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Sanctions Won't Stop North Korea's Nukes

Stephan Haggard - Over the last two years the Bush administration has had surprising success putting together a sanctions regime against North Korea. But the country's threat to test a nuclear weapon could leave the U.S. worse off than ever: with a nuclear North Korea perfectly willing to pay the price of hunger and even famine. I'll tell you first why these sanctions are so efficient, and then why they're also ineffective.

First, how did the U.S., which trades hardly at all with North Korea, gain such influence over Pyongyang's international economic relations? Using provisions of the Patriot Act, the Bush administration issued a warning in 2005 that a small Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, was involved in money-laundering activities. Facing a run on the bank, the Chinese authorities moved swiftly to take it over and close out the North Korean accounts. Some of these were almost certainly funds used by North Korea's military and political leadership. Financial institutions, even small ones, learned that they did business with North Korea at their own risk.

The executive order of 2005, "Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters," issued a similar warning shot to financial institutions. The U.S. subsequently interpreted "supporters" liberally to include those doing business with firms suspected of WMD activities, even if the trade in question was not WMD-related.

Japan has moved toward a hard sanctions approach. Europe stands on the sidelines waiting for the dust to clear. So China and South Korea have become Pyongyang's economic lifelines. North Korea is more dependent on them than ever before.

But in the wake of the July 4 missile launch, China surprised observers by accepting a strong Security Council resolution that called for sanctions against proliferation activities. The biggest surprise then came from South Korea, which, prior to the missile launch, warned that it would discontinue humanitarian assistance if a missile went into the air. South Korean sanctions now loom large on the economic landscape of the peninsula. Some history explains why.

In the 1990s, the North Korean economy collapsed as the Russians traded decades of largesse for hard currency terms. Up to a million people died in one of the greatest famines of the 20th century. But grain production today remains below its 1990 level and food shortages have persisted. A bumper harvest last year, and food aid from South Korea and China, created the illusion of a return to normalcy. But recent floods show the ongoing vulnerability of the North Korean economy.

North Korea needs over 6 million tons of grain to feed its population -- and even that on minimal rations. One million tons of that demand is met by imports and aid, over 85 percent of which is supplied by China and South Korea. If Seoul sticks to its guns, food shortages will certainly recur.

While sanctions have hit the regime hard, they have also had the perverse effect of strengthening those most opposed to a negotiated settlement. Sanctions will not achieve regime change. Kim Jong Il has demonstrated his ability to weather famine. In fact, sanctions will likely lead directly to the test, which will then scuttle the Six Party Talks for the remainder of the Bush administration, and lead directly to a new humanitarian crisis.

It is probably too late for the U.S. to make a face-saving gesture. But we must learn two lessons from the North Korean case. First, sanctions do not necessarily work against authoritarian regimes willing to allow massive human suffering. And second, ambiguous signals about the willingness to negotiate are unlikely to produce the type of settlement America needs.

Professor Haggard's research interests center on the international relations and comparative political economy of East Asia. Some of his books include Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (1990); The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis (2000). His current research has focused on North Korea (Famine in North Korea: Aid, Markets and Reform, with Marcus Noland forthcoming 2006). He recently received a grant to conduct research on China-North Korea relations. He is also completing a book with Robert Kaufman on social policy in East Asia, Latin America and Central Europe.

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Woody Martin:

What all this talking about North Korea's nuclear test boils down to is nothing can be done about it. We do not know what kind of secret string pulling goes on between China, Russia and the US. It seems inevitable that in the long run, that is over the next few decades we will have many more nuclear powers emerging. A credible global non-nuclear policy would involve a progressive and verifiable disarming of all nuclear powers. That is clearly not in the cards until we have had a major nuclear war! And even then, as shown by the example of nerve gas and other chemical weapons banned after its disastrous use in World War I many countries -unfortunately among them also the US- still hold huge stockpiles of these. Today's biggest nuclear war threat is not North Korea but Pakistan, a country that is politically unstable and in a state of low-grade warfare with nuclear neigbour India and a shaky pact with China. What do about it. Economic development to diffuse tensions is the only way forward.

toshiro:

N.Korea having nukes is more threatening to Japan or even China than S.Korea. It is a long way off from being a threat to the U.S. Since there is historical animosity between the Koreans and Japan, it puts Japan in the worst spot, especially since N. Korean missles could easily and accurately reach Japan.

