The fuindamental problem is that while the UN has recognised the importance eliminating the Hezbollah's armed military presence in southern Lebanon, it has no real way of enforcing that objective. Getting the UNSC to endorse the goal of disarming the Hezbollah might remain elusive despite the plans to get the world body to address the question.

There is no stomach among the major powers to undertake the responsibility for disarming the Hezbollah. The Europeans, for all their talk of the centrality of the UN, appear reluctant to either contribute troops or put their political capital on line.

The U.S. which is the only power capable of bringing force to bear upon the situation is preoccupied in Iraq. And being seen as completely pro-Israel--and rightly so-- the U.S. is not in a position to inject itself as a credible neutral force.

In other words the big picture is not conducive to long-term stability in Lebanon.

Second, like all resolutions in a committee, the UNSC resolution no 1701 is a compromise and has many formulations which can be interpreted differently by different sides.

That will form the basis for the perceived "violation" of the resolution by one side or both and the eventual undermining of the basis on which the international community plans to move into Lebanon.

For example, the resolution bars Israel only from conducting "offensive operation" and asks Hezbollah to stop "all attacks" against Israel. Jerusalem, has naturally interpreted this as having the space to undertake "defensive" operations and Hezbollah too would insist that it has the right to pursue "legitimate resistance" against Israel. As a consequence, violations of the ceasefire are absolutely inevitable.

Third, there is no real mechanism to enforce the many restrictions that 1701 boldly proclaims. For example the UN hopes the Lebanese Army will secure its borders with Syria in order to prevent arms supplies to Hezbollah. But the reality is the Lebanese army is too weak, militarily and politically to achieve this objective.

Four, while the next resolution might go some distance towards devising robust rules of engagement for the UN force and calling it assist in preventing entry of unauthorised arms for Hezbollah, it brings us back to the same political question. Is there a political will to take on the Hezbollah and its friends?

While the rules of engagement might be too tough for some, for others it might look like inserting a force without enough freedom to operate. The best one can expect is more drift and a renewed crisis in not so distant future.