First, the deliberate destruction of a satellite in a highly used orbit - creating mass quantities of space debris that will remain a global danger for decades - has quite rightly been greeted with U.S. and international opprobrium. Protests should be forthcoming from all responsible space-faring nations, and the action deplored by all at the upcoming February meeting of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Space (COPUOS). Even if China broke no laws, the destructive ASAT test violated at least the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which pledges nations not to interfere with the space operations of others and to consult when national action might lead to such interference. China neither notified others nor has it yet conceded to calls for consultations; behavior that is simply unacceptable, particularly in peacetime.

It has also raised serious questions about Beijing's credibility as a responsible space-faring nation - tarnishing a reputation that the Chinese leadership has been steadily building among the international space community. How that plays out in other nation's willingness to continue civil and commercial space cooperation with Beijing remains to be seen. While isolating China for one negative act, even if it was spectacularly negative, is probably not useful, some thought must be given to how to drive home to Beijing the magnitude of its error.

Second, what should be the U.S. response? The vulnerability of U.S. satellites has been starkly highlighted and the need to seriously address those vulnerabilities must now be recognized by policy-makers and the U.S. Congress. Top priority should be placed on improving space-situational awareness (the ability to 'see' and understand what is going on in space), ensuring that satellite systems have passive protections to the extent feasible, and building redundant capabilities - both in space and in other mediums - to guarantee back-up in case of loss. While the U.S. Air Force has long been advocating such activities, investment has not been adequate. This disconnect must be remedied.

That said, it would be a major mistake for the United States to conclude that an all-out drive for an arsenal of offensive counter-space weapons -- including similarly destructive ASATs -- is in order. As most space experts recognize, ASATs cannot protect U.S. space assets, since there are myriad terrestrially-based ways to threaten space systems including satellites. It is further highly unclear that ASATs would serve to deter potential adversaries from seeking to target U.S. space assets, as most other nations are not as dependent on space. The question of what, if any, 'hard power' response to the Chinese provocation is prudent rests, in part, on determining exactly what was Beijing's motivation for doing what it did when it did it. And that is not currently possible, given the historic lack of engagement with China on space-related issues. Indeed, the long-standing refusal of the United States to enter into any discussions regarding military space issues now must be seen as a strategic error. The time has come for a change in U.S. approach, and for responsible space-faring nations to come together to define acceptable 'rules of the road' in space, as well as to deter and/or punish unacceptable behaviors.

Theresa Hitchens is the Director of the World Security Institute's Center for Defense Information, and the author of "Future Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Course." Special thanks to Omar Aslam.