Though Lebanese Shiites (including some American ones) will not soon trust the United States, any peace plan in Lebanon must seek to break the Shiites away from Hezbollah. This is a tough proposition, perhaps an impossible one, but for a peace plan to work, Nasrallah must be made to face the reality that hundreds of thousands of his coreligionists are living in schools, public facilities, and in the streets, many having lost everything. He will bitterly resist disarming, but if Shiites remind him that he has a responsibility to care for his community, he, or other Shiite leaders, may begin to waver. If Shiite leaders, particularly Parliament Speaker Nabih Birri, warn Nasrallah that he is taking Shiites to hell in a hand basket, Shiites may push Hezbollah toward compromise.

And to make sure the community does not feel humiliated and defeated, which could cause a disastrous sectarian backlash, it's time to leave a door open toward implementation of reforms that in some fashion recognize Shiite numbers. This must be done under the rubric of the 1989 Taif agreement, which ended the Lebanese civil war. Taif also called for the disarmament of militias. Today Hezbollah reject Taif in order to reject disarmament, which is precisely why Taif must be re-legitimized through talk of reform.

Second, The U.S. should consider opening lines to Iran, because at the end of the day it is Iran that will influence Hezbollah most profoundly. I have no hope whatsoever that Syria can be constructively brought into a dialogue on Lebanon, but Iran, with its complex array of interests can. Once could think of offering incentives in exchange for accepting, or even assisting in Hezbollah's disarmament. Maybe this is naive, but it might be useful for the Bush administration to at least explore ways this link can be exploited.