A S.Korean Sec Gen of the U.N. would probably only make this worse. If you read S.Korean op ed pieces, they're in full appeasement/apologetic mode for Kim Jong Il. Even after he launched the July 4 missle, many excuses were being made by S.Korean papers on his behalf. The reason is that S.Koreans are in the throes of their ultimate dream -- a united Korea. They totally believe that Jong Il will never hurt them. The rationale is that if he were truly a madman and did want to "take" S.Korea, he has the force and would have done it some time ago, so Jong Il with nukes changes nothing to S.Korea's position.

The assumption of a S.Korean Sec Gen makes Japan's position worse. The apologetic politics towards Jong Il would gain increased legitimacy in the world.
This is a lot worse for Japan in the long run, since it has little ability to threaten a counterstrike against Jong Il. Japan could be challenged or have demands made of it, with nukes being used to back the extortion. This would put the U.S. in a bad position.

This has little to do with Pres. Clinton, Bush or the United States itself. It's simply the local politics of a dictator manipulating world politics for his own gain.

From where I sit, there's nothing that can be done about this. It will play out this way and some time down the line we will have to make some very tough choices.

Zathras:

I disagree with Steve Clemons to the extent that I suspect the Pyongyang regime's tolerance for political isolation is less than it used to be in the years when it could rely on quiet support from China no matter what the West did. Sanctions in response to North Korean conduct represent a point of agreement between Washington and Beijing, and an increased level of isolation for the North. Productive negotiations will depend on that isolation being maintained.

This doesn't mean America has no changes to make in its policy -- or, more precisely, that the administration doesn't need to decide on the policy it wants to pursue. However, while I doubt that the appointment of a South Korean Secretary General will have quite the impact inside the North that Steve thinks possible, it would certainly have an impact on American diplomacy in this part of the world. Accordingly such changes in America's approach to the North Korean problem as may need to be made should wait until after we know whether Ban is to replace Annan, and (if he is) after he has had a chance to settle in.

terrance savitsky:

i had to read professor's haggard's credentials a few times to convince myself he actually possesses expertise on north korea's political culture. it is certainly true that n. korea is trying to get the attention of the u.s. with ever more flamboyantly irresponsible actions. what is less clear are the underlying political dynamics in n. korea that continue to propel that government to move from agreement to conflict. remember, n. korea chose to unilaterally violate an agreement negotiated by the clinton administration. it's as if there's an inexorbable force pushing kim jong il to ever greater levels of provocation in the hope to gain proportionate rewards. possibly the key point to understand, however, is that this 'dance' of agreement-escalation of conflict - agreement may continue like a ponzi scheme until mr. kim is removed by his own military. all to say, professor haggard's article reveals nothing about the root causes of n. korea's behavior - which is the real engine behind this conflict, rather than u.s. mis-steps. to understand the root causes that eminate from n. korea, it is helpful to address the following questions:

1. given that the only group that can muster power to remove mr. kim are the military, what is his relationship with the military?

2. on a related note, how does mr. kim maintain credibility inside the n. korean political establishment?

3. to what extent are there policy factions outside the control of mr. kim and does he compromise his actions in their directions?

4. how does mr. kim enforce loyalty?

5. how does mr. kim reward loyalty? e.g. i've heard from time-to-time that n. korea is the largest consumer of chivas regal scotch because it's used as something of a reward currency.

RiceForNK:

Rice for North Korea: I think the United States should send Rice over there to all those starving people. Keep her there, rather than have her give birth to a new middle east.

toshiro:

I really don't see how this is a problem for the U.S. to solve.

We should engage in normal diplomacy, no more, no less and see how things pan out.

The local countries have more at stake than we do.

Carl Senna:

