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Where were anti-war people when Turkey-Iraq destroyed 9000 Kurdish Villages?

I am trying to ignore the grave situation in Kurdistan affecting my family, my motherland and my friends.

The Turkish government is a shameless exploiter and impediment. Unlike Hitler their hero Kemal Ataturk (the father of the Turks) succeeded. So after some 80 years of Nazi-like supremacist brainwashing the whole nation of Turks - with the exception of a few noble artists - are like racists Germans had Hitler succeeded! But the naive "Anti-War" mode campaign is wrong-headed and unhelpful to the real peoples of Iraq, Kurdistan and Middle East.

Where were they when Turkey's war destroyed 4000 ancient Kurdish villages; when Iraq in Anfal campaign made 200,000 Kurds disappear and literally destroyed an astounding 5000 Kurdish villages?

And where are the anti-war demonstrators and emails against Sharon's daily war against Palestinians; Chinese against Tibet or Russian's against defenseless poor Chechens?

And as for that United Nations, it is definitely not representative of nations of people: it is mostly corrupt self-serving United Governments staffed with mostly corrupt technocrats privileged bureaucrats with their own highly-paid careers and hidden agendas of corrupt governments.

Excepting UN people on the ground who help out and risk their lives. So of course UN loves everything to be delayed and go through them. Remember the mess they made at: Shatila, Srebrenca, Tibet, Kurdistan, Chechnya...etc.

What is UN doing about Leyla Zana, the Nelson Mandela of Turkey, the Kurdish parliamentarian woman mother of 3 toiling away serving 15 years in Turkish prison for addressing the Parliament in both Turkish and Kurdish?

So most of this exclusive 'anti-war' is confused, probably indirectly Saddam and Arab oil and United Nations financed! UN loves to keep the status quo. It is better to get information from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International - these represent the oppressed, gagged, imprisoned people of the world.

United Nations represent the establishment. The French, Chinese, Germans, Russians are even less trustworthy and less just than USA even under Bush/Powell.

The "Secret" Kurdish State

Kurds around the world legitimately and rightly rally to the cause of the creation of a Kurdish state. The question that needs to be raised is whether there is already a Kurdish state? Is it quite possible that a Kurdish State was founded by Paul Wolfowitz in 1991 and that the entire world including most Kurds pretend that it actually doesn't exist?

Is it possible that the only reason that the adherents of Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani are not at present out killing each other is because Jerusalem and Washington tell them not to? Is it possible that Iraqi sovereignty in southern Kurdistan is purely fictional? Is it possible that "Iraqi Kurdistan" is not Iraqi at all? Is it possible that no declaration of independence is necessary and all that is required is the will to exercise sovereignty? Is it possible that the Kurdish State doesn't defend the interests of the entire Kurdish nation or of Kurds outside of its borders? Is it possible that the Kurdish State last year won a war and now with a twisted and sycophantic logic offers territorial concessions to its defeated enemies? Is it possible that the Kurdish state is a major regional military power with 220 000 highly trained professional soldiers that is now in possession of much of the military hardware of its defeated southern neighbor?

Is it possible that the Kurdish State is allied with the world's only superpower? Is it possible that the Kurdish State is allied with the strongest state in the region? Is it indeed possible that the leaders of the Kurdish State refuse to form a national government? Is it possible that Kurdish State's only international asset is the faithfulness of politically influential mainly Jewish friends of the Kurds and without that there would not have been or be a Kurdish State as the Kurds' restive leaders even refuse to form a government? Is it possible that the Kurds wait for the next genocide instead of forming a government in the existing Kurdish State? Is it possible that the leaders of the Kurdish State act as if they were secretive Sudanese warlords rather than leaders of a powerful state allied with the two strongest powers of the region? Is it possible that the Kurdish State's two powerful allies are now targeting two more of the Kurds' enemies? Is it possible that the Kurdish State is one of the richest nations of the world?

Yes it is indeed possible. Indeed, it seems that Kurdistan and the Kurds need a reality check. It seems that the Kurdish State needs to complete its process of democratization and form a government. It seems that it depends on the Kurds themselves. It seems that it depends on the Kurdish grassroots of the Diaspora to cultivate to its full potential what in effect is its only real international asset.

Instead of just one Iraq - Try three

No less an authority on the breakup of failed states than Peter Galbraith, the former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, considers the possibility that Iraq will split up along ethnic and religious lines "more likely than a transition to a centralized democracy."

Religious and ethnic violence has been a fact of life in Mesopotamia for thousands of years; it has been suggested before that only a monster like Saddam Hussein could have hoped to rule it as one country.

(Mr. Galbraith, by the way, will speak Friday, 7:30 p.m., to the Windham World Affairs Council of Vermont in the Rotch Center located on the World Learning campus here in Brattleboro; his talk is entitled, "How to Get Out of Iraq.")

The United States, he writes in the New York Review of Books, "faces a near-impossible dilemma in Iraq." If it withdraws now, it will leave a weak central government incapable of controlling the chaos that provides such fertile ground for terrorists. But by staying, it undermines the legitimacy of that government.

A civil war may come whether American troops withdraw or not. The horrific torture-murder of five Shiite truck drivers in Fallujah this past June may prove the flash point for a confrontation between Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority and the Sunni minority. The descriptions of the pictures of their mutilated bodies make the snapshots from Abu Ghraib pale by comparison. They are making the rounds of Shiite mosques in southern Iraq, and so great is the anger in the Shia heartland that the American troops now besieging Fallujah may be the only thing that prevents the Mahdi Army from sacking it.

