We can only assess the Annapolis meeting results on the basis of two elements: the words spoken, and the diplomatic procedures set in motion. On both counts, I find the gathering disappointing, though the real test is yet to come. So we should not be too hasty in pronouncing this process a success or failure. There is a very small chance that both sides will make bold compromises in the negotiations to come. The Arab world may yet actively push its 2002 peace plan with Israel. Europe and Russia might weigh in with equal force; the U.S. might finally act as a fair and decisive mediator; Arab and Israeli civil societies might yet play a dynamic and constructive role in pushing their leaders to make the fair and lasting peace that the majorities of both people clearly want and would support.
But the chances of success remain slim, because Annapolis’s words and procedures were unimpressive. That’s mainly because they expect weak and vulnerable leaders in all three principal countries to move ahead by rehashing what’s already failed.
The words spoken at Annapolis are important because they reflect political positions and actions on the ground. Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas reiterated known, entrenched positions and offered nothing new in their texts; that suggested a minimal will to compromise.
The joint understanding between the parties and President Bush’s speech are more significant. The joint statement is problematic because it does not specifically refer to U.N. resolutions as the starting point to resolve the conflict. It also makes the U.S. the judge of both sides’ compliance with the ‘roadmap’ requirements. But the U.S. has played this role before, and failed – though it remains unclear if its past failure was due to pro-Israeli bias, structural diplomatic incompetence, or weak resolve. The U.S. has not proved itself to be either an impartial or persistent mediator in the Middle East (unlike in Northern Ireland, where it gave a stellar performance). Bush’s letter to Ariel Sharon in 2005 supporting Israel’s views on borders, settlements, and refugees disqualifies America as an impartial arbiter.
This is a dangerous attempt to substitute American will for U.N. resolutions and international law as the basis for a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Bush’s references to Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people also brings the U.S. down on the Israeli side of the dispute about whether Israel is a Jewish nation or the state of all its people, including one-fifth of its citizens who are non-Jewish Christian and Muslim Arabs, and Druze.
Making the 2003 ‘roadmap’ a centerpiece of the diplomatic path ahead is unimpressive. The roadmap, and its supervising Quartet (the U.S., E.U., U.N., Russia), have proven to be hollow and unrealistic. It’s amateur diplomacy at best to promise again to implement practical moves on the ground that have been repeatedly ignored after many previous promises by the same parties. The roadmap in any case is not a balanced and clear document, and probably failed to be implemented for precisely for that reason, along with incompetent supervision by the U.S.- and Israeli-dominated Quartet (for example, the Quartet followed Israel’s lead on boycotting Hamas after its election victory in 2006). If the Quartet was a failure, the U.S. alone in a supervisory position will almost certainly prove to be worse, especially during an American presidential election year when slightly hysterical pro-Israeli expressions are the prevailing order of the day.
The commitment to negotiate tirelessly and try to achieve a full peace accord within a year is valiant, but slightly romantic in view of the huge differences on key issues (refugees, settlements, Jerusalem) that have to be negotiated. Opposition at home for the Israeli and Palestinian leaders will constrain their negotiating positions even further, especially in Palestine where the elected Hamas government is outside this process. This looks like the 2000 Camp David II negotiations all over again, when a time-pressed American president rushed Arabs and Israelis into a negotiation they were not prepared for and were not politically able to deliver on.
Success is possible, and would require mutually reassuring speedy and bold moves by Israelis and Palestinians, combined with decisive American mediation, and strong Arab and European support. I believe a negotiated, comprehensive peace is possible, but the conditions today do not augur well for its happening soon. The words and diplomatic procedures that emanated from Annapolis only reinforce my sense of skepticism and concern for the period ahead.
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