The weakest link in setting up the tribunal is Lebanon, whose political system remains divided. Senior pro-Syrian politicians have told their anti-Syrian colleagues that Damascus recently informed its Lebanese allies that "it didn't even want to hear the words 'international tribunal.'" Because setting up the tribunal is a complex process, the Syrians have gone for the jugular in weak Lebanon, and have several means through which they can derail the process. The first step came 10 days ago, when six pro-Syrian ministers, including two close to Hezbollah, resigned from the government rather than endorse through a cabinet vote the first draft tribunal plan sent by the United Nations.

Their principal aim is to bring down the government, which could block the tribunal's progress. Since then, Hezbollah has threatened to resort to street demonstrations in pursuit of this goal. The party, along with its allies, had demanded enough ministerial portfolios to be able to hold a collective veto against cabinet decisions they didn't like, but the anti-Syrian cabinet majority rejected this; hence the current standoff. Mr. Gemayel's murder is likely to delay any resort to the street (perhaps not such a bad thing for Hezbollah, as the party has little to gain from such a move); it will also turn many Christians more squarely against Christian politician Michel Aoun, who has been allied with Hezbollah in recent months but who still enjoys a hard core of communal support.

Is Lebanon on the verge of a new civil war? In a funny way I don't think so, though I have a deep conviction that Syria would like one to happen, in order to be invited back into the country by the international community to impose a Pax Syriana. That's precisely why I have no confidence in a dialogue with Syria over Iraq, as some have proposed, since the Syrians would use the breathing space gained to advance its bid to organize a coup to regain Lebanon, in league with its prospective local Praetorian Guard: Hezbollah.

Will Hezbollah accept that role? I fear it might, though the Lebanese system is merciless with those who fail to understand its rules. Hezbollah may believe it can control Lebanon through force of arms. Such an ambition would be its obituary. Now is the time for the party to determine whether it is Lebanese or whether it is a mere extension of Syria and Iran. It has failed most tests showing it is the former, which is why Hezbollah has so dramatically lost ground this year, despite its hollow claims of victory last summer.

In many ways the party's blunders today, its destabilization of the political system, are efforts to cover up for the setbacks of last summer, when Hezbollah was militarily neutralized in its vital space of south Lebanon, lost its Iranian-supplied deterrent capability against Israel for nothing, brought catastrophe down on hundreds of thousands of Shiites, and lost any lingering cross-sectarian approval of the party and its goals. Lebanon is paying a heavy price for Hezbollah's mistakes, and its inexperience when it comes to the subtle game of communal compromise.