Meanwhile, the Kurds in the north, who already had a quasi-independent state under American protection, are disenchanted with the blunders of the occupation and annoyed that their leaders were frozen out of top spots in the new government. Their militia is the second most numerous, best trained and equipped fighting force in Iraq, and they are openly talking of secession and of refusing to let the new Iraqi army enter their territory. In the south, Shiite political parties and religious institutions form a defacto government, independent of Baghdad's authority.

President Bush, before the invasion, promised to respect the territorial integrity of Iraq, which was formed by the British from the Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Religious and ethnic violence has been a fact of life in Mesopotamia for thousands of years; it has been suggested before that only a monster like Saddam Hussein could have hoped to rule it as one country. Civil war would be intolerable -- it would benefit the terrorists, it would threaten the already precarious stability of world oil markets, and it would put American troops in an even more untenable position.

The Turks kept those provinces separate for a reason. A "loose federation," Mr. Galbraith suggests, would allow the people of Iraq to rule themselves, and take America off the hook. Perhaps a unified Iraq is a promise Mr. Bush, or Mr. Kerry should consider breaking.

The Kurds: The Expendable people!

Notwithstanding the unparallel tragedies and untold calamities that have befallen Kurds throughout their modern history, they are deplorably optimistic about the events that concern them and their foreseeable future. As soon as they see a spark of light, they forget all their desolation and start believing and taking things at their face value.

This of course regardless of the fact that their entire history could be summed up as a chain of denial, deprivation, oppression, total devastation of their land, genocide and betrayal after another by the merciless regional and international players. The allegory amidst regional circles as well as international players now that Kurds are the expendable pawns in the harsh political game of Middle East, that they could be used and abused repeatedly without learning their most valuable lesson of refraining from relying on their adversaries and start depending on the everlasting resources of their own people. Unfortunately, the myth has become more real as the Kurdish leadership is continuing on the same track while the Kurdish intellectuals and true patriots are standing by helplessly not doing anything about it.

For that matter Southern Kurdistan, is the best case scenario here. The whole world recognizes that the Kurds have played a major role in bringing down the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein, and in combating terrorists and keeping the law and order not only in Southern Kurdistan but also in Iraq, yet there is no single unequivocal official signal from the concerned parties of reward for their sacrifices and heroic role that would recognize them as an oppressed nation aspiring to have a genuine voice in deciding his own destiny in a peaceful and democratic manner.

It is excruciating to admit that the coalition in Iraq is only carrying on the same policy as before when the safe haven was established in 1991, and the Kurdish issue was dealt with as a humanitarian one rather than a political issue as in fact it is. Not much has changed since. The true federalism the Kurds are seeking has not been recognized. Instead the so called Administrative Federalism is prevailing. The Iraqis, Coalition forces, and the international Community have utterly ignored the Kurdish Referendum that expressed the wishes of over 1.7 millions Kurds from around the world. Furthermore, the Security Council Resolution 1546 completely overlooked Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that is indeed the only actual guarantee the Kurds have gained so far next to their status quo.

The Iraqi elections that are due in January 30s, are basically meaningless for the Kurds, no wonder they are advocating their postponement. In reality, holding elections in Southern Kurdistan before the implementation of the article 58 of TAL that concern the reversal of Arabization policies of the Kurdish lands, specifically Kirkuk, would undermine all the Kurdish efforts, and it would be considered a huge setback for the Kurdish project of federalism. So far, all the indications are pointing towards the ascendancy of governorates decentralization over other options, especially the law regarding the election of the governorate councils where 41 people need to be elected as if setting up a whole regional parliament.

Nevertheless, for the Kurds what remains in the shadows is way more daunting than all of this. The Kurds are not keeping informed of the latest escalated episode of violence in Iraq, that targeted them specifically for being Kurds and for no other sin they have committed. The whole debacle of beheading Kurds should not have escaped our attention. Not only the Kurds were savagely victimized, but they were possibly set up. For years there were attempts to turn the Arab-Israeli conflict into an Islamic- Israeli/ Western one, the September 11th terrorist attack on New York and Washington heralded the success of those attempts. Now, anybody can tell you terrorism can not be defeated militarily, simply because this kind of war can only be dealt with by intelligence gathering, information sharing, cooperation and coordinating efforts. That means a political settlement should not come as an eye popper shock to anyone including the Kurds, for the Israeli- Arab conflict before long, especially after Sharon has expressed his readiness to dismantle the Israeli settlement and totally withdraw from Gaza strip. Regrettably, this in itself would not be gratifying Arabs who are seeking much more than that.

A few days ago, the Egyptian Foreign Minister abu- Algait in Sharm al-Shekh summit made an interesting remark in which he called for " the necessity of combining the resolution of the Palestinian issue with that of the Iraqi. The implications of such a statement are dangerous and enormous to the Kurds who ought to entirely reject such a proposal. The Kurds must not accept in any way, shape or form for the settlement of the Iraqi question to be hooked up with that of the Palestinians. There is no connection whatsoever between the two issues. Under such a horrible scenario the satisfaction of Arabs would inevitably lead to the sell out of the destitute Kurds. Therefore, every patriot Kurd and their friends are required to use all their resources to prevent such a shameful scheme from materializing.

The international community should realize that the Kurdish people have already suffered too much. They have been victimized for too long, perhaps it is time to deal with their plight as a political question and stop exploiting their wretchedness and misery. They have suffered enough and cannot afford another national disaster.

What do the Kurds want in Turkey?

The Kurds make up about a quarter of the population of Turkey, numbering between 15 and 20 million, according to the October 2004 Report of the European Commission. Like all historically constituted human communities, they have the right to live in dignity in the land of their ancestors, and to preserve their identity, culture and language and hand them down freely to their children.