Nuclear bomb making, despite the wishes of the Bush administration, is no secret restricted to a handful of countries on the U.N. Security Council. Any country with a chemical and oil refinery production operation can manufacture a crude nuclear weapon within months, should it choose to do so. Since the nuclear Socerer's Apprentices have learned the Wizard's magic, the need for peace and security is to get them to learn to control the magic. Threats and sanctions, in effect, shut the stable doors after the horses have fled. We need to get the Wizards and Apprentices to work together, not work behind one another's backs as adversaries. That will mean cooperation, dialogue, and negotiation to provide international controls on nuclear weapons. Attempts to restrict nuclear weapons technology to the declared nuclear powers will only encourage the kinds of self-fulfilling threats of military confrontation over a proliferation that has already occurred. Presently, the main proliferator of nuclear weapons around the world is the belligerent foreign policy of the Bush administration, through threats of unilateral pre-emptive military action against what Bush perceives to be international threats to U.S. geopolitical and economic interests. Since Iran and North Korea already have nuclear weapons technology, as well as crude defensive nuclear weapons to deter U.S. aggression, any calls upon them to unilaterally abandon their defense is an unreasonalble demand, which no one in the right mind would accept. Any country feeling that it would be vulnerable to an American invasion similar to the baseless one conducted in Iraq, with thousands of innocent civilians killed unnecessarily, the social infrastructure in ruins, and governed by an inept U.S. installed puppet would have no political choice other than to defy calls to disarm itself against a potential U.S. led attack. One day, should the next several American presidents follow the present Bush foreign policy, which increasingly promotes world hostility to the U.S., then the U.S. might well find itself confronted with the same choice as an Iran or North Korea. I, for one, hope then that our president will defy the call to disarm.

occasion:

What is the solution?

R&G:

game over for Kim Jong II. the world needs to end his craziness

Yousuf Hashmi:

Your analysis definately very correct except one point. You have started the article with the US tough sanctions which are working. Please recall how much times US and western allies have imposed sanctions against how many countries. the end result is that the countries under the sanctions not broken and bent down but instead became more stronger.

I have visited North Korea long tme back.where the people are not even aware if their is any other world with another way of life there you can not expect any fruitful results by sanctions creating the food shortages or non avilability of life saving drugs.

the only successful policy US had is with the china. when the policy was implemented china was in same condition as of todays north korea. at one side cultural revolution was going on and on another side missiles , neuclear devices and sattelites were tested. US policy brought china to a matured super power status in the world as well as tremendously improving the quality of life for ordinary persons

attacking north korea will be bigger disaster than attacking iraq or iran because north korea is just 100 km from japan. one of the biggest industrial power and faithful partner of US. bringing the war to the door step of japan will not serve US long term intrests in pacfic region

Brigitte Meier USA:

Why does Bush insist on sanctioning North Korea for alleged "money laundering/counterfeit currency" issues? For one thing, there is no proof of the truthfulness of the accusations. North Korea long understood that Bush's insistence on denuclearization is a ploy to make invasion less risky. That is the message of imposing the money laundering/counterfeiting sanctions. If North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons, Bush would have no cause for war; then the counterfeiting issue will conveniently be made into another irresoluble problem to justify invasion for regime change. It is unreasonable to expect concessions from North Korea. For them it is a question of existence. Instead, the U.S. should have accepted to resolve the counterfeiting issue first with due legal procedure or end the sanctions for lack of evidence. Too many decisions in the U.S. foreign policy are based on assumptions, which at some point are postulated as facts. It makes it clear to any other nation that the U.S. intentions are corrupt.

Contrary to U.S. government propaganda, North Korea has no intentions to attack anyone or start another Korean war. What it really intends is to develop its economy with international trade so as to improve life for its people, increase its international presence, along the lines taken by China, so as not to lose face and to preserve its leaders. South Korea long understood that and makes efforts at reuniting north and south by engaging in joint projects and by extending food and fertilizer aid. So did China.

The real deadlock is not North Korea, but Bush's U.S. government and its goal of world energy and economic control. That is what underlies the rhetoric of the "axis of evil", in analogy to Reagan's "empire of evil" and the latter's intention to topple the Soviet Union by destabilization from within. Iran understood that very well. Hence Ahmadinejad's comment that the age of nuclear weapons is past, because efforts at destabilization of sovereign governments cannot be prevented with nuclear weapons.

Like Iran, North Korea wants to be treated with respect and acceptance for its sovereignty. And both want to develop their economies and establish trade relations with other countries.

Bush meanwhile lost his chances at World Empire; instead he will have to admit defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Taliban who is now invited to join the government will in turn take over that government and restore its regime. In Iraq, in the long run, the Sunnis will likely defeat the Shiites despite disparity of numbers and restore order by force in a new Sunni dominated regime.

Had the U.S. acted to expand trade with legal and reciprocal means, it would be welcomed now and would have increased its importance naturally. Instead, the world hates the U.S. and, rightfully so. Like the Soviet Union, the U.S. is on the verge of falling apart internally, from excessive corruption in its corporations and government. Extreme oil profits cannot substitute for genuine economic development. The loss of the Middle Class is parallel to the loss of genuine democratic institutions. Both are replaced with extreme security mechanisms. That is needed only because a small, excessively rich class has to protect its power against the majority of the people who have no say. It is an intrinsically unstable order, which is bound to collapse in time. Afghanistan, Iraq and the failed negotiations with North Korea and Iran, the failure of resolving the Palestinian problem are symptoms of failed U.S. government.

