He was a Fatah member who was shocked by what he viewed as his movement’s surrender -- i.e reaching an agreement with Israel that did not translate into an end of the occupation of the Palestinian territories. He was disillusioned with Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and with their secular vision. He felt humiliated and powerless.

His short life under Israeli occupation involved witnessing killings, living in fear, feeling his life totally controlled by patrolling Israeli soldiers as he came of age and losing faith in the PLO (for many in Gaza then the embodiment of their rights, dignity and hope). This all made him an easy recruit for a group with a higher ideal, a religious ideology that promised to deliver where secular forces had failed. He turned because this other group promised continued resistance, not because of the promise of sunning virgins and rivers of wine in heaven.

His concept of martyrdom was very similar to that of the many PLO fighters, Muslims and Christians whose dream was the liberation of Palestine. In fact, all those who die in the Palestinian struggle, including Christian Palestinian fighters and intellectuals assassinated by Israel, are called martyrs of Palestine.

But in the last decade we have been witnessing a growing phenomenon of religious martyrs that reflects both the defeat of secular movements to liberate the oppressed as promised and the consequent prevalence of religious ideology as solace for the disillusioned who seek power directly from God.

"Martyrdom" as a concept is not necessarily related to Islamic extremism. In contemporary Arab history, martyrdom has been associated with nationalist struggles for liberation from colonialism. The Algerian struggle to drive out French colonizers is known as the One Million Martyrs Revolution -- in reference and deference to the one million Algerians killed in the fight for freedom. Religious connotation was a subtext of nationalism rather than the driving force behind the early struggles of contemporary Arab nations.

The phenomenon of the Red Mosque in Pakistan is more closely associated with religion and extremism. But it is also related to the appeal of dying in defense of an idea – regardless of whether fanatic or not.

In my view, there are two forms of concepts of martyrdom that sometimes, but not always, overlap. Religious martyrdom, as we see today in Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups, is closer to the literal interpretation of the Quran of God's reward for a better life -- with all the temptations that martyrs are deprived of in their lives on earth. In this sense there is nothing to lose from a suicide bombing or from fighting until death without surrender -- as in the Red Mosque this past week.

But even for the most religious fanatics, religious fanaticism is associated with social and/or political grievances. Political and social injustice is often the common denominator between religious fanaticism and national liberation movements. The difference is that in religious ideology-based struggles, death of both oneself and others becomes easier -- or more justifiable -- to a fanatic. The fighter is driven by absolutist beliefs that make killing large numbers of the enemy a victory for the cause.

Nationalist liberation struggles, on the other hand, are not usually related to an absolute ideological vision but seek to offset an imbalance of power. Martyrdom is the ultimate sacrifice to combat a real injustice, such as occupation, by increasing the losses suffered by the enemy.

Forms of self-sacrifice as drastic as suicide bombings become the weapon of the weak to offset stronger and better equipped oppressors. There are elements of both in martyrs of religious and national liberation movements -- as defeat of the enemy is always the underlying goal. But national liberation movements see the defeat of the enemy as a prerequisite for independence and coexistence, on a basis of ending an occupation rather than annihilating the occupier.

Most movements in the Arab World, such Hamas and Hezbollah, include elements of both religious and national resistance movements combined. Hamas and Hezbollah fighters may have a promised heaven in mind, but there is a clear goal of ending an occupation. In such movements, religious zeal can sometimes take over the political cause -- but religion never obscures the national goal.

The Red Mosque, however, is a unique case. The showdown did not solely or even initially revolve around the desire for martyrdom. It was more about a decision by the Pakistani army to use a ruthless iron fist that, I would suspect, aggravated the state of mind of the besieged students. It is wrong to see the Red Mosque strictly through the prism of martyrdom.

The mosque siege reminds of the crisis at Waco, Texas where American forces did not really care about the lives of "the fanatics under siege." But while a large power like America was able to get away with it, what could be viewed as a massacre could prove to be Pervez Musharraf's Achilles heel.

Musharraf's siege of the mosque invoked the strongest notion of martyrdom in those besieged who felt condemned to destruction by the state. The students were uniquely vulnerable to talk of ultimate sacrifice because the outside world must have looked as bleak as their isolated mosque of doom. The incident may in turn become the greatest inspiration for fanaticism and martyrdom for a wide segment of the Pakistani population. Martyrdom thus becomes a way of revenge.