Having been victims of great injustice throughout the 20th century, the Kurds now pin their hopes for a better future on the process Turkey must undergo to become a member of the European Union, which they perceive as being, above all, a multicultural area of peace, democracy and pluralism. To join this family of democracies, Turkey itself must become a true democracy, with respect for its own cultural diversity and political pluralism. In particular, it must guarantee its Kurdish citizens the same rights that the Basques, Catalans, Scots, Lapps, South Tyroleans and Walloons enjoy in the democratic countries of Europe - and which it is itself demanding for the Turkish minority in Cyprus.

Public conscience will not abide a policy of double standards, which would eventually undermine the moral credibility of the European Union and tarnish the image of the Turkish government in European public opinion.

The European process offers both Turks and Kurds new and promising prospects, and gives them a chance for reconciliation on the basis of a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question, with due respect for existing borders. This opportunity must be appreciated at its true value.

We the undersigned, representing Kurdish society in all its political and cultural diversity, consider that such a settlement calls for:

- a new and democratic Constitution, recognising the existence of the Kurdish people, and guaranteeing it the right to a public school system and media in its own language and the right to form its own organisations, institutions and parties with the aim of contributing to the free expression of its culture and its political aspirations.

- a general amnesty in order to establish a climate of confidence and reconciliation and, once and for all, to turn the page on violence and armed conflict;

- the implementation, with European support, of a vast programme of economic development of the Kurdish region, particularly including rebuilding the more than 3,400 Kurdish villages destroyed in the 1990s, and incentives for the three million displaced Kurds to return to their homes.

We ask the Turkish authorities and the European leaders to do justice to the Kurds in Turkey by acceding to their legitimate demands in order to ensure regional peace and stability, and to consider the fulfilment of those demands to be an essential criterion by which to measure Turkey's progress along the road to membership of the European Union.

