics accordingly. Unfortunately, or rather fortunately, dictators as a class -- even when smart -- are far too arrogant to figure this.
People on the subcontinent tend to show impatience for their elected governments. For example, it is common for the older generation even in India to sometimes talk fondly of the days of the Raj, when the government was "so much better" and when there was "so little corruption" or when there was "so much respect for authority." Even when Indira Gandhi imposed the emergency in 1975, many Indians had welcomed it for months as it caused the trains to run on time and strikes were banned. But soon enough people realized the price they were paying in terms of democratic freedoms for that "era of discipline" as Ms. Gandhi's propaganda machine called it. Because Ms. Gandhi was essentially a democratic leader, she could soon see that the use-by date on her dictatorship was over, and held a fresh election within 19 months, and while she lost, it enabled her to return to power in less than three years and to also perpetuate her dynasty.
This is too complicated for a military dictator like Musharraf to understand. So he thought that the initial Pakistani welcome for the return of military discipline and focus would last forever. He did not know when to cut his losses. He also failed to see the second contradiction: that despite having been under military dictatorship for more than three decades, Pakistan has been as imperfect a dictatorial system as India has been an imperfect democracy. The people of Pakistan have not been totally denied democratic freedoms as the case would have been in any classical military dictatorship, just as the people of India are not always able to enjoy all the freedoms their constitutional democracy promises them. As a consequence, even under dictators tougher than Musharraf, like Zia, Pakistan has had a bull-dog media and a judiciary which, though often helpful, has never been a total pushover. A judge, for example, even dissented when Bhutto was hanged.
If Musharraf was as smart as he sounds, and as he thinks he is, he should have known where to draw the line. Even more important, he should have known that his long-term survival lay in morphing into a politician, and then, hopefully, into a statesman. That would have implied shedding the uniform, facing a fair election, which he would have won at least until a couple of years ago. But true to his type, he did not see that wisdom while he still had time. Today, it may have just run out, irrespective of what policy he now follows towards the U.S.
If you look back on the history of Pakistan, there are only two ways a dictator goes: fight an unsuccessful war with India and leave in disgrace, or be jailed or killed by his successor. Musharraf was given an opportunity to defy that script by 9/11. He has blown it. A different, better future may still lie for him if he were now to retreat now from the path he has chosen. There isn't very much in his track record so far to indicate that he would.
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