History will never forget the Hamas of the 1990s, which carried out a popular war against Israel and rightfully earned the minds and hearts of millions. The images coming out of Gaza today, however, will remain imprinted in the minds of Arabs for long -- longer perhaps, than those of Hamas’s performance during the Intifada. When one’s land is occupied, it is natural for him to fight for freedom. The opposite is what is wrong. It was the duty of Hamas to do so since the 1980s, regardless if the world agreed with its tactics or not. The abnormal -- and unforgettable or forgivable -- is to engage in civil war while under occupation and abandon all the utopian rhetoric of the 1990s and early 2000s.

I can accept this mistake from Fatah, which has been corrupted for many years and long deviated from its principles of liberation in favor of sleazy politics and power. Fatah was finished the minute Yasser Arafat died in November 2004. Hamas is more to blame for what is happening in Palestine today. This is the same Hamas that was once described as selfless and interested not in power but in liberation. Former Israeli Knesset member Azmi Bishara described the situation saying that Fatah and Hamas were like two prisoners fighting to control the prison cell in which they are locked up -- forgetting that at the end of the day, both of them are nothing but prisoners. I simply cannot sympathize with any of the warring groups despite my former admiration for Hamas and respect for the legacy of Fatah.

To be fair to Hamas, however, we must acknowledge two realities. One is that they were voted into power through truly democratic elections and were the overwhelming choice of the Palestinians. Why? Not because they promised liberation but because they were Islamists who vowed to end corruption, promised better security, more jobs, along with administrative, social, and political reforms. They promised social justice based on an Islamic agenda. They have failed in every single one of those domains, leaving behind a starving, war-torn Palestine with a dislocated economy.

They are not to blame for that, since it was the international community, headed by the United States, that refused to give Hamas a chance in power. I wrote for this website last year saying that this was one of the biggest mistakes ever made by Israel and the Americans. When the Hamas leaders were voted into power, they were dying to be recognized as statesmen rather than guerilla warriors. They made several important gestures towards Israel and the Americans -- crying “Uncle” without actually saying it, but decision-makers in Washington, DC refused to listen. Hamas was on the verge of raising “an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun” -- not out of conviction, as Arafat had done in 1974, but rather, out of helplessness and desire to run a state. That would have been the only way to disarm Hamas.

The world has been debating this issue for some time. Clearly, the U.S. couldn’t do it and nor could the UN, Israel, or Arafat. The only way to prevent Hamas from being a state-within-a-state was to let Hamas become the state. By accepting the duties of power, and sharing responsibility and accountability before the international community, Hamas could not -- even if it wished -- continue its military war against Israel. They would have to make a choice: either freedom fighters or statesmen. In 2006, Hamas was willing to chose the “statesmen” option. A Hamas in power, courted and respected by the international community, would be a Hamas that could not send bombs into Israel. A Palestinian liberation movement with no Hamas and no Arafat would become increasingly ineffective militarily, something frowned upon by the Arabs but much welcomed in the Western world. That is why I was very much opposed to bringing Hamas to power in 2006. A Hamas that is out of power, however, would resort to doing what it does best: waging war against Israel. Others would argue that any resistance movement that abandons resistance and enters the world of politics gets ruined and literaly falls from the rank of “untouchable.” This was the case with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. Who would have imagined Hezbollah being criticized in such a manner by different parties in Lebanon prior to their entry into the political system after the liberation of the South in 2000? Compare the standing of Hezbollah among different parties in 2000 to its standing today. The same applies to Hamas before 2006 and the Hamas of 2007.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice seemingly landed from another planet when she declared that she supports the “moderates” in Palestine, represented by Abu Mazen (also known as Mahmoud Abbas). What moderates? Doesn’t Rice realize that “moderation” is dead in the Arab World and that Gaza has “fallen” to the Islamists? Doesn’t she realize that the symbol of moderation, Abu Mazen, is completely irrelevant? When Hamas was willing to become moderate, the Americans literarily strangled it to death and turned it into the radical creature that controls Gaza today. Abu Mazen is fit to rule a country like Switzerland, but not Palestine. He doesn’t resemble his people. He doesn’t talk like them, think like them, or act like them. He disrespects the militants -- even those of Fatah in the 1980s -- and considers himself too refined to deal with them, preferring the company of European ambassadors and intellectual conversation over a good drink in an air-conditioned saloon. That is disrespectful to a nation where every family has lost a son in war with Israel.