FIRST SIGNATORIES TURKEY: Mehmet ABBASOGLU, Former President of the People's Democratic Party (Dehap), Songul Erol ABDIL, Mayor of Tunceli; Nesimi ADAY, Poet, writer ; Muslum AKALIN, barrister, President of the Bar at Urfa (Edessa); Nilufer AKBAL, musician ; Abdullah AKENGIN, Mayor of Dicle ; Abdullah AKIN, former Mayor of Batman ; Ibrahim AKSOY, Former Mayor of Malatya ; Ihsan AKSOY, writer ; Haci AKYOL, barrister, former Mayor of the Yazihan, Malayata; Yusuf ALATAS, barrister, President of the Human Rights Associatîon of Turkey ; Mahmut ALINAK, barrister, former Member of Parliament for Sirnak ; Suleyman ANIK, Mayor of Dargecit, Mardin ; Firat ANLI, Mayor of Yenisehir, Diyarbakir ; M. Nezir ARAS, Mayor of Bulanik ; Rusen ARSLAN, lawyer, writer ; Ismail ARSLAN, Mayor of Ceylanpinar ; Mehmet Ali ASLAN, barrister, former President of the Workers' Party of Turkey ; Naci ASLAN, Member of Parliament for Agri ; Sedat ASLANTAS, barrister, General Secretary of the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey ; Fahrettin ASTAN, Mayor of Besiri, Batman ; Nuran ATLI, Mayor of Mazidag ; Mustafa AVCI, General Secretary of the Confedaration of Public Service employees (KESK); Eshat AYATA, writer, publisher; Sukran AYDIN, Mayor of Bismil; Behrun AYGOREN, former Mayor of Dicle ; Huseyin AYYILDIZ, Secretary General of Tum-Belsen ; Ihsan BABAOGLU, Spokesman for the Democratic Platform, Diyarbakir; Tuncer BAKIRHAN, President of the Democratic People's Party (Dehap); Murat BATGI, actor, Osman BAYDEMIR, Mayor of Diyarbakir ; Seyhmus BAYHAN, Mayor of Lice ; Mehmet Celal BAYKARA, barrister, President of the Foundation for Research on Kurdish Culture (KURTKAV) ; Sefik BEYAZ, President of the Istanbul Kurdish Institute ; Ekrem BILEK, former Mayor of Siirt; Nevzat BINGOL, journalist, writer ; Nadir BINGOL, Mayor of Ergani; Kemal BIRLIK, former Member of Parliament for Sirnak ; Murat BOZLAK, Former President of People's Democratic Party (Hadep) ; Ali BUCAK, barrister, President of the Urfa Cultural Centre ; Aydin BUDAK, Mayor of Cizre ; Feridun CELIK, former Mayor of Diyarbakir ; Demir CELIK, Mayor of Varto (Mus) ; Omer CETIN, co-foun-der of the Research Foundation on Social Issues (TOSAV) ; Yusuf CETIN, President of free contemporary Actors' Association (Casod); Murat CEYLAN, Mayor of Kurtalan ; Emnullah CIN, Mayor of Viransehir ; Muzaffer DEMIR, Former member of Parlement for Mus ; Selim DEMIR, Mayor of Kozluk ; Cafer DEMIR, President of Elazig Chapter of Human Rights Association ; Ahmet Turan DEMIR, President of the Free Society Party (OTP) ; Abdullah DEMIRTAS, Mayor of Surici, Diyarbakir ; Hatip DICLE, former Member of Parliament for Diyarbakir, former President of the Demoeracy Party {DEP) ; Ilhan DIKEN, President of the Diyarbakir Medical Assocoation ; Seyhmus DIKEN, writer ; Orhan DOGAN, former Member of Parliament for Sirnak ; Faik DURSUN, Mayor of Beytulsebap ; Tarik Ziya EKINCI, former Member of Parliament for Diyarbakir, former General Secretary of the Worker's Party of Turkey (TIP) ; Tahsin EKINCI, lawyer ; Adnan EKMEN, former Minister, former Member of Parliament for Batman ; Serafettin ELCI, former Minister, former Member of Parliament for Mardin ; Nuretttin ELHUSEYNI, writer, translator ; Giyasettin EMRE, former Member of Parliament for Mus ; Hamit ENGIN, Mayor of Hazro ; Mehmet Ali EREN, barister, former Member of Parliament for Istanbul ; Ahmet ERTAK, Mayor of Sirnak ; Enver ETE, Spoksman for the Democratic Platform, Mardin ; Mehmet Fuat FIRAT, former Member of Parliament for Erzurum ; Umit FIRAT, publisher, writer ; Ibrahim GUCLU, lawyer, writer ; Nezir GULCAN, former Mayor of Kurtalan (Siirt); Ahmet GUMUSTEKIN, painter ; Hasim HASIMI, former Member of Parliament for Diyarbakir, former Mayor of Cizre ; Necdet IPEKYUZ, former President of the Diyarbakir Medical Association ; M. Tahir KAHAMANER, Mayor of Malazgirt ; Hüseyin KALKAN, Mayor of Batman ; Ramazan KAPAN, Mayor of Derik ; Hasip KAPLAN, barrister ; Seyhmus KARAHAN, former President of the Urfa Association of Civil Engineers ; Zulkuf KARATEKIN, Mayor of Karapinar, Diyarbakir: Selahattin KAYA, former Mayor of Bingöl; Hasan KAYA, former President of the Istanbul Kurdish Institute ; Ferzende KAYA, journalist; Mehmet KAYA, Mayor of Kocaköy, Diyarbakir ; Fikret KAYA, Mayor of Silvan ; Gulten KAYA, music publisher ; Eren KESKIN, Former President of Istanbul Chapter of Human Rights Association of Turkey (IHD) ; Abdullah KESKIN, publisher ; Abdullah KIRAN, writer ; Muhsin KIZILKAYA, writer; Servet KOCA-KAYA, musician ; Muhsin KONUR, Mayor of Silopi; Burhan KORHAN, Mayor of Besiri; Mukkades KUBILAY, Mayor of Dogubeyazid; Cabbar LEYGARA, barrister, former Mayor of Baglar, Diyarbakir; Ahmet MELIK, former Member of Parliament for Urfa; Yilmaz ODABASI, poet, writer ; Husnu OKCUOGLU, former Member of Parliament for Istanbul; Selim OLCER , former President of the Union of Medical Associations of Turkey; Eyup Sabri ONCEL, barrister, former President of the Urfa Bar; Esat ONER, Mayor of Gercus, Batman; Mahmut ORTAKAYA, former President of the Diyarbakir ; Medical Association ; Selim OZALP, former Mayor of Siirt : Sahabettin OZARSLANER, former Mayor of Van ; Mustafa OZER, barrister, former President of the Diyarbakir Bar ; Hicri OZGOREN, poet ; Osman OZGUVEN, Mayor of Dikili, Izmir; Yurdusev OZSOKMENLER, Mayor of Baglar, Diyarbakir; Mesut OZTURK, former Mayor of Van ; Fadil OZTURK, poet ; Kemal PARLAK, spokesman of the Democratic Consensus and Initiative for a solution to the Kurdish Question (DEMOS) ; Selim SADAK, former Member of Parliament for Sirnak ; Resul SADAL, Mayor of Idil ; Ethem SAHIN, Mayor of Suruc ; Sirri SAKIK, former Member of Parliament for Mus,; Rahmi SALTUK, musician ; Suzan SAMANCI, writer ; Menderes SAMANCILAR, actor ; Mehmet SANRI, publisher ; Naci SAPAN, President of the Association of Journalists of the South-East; Mehmet Emin SEVER, former Member of Parliament for Mus ; Yasar SEYMAN, President of the Press Trade Union of Turkey (BAS-SEN). Former vice-President of People's Republican Party (CHP) ; Enver SEZGIN, writer ; Emir Ali SIMSEK, General Secretary of the Teachers' Union (Egitim-Sen) ; Cihan SINCAR, Mayor of Kiziltepe ; Malmut SONMEZ, former Member of Parliament for Bingöl ; Mehmet TANHAN, Mayor of Nusaybin; Sezgin TANRIKULU, barrister, President of the Diyarbakir Bar; Nimet TANRIKULU, President of Tunceli Cultural Genler; Metin TEKCE, Mayor of Hakkari ; Hursit TEKIN, Mayor of Semdinli; Deniz TOPKAN, Spokesman for the Democratic Platform, Batman ; Ahmet TULGAR, journalist ; Ferhat TUNc, musician ; Sehnaz TURAN, barrister, President of the Foundation for Research into Society and the Law (TOHAV) ; Ahmet TURK, former Member of Parliament for Mardin ; Sehmus ULEK, barrister, Viee-President of the MAZLUM-DER (Association for Human Rights); Rojin ULKER, singer ; Mehmet UZUN, writer ; Behlul YAVUZ, former General Secretary of the Diyarbakir small shopkeepers and artisans Union ; Feridun YAZAR, barrister, former Mayor of Urfa, former President of the People's Labour Party (HEP) ; Canip YILDIRIM, Publisher ; M. Salih YILDIZ, Mayor of Yuksekova ; Sedat YURTDAS, former Member of Parliament for Diyarbakir ; Leyla ZANA, Former member of Parliament for Diyarbakir, winner of the European Parliament's Sakharov Prize ; Mehdi ZANA, Former Mayor of Diyarbakir ; Veysi ZEYDANLIOGLU, lawyer.

