This is a classic case of an authoritarian leader who agrees to carry out extremely unpopular pro-U.S. policies in support of the war on terror. For the leader to survive ending cooperation with the unforgiving Bush administration, he would need to reverse many repressive anti-terror measures and secure a minimum national consensus behind him. Instead, it appears that Musharraf has burned all of his bridges at home, and is dependent on the Pakistan Army to keep his tenuous hold on power.

Recent moves by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and even by Imran Khan, the leader of an opposition party in Parliament, show that many forces are readying themselves to move into an impending vacuum of political leadership.
Of course the Islamist opposition may prove to be the most prepared, especially if the competition moves to the streets.

Pakistan has been one of the first causalities of the backlash against U.S. and Pakistani security services’ direct involvement in mobilizing and recruiting an extreme brand of political Islamists against the Soviet Union and the communist threat in the late 1970s and 1980s.

Musharraf can no longer play the dual game of encouraging the extremist madrassas -- I am using this word reluctantly because in Arabic it simply means schools -- and tolerating if not supporting the Taliban. These groups have become entrenched in many sectors of society while Musharraf continues to alienate the border regions, and approval of joint American bombings does not help.

I admit that my comments are based on observation which does not make me an expert, but I derive some of the analysis from comparison with other leaders. Many Muslim leaders have lost support from their constituencies for following American policies -- especially after 9/11. Most rely on subtle and not so subtle forms of repression; many have managed to stay in power simply because the Islamist movements in their countries have not decided to take over. In spite of the growing popularity of these movements, they still lack effective governance programs, and many sectors of Muslim society still prefer dictators to any form extremist Islamic government.

In the case of Pakistan, it seems that there are more secular alternatives who are preparing themselves to fill a power vacuum, but it is not clear if any has enough credibility to challenge even an unpopular dictator.

Musharraf's Achilles heal could prove to be the recent sacking of the Supreme Court chief justice. The historic record suggests that Washington would not hesitate to drop Musharraf in favor of a more "acceptable" ally.