Indeed, I'm afraid the record of the UN in peacemaking and peacekeeping inspires little confidence anyway. And because of this history and factors peculiar to the current Middle East, the proposed new UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon is unlikely to be any more successful than the present United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for several reasons.

First, getting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to endorse the goal of disarming Hezbollah will remain elusive even if the world body joins in addressing the question. There is no stomach among the major powers to undertake responsibility for disarming Hezbollah.

The Europeans, for all their talk of the centrality of the UN, appear reluctant to either contribute troops or put their political capital on line. The U.S. which is the only power capable of bringing force to bear upon the situation is preoccupied in Iraq. And being rightly seen as completely pro-Israel, the U.S. is not in a position to inject itself as a credible neutral force. In other words, the big picture is not conducive to long-term stability in Lebanon.

Second, like all resolutions in a committee, the UNSC resolution number 1701 is a compromise with many formulations, which allow different sides to interpret it differently.

These multiple interpretations will form the basis for the perceived "violation" of the resolution by one side or both and the eventual undermining of the basis on which the international community plans to move into Lebanon.

For example, the resolution bars Israel only from conducting "offensive operations" and asks Hezbollah to stop "all attacks" against Israel. Jerusalem, has naturally interpreted this as having the space to undertake "defensive" operations and Hezbollah too would insist that it has the right to pursue "legitimate resistance" against Israel. As a consequence, violations of the ceasefire are absolutely inevitable.

Third, there is no real mechanism to enforce the many restrictions that 1701 boldly proclaims. For example the UN hopes the Lebanese Army will secure its borders with Syria in order to prevent arms supplies to Hezbollah. But the reality is that the Lebanese army is too weak, militarily and politically, to achieve this objective.

Four, while the next resolution might go some distance towards devising robust rules of engagement for the UN force, calling upon it to prevent entry of unauthorized Hezbollah arms, any such resolution brings us back to the same political question: Is there political will to take on Hezbollah and its friends?

While the rules of engagement might be too tough for some, for others it might look like the insertion of a force without enough freedom to operate. The best one can expect therefore is more drift and a renewed crisis in not so distant future.

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