EUROPE: Aso AGACE, Director of the Women's Training Centre, Germany ; Salih AKIN, Lecturer at Rouen University, France; Haci AKMAN, University Professor of Bergen, Norway ; Rohat ALAKOM, writer ; STOCKHOLM, Foundation for Kurdish Culture, Sweden ; Faruk ARAS, essayist, Sweden ; Nizamettin ARIC, musician and film director, Germany ; Gunay ASLAN, journalist, Germany ; Mustafa AYDOGAN, writer, Sweden; Kazim BABA, Politician, Germany ; Halîn Evrim BABA, member of the Berlin Regional Parliament, Germany ; Kurdo BAKSI, journalist, winner of the Olof Palme Peace Prize, Sweden ; Riza BARAN, President of the Fridriechhein-Kreuzberg, local Council, Germany ; Rojen BARNAS, writer and poet, Sweden ; Hamit BOZARSLAN, Lecturer at the School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, France ; Sermîn BOZARSLAN, President of the Federation of the Kurdish associations in Sweden ; Serhat BUCAK, Lawyer, Germany ; Yilmaz CAMLIBEL, writer, Germany ; Firat CEWERJ, writer and publisher, Sweden ; Ali CIFTCI, publisher, Sweden ; Mûrad CIVAN, research worker, Sweden ; Faysal DASLI, Journalist, Germany ; Seyhus DAGTEKIN, poet and novelist, winner of the International Prize for Poetry in the French Language, Franee ; Mehmet DEMIR, President of the Federation of Kurdish Assoeiations (YEKKOM), Germany ; Abdullrahman DURRE, former Mufti of Diyarbakir, Germany ; ELISHER, writer, Sweden ; Hasan Basri ELMAS, Lecturer at Paris-VIII University, France ; Derwesh FERHO, President of the Brussel's Kurdish Institute, Belgium ; FOUNDATION of Kurds from Anatolia, Sweden ; Gülistan GURBAY, Researcher, Germany ; Metin INCESU, Director of the Center for Kurdish Studies (Navend), Allemagne ; Haydar ISIK, journalist, Germany ; Ahmet KAHRAMAN, Journalist, Germany ; Yasar KAYA, Former President of the Demoeracy Party (DEP), Germany ; Cahit MERVAN, Joumalist, Germany ; HfisenS METE, Writer, Sweden ; Kendal NEZAN, President of the Paris Kurdish Institute, France ; Ozz NUJEN, actor, Sweden ; Nihal OTURAN, Research Engineer, France ; Mehmet Ali OTURAN, University Professor, France ; Nalin PEKGUL, Presidenl of the National Federation of Women Social-Democrats of Sweden, former Member of the Swedish Parliament; Sivan PERWER, musician, Prise-winner of the Charles Cross Academy for the Music of the World. Germany ; REMZI, painter, Paris ; Serdar ROSHAN, writer, Sweden ; Mehmet SAHIN, Coordinator of the Kreise-Dialogue, Germany ; Giyasettin SAYAN, member of the Berlin Regional Parliament, Germany ; Abubekir SAYDAN, President of the International Center for Kurdish Human Rights, Germany ; Nizamettin TOGUC, Former member of Parliament for Batman. Holland ; Feleknas UCA, member of the European Parliament, Germany ; Ali YIGIT, Former member of Parliament for Mardin, President of the Union of Democratic Kurdish Federations in Europe (KONKURD), Holland ; Kerim YILDIZ, Esecutive Director ot the Kurdish Human Rights Project, London ; Kotan YILDIZ, Resarcher at the Technical University of Berlin, Reso ZILAN, Linguist, Sweden ; Ahmed ZIREK, actor, France.

KURDISH INSTITUTE OF PARIS
106, rue La Fayette, 75010 Paris
www.fikp.org
info@fikp.org

Kurdish paradise lies in Independent Kurdistan

The United States is attempting to establish a democratic Iraq similar in fashion to western democracy, and specifically to America, in order to justify its occupation of Iraq and to yield dividends for its gigantic investments. However, early signs indicate that the exercise of democracy in Iraq will produce an Islamic system of government, certainly a delightful circumstance to Iranian clergymen, and a regrettable one to the western world. The Kurdish minority, who has been struggling for independence from Iraq, will end up being disfranchised and resentful of the Islamic regime. Whichever system prevails, democratic or Islamic, the Kurds will still remain distrustful of Iraq and will still continue to pursue an end to their status as a merged nation.

Let's consider the best possible scenario. The Iraqi people draft a constitution through a consortium of great-minded constitutional scholars. These scholars possess the common sensibilities, can sympathize with the common people's concerns and desire their common good, and are visionary enough to frame the constitution in such a way that every person's rights and properties are protected. This imaginary constitution leaves no room for "invisible hands" to exercise any kind of power that could override the will of the general public. That is to say, these framers make the opening article of the constitution a proclamation of the separation of state and religion, so that the mosques will not be political offices exerting political power. Furthermore, they precisely define the authorities of both executive and legislative branches of this new political body so that there will be no overlapping of rights and no way to overstep each other's power. In this way, the direction and power of each branch would be precisely defined, and well known to each other and to the general public.

In this scenario no one's rights exceed the established law and no one's rights are undermined--justice would apply equally to all. In other words, the integrity of constitution would be maintained so that justice could never, by any means, be compromised or corrupted.