Eric Yap:

If you want to help them, get in their and remove the damn regime, these sanctions only make the people suffer, put them through another huge famine and you will achieve victory through the worst way imaginable.

If bush wants a "war on terror" and to bring freedom bring it to NK!

The cost will be terrible but its inevitable, its either we remove them or we continue this ridiculous act of purposely starving the innocent people.

Sherzad:

I think imposing sanctions on any country is effective, as we experienced in the past while it was imposed on India, Pakistan and Iraq and now it may be imposed by Iran as well and all those countries now have best relationship with US and other countries who were more keened on imposing sanction, one of them is Pakistan now it stands in position to challenge the world that if i don't help you in war on terror all the nation will fail in war on terror.

Donald Gregg:

My impression of the NK statement was how carefully it was was worded, and how free of bombast it was. It sounds as though NK is trying to establish its credentials as a responsible nuclear power. It may hope that this statement will put pressure on the US to start talking with them bilaterally. This will not work with the Bush administration, and the gulf of suspicion and mutual hostility will only widen. I still believe that NK would rather talk seriously with the US than to conduct
a nuclear test, but this latest move is another step away from dialogue toward greater estrangement.

Is there anything that could be done to stop a test from occuring? I think there is. If the Bush administration would appoint a senior policy director for North Korean issues, as Congress wants it to,
I believe that talks could be re-started. I fear that there is very little chance of this happening. I hope I am wrong, but I do not think I am.


Donald Gregg was a CIA official since 1951 and a liaison to President Carter's National Security Council and, National Security Advisor to Vice President George H.W. Bush and U.S. ambassador to South Korea from 1989 to 1993. He's now chairman of the board of the Korea Society.

Steve Clemons:

Steph Haggard has written an interesting piece.

My friendly critique would challenge this summary on two fronts. First of all, the US-North Korea standoff is hardly about sanctions at this point. What is missing in the encounter is a strategic roadmap or sense of an endgame to this conflict.

Is the US committed to undermining, sustaining in a limited way, or acquiescing to the North Korean regime? The Bush administration seems to be internally divided as to what the objectives of American policy are.

Sanctions as a device or tool are only effective if they help the US achieve an objective that enhances America's and its allies' interests.

Sanctions in a tit-for-tat situation without an understanding of the larger issues involved seems to trivialize the increasing threat and tendency towards brinksmanship by the N. Korean regime.

Secondly, Ban Ki Moon, South Korea's foreign minister, seems on the verge of ascending to the Secretary Generalship of the UN. This will cause a severe legitimacy crisis for North Korea -- and will possibly result in Moon being far more popular in North Korea than the Dear Leader, Kim Jong Il.

North Korea faces a crisis that has little to do with economic conditions -- but has to do with the loss of face that a South Korean leader is now arguably one of the key people running global affairs.

This is a big deal -- and Haggard's piece on sanctions and their impact seems not to deal with this question of what either helps or hurts the legitimacy and staying power of the North Korean government.

Thanks.

Steve Clemons
www.TheWashingtonNote.com

Truth:

Send food to a regime that sells it for military profit? Like RZ Peirce posted above, that is not going to help anybody who really needs help there! That's proven. You need to send truth to the people of North Korea. No doubt they view their situation as hopeless. You need to continue powerful sanctions which are obviously pressuring the government there big time, or this would not be a news item, but you also need to figure out how to empower the people to take matters into their own hands! That's crucial. They need to know that there is a great deal of the world out there that is free and prosperous (if not perfect) and they can be part of it. They must kill that sawed off little maniac and his wacked out regime.

RZ Pierce:

Unfortunately, food aid does not go to those suffering in North Korea. Often, the aid is diverted to the army by the North Korean government. Have you watched the Discovery documentary "Children in the Secret State?" It shows evidence of the food being sold on markets at prices people can't afford. In the end, even food is used for their regime. Why send aid when it makes the situation worse?

Sanjay:

This is the legacy of the Clinton admin's other great myopic policy in Asia (the first being its allowing the rise of the Taliban).

The Sunshine diplomacy pursued by Albright only allowed Pyongyang to cross the nuclear threshold.

Condoleeza Maize:

Rice for North Korea: I think the United States should send some rice over there to all those starving people.

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