Arafat was not like that. He looked like a resistance leader with his khaki uniform and kufiyya, spoke like one, and spent quality time with Palestinians from all walks of life. He was a humble man, a man of the people, which explains why he is so popular until the present, nearly three years after his passing. Abu Ammar never hesitated to visit the wounded in hospital, and at one point even kissed the foot of an injured child. Abu Mazen, clean shaven in a Western suit, is too civil for a country at war, and what he just did -- discharge the cabinet of Ismail Haniyeh -- should have happened ages ago. It must be noted that I do not only blame Haniyeh for the chaos in the Occupied Territories. Abbas is equally responsible and the best possible scenario is for both of them to leave office and make room for new, untested politicians to come to power. Haniyya and Abbas must go.

The new Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a respectable former minister of finance and World Bank official who spent over 20 years in the United States, is also not the solution to the problems of the Palestinians. His choice of ministers is promising, including Justice Minister Riyad al-Malki, Agriculture Minister Ziad Bandak and Education & Culture Minister Lamis al-Alamy, who studied at AUB and is former director of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights. But once again, bringing these people to power, while it might look good on U.S. television talk shows, will not make Hamas go away. On the contrary, it will bring Hamas into the underground and make it more radical, both against Israel, and the Fatah-led government. Hamas is a popular reality that Mahmoud Abbas must deal with in a mature manner. Confronting it in such a way is counter-productive; it shows immaturity, to say the least. Napoleon once said: “I have tasted command. I like it and will never give it up.” That is how the leaders of Hamas are thinking today and it is expected. Any political party that does not aim at reaching power is a mediocre one. Had somebody tried challenging Fatah when they came to power after the Oslo Accords of 1993, then Arafat and Fatah would have done the same. They would have fought to stay in power.

I am friends with Palestinians from all walks of life; Hamas, Fateh, the PFLP, and the DFLP. I am a declared supporter of former President Yasser Arafat and I have interviewed several of his officials, as well as those of Hamas, including its political chief, Khaled Meshal. So many of the traditional supporters of Fatah abandoned the party during the elections of 2006 and voted for Hamas. These same supporters of Hamas have now abandoned the Islamic movement and are searching for alternatives -- which sadly do not exist in Palestine. The occupation, internal bickering, and Arafat’s towering personality all hollowed out the Palestinian movement. Arafat’s chief commanders Abu Jihad, Abu Iyad, and Abu Hasan Salameh have all been killed by Israel. Others like Wadih Haddad were also liquidated while an older generation of Palestinian leaders like George Habash, Ahmad Jibril, Nayef Hawatmeh, and Farouk al-Qaddumi are aged and ailing, in retirement or near retirement age.

Arafat himself was killed -- I insist on the word killed -- by somebody who did not want him to continue leading the Palestinians. This was the biggest curse to hit the Palestinians since the wars of 1948 and 1967. Ahmad Yassin, a moderate voice in Hamas, was silenced with an Israeli missile in 2004 and so was his successor Abdul-Aziz al-Rantisi. Potential leaders like Marwan al-Barghouti languish in an Israeli jail. When compared to any of these figures, Abbas, Haniyya, and even Salam Fayyad come across as colorless figures. That is the situation within the Palestinian Territories. They lack inspiring, able, and wise figures who can offer good leadership and a walk the delicate balance between being a freedom fighter and being a statesman.

They need another Yasser Arafat; another Abu Ammar. If he does not exist, then they must create him. When Arafat wanted calm in the Occupied Territories in 1999, to prove his goodwill to incoming Prime Minister Ehud Barak, the Hamas-led violence stopped automatically -- almost by remote control -- and not a single incident was recorded in the West Bank and Gaza. When Arafat wanted confrontation, we got the second Intifada in 2000. Until we get that kind of leader, who can impose his will on everybody and everything, the circus will continue in Palestine and produce more Mahmoud Abbasses, and more Ismail Haniyehs.