From this description of an imaginary social contract at its best, one may assume that, if it were intended and promised, the Kurds will be thrilled by it. But not so, for the Kurds have suffered for centuries at the hands of their occupiers, all the while being promised freedom and autonomy by words that were never fulfilled.

A glimpse at the memoirs of Kurdish pioneer Mosa Antar reveals a tale of chilling and heartbreaking atrocities committed against the Kurds. He wrote, "543 AD, Caliph Omar's Moslem commander, Ibnuul Ghaname and infamous tyrant Khalid Bin Walid set fire to the whole Kurdistan, committed genocide and the survivors were taken as slaves and forcibly converted to Islam. It was as such that Zoroastrian Kurds would light fire in their temples, so that it would look like God's spiritual light. These Arab commanders extinguished fires in the temples with blood of Kurds youth, which they had strangled and without shame they claimed that they had committed those murders on the orders of God and saw this as Islam's honorable victory.

"So much so, when Khalid Ben Walid's son Suleyman, who was killed during the siege of Diarbakir, Khalid Bin Walid after capturing the city of Diarbakir, beheaded 60,000 citizens. Even today this part of the city is still known as Kellshane (Slaughterhouse)."

In 1963, General Sadek was appointed by the Ba'th party to calm the troublesome city of Sulaymania. He ravaged through the city like a hungry beast, killing almost two hundred artists, scientists, writers, athletes and prominent members of the city. They were all bulldozed alive and their bodies covered with dirt. Later on, they got the dead bodies and buried them in a graveyard that is still this day called the "martyr graveyard." He imprisoned thousands of innocent people in stables without food and sanitation. Months later, some were released while others were sent to Arabia and housed in a torture camp, Abu Ghrib amongst them. Some were released, but most never made it home and their loved ones never learned what happened to them.

In 1988, Saddam utilized chemicals and nerve gas to bomb my hometown, Halabja. More than five thousand people died within less than an hour. Thousands of others were crippled or disabled. Not only that, almost two decades later, Halabja is the world's capital for birth defects and diseases that are beyond the ability of the scientific community to diagnose.

In the 1980's, Saddam began a campaign of "Anfal" whereby he descended upon thousands of villages and licensed his men to kill any male over the age of twelve. He watched as his men took hundreds of thousands of lads and elders and bulldozed them alive in a front of their loved ones. Saddam did not bother to get an accurate figure of how many were killed, but the number is in the hundreds of thousands.

These and countless other tragedies all occurred in Kurdistan, as it has been a common place for atrocities which the world superpowers either endorsed or looked the other way. These Kurdish experiences are one reason not to trust any future bond with Arabs, for nothing ever changes except time, and time so often happens to be neutral. Now the superpowers are trying to trick the Kurds, letting them believe that a democratic Iraq will warrant their freedom, but it's about time these superpowers understand that the Kurds will never be satisfied until they are sovereign. How difficult is it to understand that? They are trying to turn Iraq into everyman's paradise, but the Kurdish paradise lies in an independent Kurdistan with a Kurdish flag to glorify the nation of Kurds and mark the end of occupation. Why is it so difficult for America to act upon such a simple fact? It's about time America lives up to the true meaning of freedom and liberty. When that happens, the Kurds will be sovereign and America's claims of promoting freedom will be taken as genuine and meaningful. Until then, the Kurds must live with a broken dream while America continues making a mockery of freedom and liberty.

What future for the Kurds?

What will the January 2005 Iraqi elections and dramatic events elsewhere in the Middle East mean for the Kurds? This article reviews the current situation and likely future scenarios for the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran.

"Our past is sad. Our present is a catastrophe. Fortunately, we don't have a future."
--Hiner Saleem, Kurdish film-maker, quoting his grandfather[1]

"It's a great feeling to be free. It's a great feeling to live in peace and not feel any threats from a tyrant like Saddam. If this house is taken away from me, I live in a tent. If the tent is taken away and I am forced to live under a tree, I'll still be free."[2]
--A Kurdish refugee returning to Kirkuk

The Kurds, as a people divided between four states, pose an intellectual and policy issue of great importance for the future of the region and of these specific countries. Of course, deciding "who is a people" in the contemporary world is a political question rather than a legal process, a subjective self-identification, or historically based assertion. In the international political system only those who have attained, or were granted, state sovereignty are regarded as peoples.

Enabling Kurdish women, men, and children to develop better living standards and the ability to live in freedom from want and fear alike would be a noble and great responsibility for those who desire to engage in facilitating a better future all of West Asia. Compared with other peoples in the region, the Kurds have not been on equal footing in these terms since the creation of the modern states at the beginning of the 1920s, with the sole exception of the Kurds in Iraq since 1992.

The Kurds are regarded either as a "pariah minority"[3] or seen not as victims, but rather as a source of destabilization.[4] However, being regarded as a "pariah minority" or "destabilizing factor" is not an entirely irrelevant concept to understanding how the Kurds have been dealt with politically.

Past Strategies

When the empires of West Asia were replaced by modern centralizing territorial states (often misleadingly called nation-states) at the beginning of the 1920s, the Kurds were left without a state of their own. In the new framework, they became minorities within new political inventions and constructions dominated by ideologies of Turkish, Persian and (two versions of) Arab nationalism.

The imposition of this new state system with its new ideological drive for centralization, homogenization, and control created entirely different conditions for the stateless Kurds. This was a dramatic shift from several hundred years of imperial tradition in which Kurdish territory had no distinct, mined, and militarily-guarded borders. The Kurds, who, like most other groups in the vast Ottoman and Persian empires, were subject to "remote" and discontinuous imperial control, carried out "cross-border" activities and thus could easily manipulate and adjust to the loose imperial networks for their own benefit and intermittingly enjoy a relative degree of local autonomy.

