The report says, for example, that “Cuba did not attempt to track, block, or seize terrorist assets, although the authority to do so is contained in Cuba’s Law 93 against acts of terrorism, as well as Instruction 19 of the Superintendent of the Cuban Central Bank.”

But any decent lawyer would respond to that by asking “what assets?” There is no evidence at all that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has any assets in Cuba. And so, there is nothing to seize. The only thing the statement makes clear is that Cuba does have laws on the books against acts of terrorism. How, one might ask, does that square with the report’s assertion that it is a terrorist state?

The report also claims that Cuba provides safe haven to members of the Spanish ETA, and the Colombian FARC and ELN. “Safe haven” may not be the right term, for all are there with the full knowledge, and approval, of the Spanish and Colombian governments. Neither government is trying to bring about their return. And no evidence is presented to suggest that any of the ETA or FARC and ELN members in Cuba are engaged in terrorist activities of any kind. On the contrary, the ELN has recently been involved in talks with the Colombian government, which has expressed gratitude to the Cuban government for the role it has played in encouraging these and earlier talks. In short, there is nothing about the presence of ETA, ELN and FARC members in Cuba that in any way suggests that Cuba is a terrorist state.

The report repeats its annual complaint that Cuba permits American fugitives to live in Cuba and is not responsive to U.S. extradition requests.

True, there are American fugitives in Cuba. Most are hijackers who came in the 1970s and have lived in Cuba since then. There are a few others, probably 7 or 8, wanted for crimes committed in the U.S. It is also true that Cuba has not responded positively to U.S. extradition requests. But two things must be noted about that. First, for all practical purposes, the 1904 extradition treaty is simply no longer operative because the U.S. has not honored a single Cuban request for extradition since 1959. Second, most of the “crimes” committed in the U.S. were of a political nature, and Article VI of the old 1904 treaty excludes the extradition of those whose crimes were of a “political character.”

Further, as Robert Muse, an international lawyer, noted in a report in 2004, none of the U.S. fugitives in Cuba provides a basis for declaring Cuba to be a “state sponsor of terrorism.” Legal authority to make such a designation is found in Section 6(j) of the 1979 Export Administration Act, which says it must be demonstrated that the fugitives have committed “terrorist” acts and that those acts were “international” in character. Muse states that he has been unable to identify a single U.S. fugitive in Cuba who meets those twofold criteria. Thus, they are completely extraneous to the definition of Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

The report, in something of an aside, says Cuba has asked for the return of Luis Posada Carriles, the arch-terrorist charged with the bombing of a Cubana airliner back in 1976 with the loss of 73 lives and for other terrorist acts in Cuba. In fact, it is not Cuba asking for his return; rather, Venezuela has requested his extradition. The U.S., without legal grounds, has not even acknowledged the request.

It is strange that the State Department raises the case of Posada Carriles, for his case simply points up the glaring double standard the U.S. has toward the whole issue of terrorism. Clearly, he has received preferential treatment in the U.S. Rather than being charged for acts of terrorism, he was arrested first for “illegal entry” and is now being held under house arrest for making “false statements.” Perhaps the government does not wish to charge him for his real crimes because a U.S. government role, such as CIA sponsorship for his activities, might come to light. Clearly, the targeting of Cuba as a “state sponsor of terror” is full of contradictions – and raises questions about the political motivations behind such U.S. policies.

Wayne S. Smith is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C. and an Adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.