The new state system led not only to the imposition of varying administrative and security control systems, but also to the introduction of new political ideologies. The new state ideologies envisaged their societies in radically different ways. Demands of national minorities for representation, power-sharing, or mere survival were regarded as "illegitimate," backwardness, or just behaving like fifth-column proxies for external enemies.

The trajectories of the modern states in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria are the basic frameworks through which one can analyze and understand these states' policies and strategies vis-à-vis their Kurdish populations. Since the aim of this article is to focus on future policy prospects in relation to the Kurds, only a brief account of the state strategies to deal with the Kurds will be presented.

Although various governments in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have chosen different approaches in their denial or partial recognition of the existence of the Kurds as a people with legitimate political, social and security demands, a persistent denial of a greater Kurdistan and attempts to prevent an eventual emergence of such an entity has been linked to the national security of these states. Consequently, the Kurds have been deprived of any meaningful opportunity to discuss various conceptions of Kurdistan, including possibly peaceful arrangements.

Often, Kurdish demands were interpreted as a direct challenge to the new state elite's authority, legitimacy, or goal of "national" cohesion (which in practice meant assimilation). The Kurds were viewed as a major obstacle to the way the new elites thought their societies ought to be, rather than dealing with how they were in fact constituted. In contrast, Kurdish political demands were for shared power and resources between different political groups and the idea that the societies do not need to be homogenous but rather heterogeneous, multi-ethnic and multi-religious. Given this clash, they easily became targets of security, military, and political campaigns in the name of "national" security, territorial integrity, and state sovereignty. Usually these kinds of internationally recognizable justifications have functioned as effective methods to ward off even mild international criticism.

While the existence of a Kurdistan province is officially acknowledged in Iran, it amounts only to one-eighth of the Kurdish-inhabited area in that country.[5] In Iraq, the 1958 provisional constitution recognized the existence of the Kurdish nationality alongside the Arabs, but the establishment of a Kurdistan Autonomous Region in 1974 did not satisfy the expectations of the Kurds and led to a wave of military confrontation between the Ba'thist government of the time and the Kurds. Until recently, denial of the existence of the Kurds and the Kurdish language in the Turkish Republic was a ritual repeated by politicians, military, security, and civil bureaucracies, as well as media and ordinary citizens.[6] In Syria, the Kurds are still treated as "guests" without political, legal, and social rights.

Military solutions have been an option to which state elites in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have devoted themselves and their countries' resources. While Iraq's military offensives against the Kurds are more known to the outside world, the Turkish military, as one author put it, "Found control of Kurdistan to be its prime function and reason d'être. Only one out of 18 Turkish military engagements during the years 1924-38 occurred outside Kurdistan. After 1945, apart from the Korean war (1950-52), and the invasion of Cyprus (1974), the only Turkish army operations continued to be against the Kurds."[7]

Generally speaking, the state elites in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have combined strategies of elimination and management.[8] The methods exploited by successive governments in dealing with the Kurds included the denial of their existence, or that of the Kurdish language, or their preponderance in certain regions. Active tactics include such widely varying policies as genocidal campaigns, mass deportation and expulsion, political homogenization and assimilation, coercive administrative and security control systems, or even partial recognition and shallow autonomy arrangements. The result was massive internal displacement, destruction of villages and small towns, militarization of states and societies, repression of political parties, and undermining of civil society organizations, to name but a few long-term consequences.

These states share important characteristic traits of what political scientists call state failure, not least because of the enduring character and the direction of the violence against the Kurds.[9] Failed states generally do not deliver positive political goods to their peoples; they are often tense, deeply conflicted, hard, and fierce in dealing with alternative versions of reality, and bitterly contested constructions. In order to avoid questioning the legitimacy of their monolithic world views, they embark on violent military expeditions to avoid dialogue, revision of flawed political orders, and profound reform programs.

Undoubtedly, violent methods dominated the ways in which the state elites tried to solve political, social and economic differences in their respective parts of Kurdistan. But violence is not the only way with which modern states have sought conflict resolutions, and the states in West Asia are not destined to pursue the same path. New circumstances, elite reconsiderations of past strategies, as well as international changes and incentives can and should change past commitments. New opportunities will require new decisions, strategies, and commitments. Given several decades of past failures and the emergence of new opportunities, one can expect different and constructive policy options to be pursued.

Future Prospects

The political elites of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria--though in fundamentally different ways--face momentous decisions about the future of peoples they control and ostensibly represent. If they opt to distance themselves from the tyranny of the past, they can actively influence, if not direct, the forces of change that take social, political, religious and regional diversities as a source of strength to create better living standards, more freedom, and social peace. There are at least two great opportunities (in Turkey and Iraq) and two future possibilities (in Iran and Syria) by which the future of the Kurds will directly be determined.

Turkey: United in Diversity, at Home and as EU Member?

"Turkey has already booked its place in Europe"
--Javier Solana[10]

"I have to turn to Europe to get justice. Europe remains our only hope."
--Sehriban Yaradimlis[11]

"There is nothing permanent except change. Give Turkey three years, and it will be a totally different country. Whatever happens we are going to change."
--Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan[12]

Compared to Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Turkey has developed a wide range of democratic political institutions and mechanisms as well as a long-standing relationship with the European Union and other Western democratic organizations that together should make the country more amenable to democratic dialogue and exchange of ideas. Turkey's progress toward EU membership provides a unique opportunity to carry out profound systemic reform.

This could include an advance beyond previous monolithic beliefs in, and practice of, homogenization and military solutions for the Kurdish issue, not least because Article Two of the first draft of the EU's constitution demands specific values from member states, saying that the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and non-discrimination.

This is strengthened by the first paragraph of Article Three in which the aim of the EU is "to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples."[13] Over time, the organization's members have dramatically shifted their focus from state security to the security of their populations and peoples. They have gradually developed from what political scientists label as electoral democracies to liberal democracies, with constitutional guarantees for human rights, women's rights and the rights of minorities. Eastern European countries who aspired to join the EU must live up to these standards and values, which they must implement for the benefit of all citizens and peoples.

In the negotiation process to qualify for membership, Turkey needs to change its dominant political thinking, the current constitution and thousands of laws and regulations before it can be described as a society characterized by pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and non-discrimination. The past cannot simply be wished away. The future cannot be achieved by imprecise changes. The ultimate test of willingness to direct the state and society in Turkey toward a new future will be determined by the government's capacity and capability to implement essential reforms throughout the country without prejudice and discrimination on the basis of historical suspicion and blaming-the-victim reasoning. Turkey has already embarked on a major reform program and it can hardly retreat from it.

Along the way, the country will need extensive assistance, expertise, financial support, and political encouragement. The EU has already committed itself to this process and the required financial needs. The current Turkish government has promised, and occasionally taken, further steps in the right direction. It has taken courageous steps "in face of strong resistance"[14] from the military and those elite groups whose positions and interests are not served by a deepening and widening process of democratization. For the root of the problem lies in the fact that Turkey, despite the determination of its government, cannot stand for the EU standards under present circumstances. Because, as a recent report from the European Parliament noticed, the country has not yet established a clear framework for guaranteeing political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights. In order to qualify for EU accession negotiations, and eventual membership, more far-reaching efforts are required from Turkey "to enhance the coherence of legal provisions and practice, which will underline the drastic and fundamental character of the transformation of Turkey towards membership."[15]

The point is that "reparation and amendments" will not do the trick--despite significant changes introduced as part of the packages of political reform-- because Turkey has not managed to circumvent its "Constitution adopted in 1982 during the military regime, reflecting a largely authoritarian philosophy."[16] Like the new members of the EU, Turkey needs to adopt a new constitution, signaling beyond doubt that such a step is a point of departure for the process of reform and modernization of the state and society.[17] This is a necessary step in a series of far-reaching reforms which can only be judged "on the basis of their actual implementation in terms of day-to-day practice at all levels of the judicial and security system, and of both the civilian and military administration... [which] must have the support of society," a long process for which Turkey will need both fundamental decisions and continued European aid.[18] As Javier Solana so eloquently put it, Turkey has already booked its place in Europe; the reservation of that seat in December 1999 was unanimously supported by the 15 EU heads of state and government of the time. But in the process, it is up to Turkey if the country "wishes to assume its place in Europe"[19]

It is in this complex process of necessary democratization that Turkey's Kurdish policies and strategies must be re-defined and re-framed within a new political system with appropriate institutional arrangements. The Turkish problem with the Kurds cannot be painted over or brushed away. Provided that Turkey continues its development toward a liberal democratic polity, almost every reform might contribute to create a better ground for different policies and strategies regarding the Kurds in Turkey. In this process, official recognition of diversity, differences and negotiations regarding the ensuing tensions and conflicts should become the basic political philosophy and process.[20]

Turkey has several options for creating a new policy vis-à-vis the Kurds. One possibility is a combination of democratization and decentralization in which the unitary nature of the Turkish state will remain its main characteristic. In this context, an administrative decentralization mechanism will devolve powers to administrative units without recognizing group identities. Several arguments might be used to support such an arrangement: the centralist tradition of the Turkish state (and its Ottoman predecessor), the French Jacobin model, and the fear of breaking up Turkey. But evidence of genuinely democratizing countries that are linked to the EU mechanisms of regional cooperation will undermine such reasoning. Spain and Greece provide two good examples against traditional resistance to reforms and democratization by exploiting fear and shallow arguments.

A second arrangement might combine democratization and decentralization with group recognition. Loyalty to the state and its institutions would be based on the notion of democratic citizenship in which shared interests, values and necessity would not only keep the state and its institutions together but strengthen the ties and links for the benefit of all groups in Turkey. References to historical traditions of recognition in the Middle East and the decentralized characteristics of the Ottoman past can serve this purpose, as well as contemporary European models, such as different arrangements in the UK to meet demands from Scottish, Welsh, and Irish national aspirations.

A third possibility for Turkey is to look closely into the Spanish constitutional revolution of 1978. Post-Franco Spain has become increasingly federal in arrangement, except in name. Post-Franco politicians have recognized the need to integrate democracy and decentralization with recognition of historical nationalities. The 1978 Spanish constitution has created a decentralized, democratic political order in Spain which political scientists characterize as "a plurinational and multilingual state."[21] The most interesting element of the Spanish development is the recognition of the need to build self-government into the fabric of the post-Franco polity by recognizing the unity of the nation (or more appropriately the state) as well as the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions. The right to self-government of municipalities, provinces, and autonomous communities has in fact strengthened both democracy and stability in Spain through a mechanism and process of differentiation of the country's previously unitary state structure.

More than two decades of negotiations and agreements have reinforced self-government and power sharing with the regions, adopting federal arrangements. Local and regional units' rights to make decisions independent of central government supervision and control have contributed to deepening constitutional democracy in Spain.[22] The political redistribution of power (between Madrid and 17 autonomous regions (three historic autonomous regions, one specific statute autonomous community, twelve ordinary autonomous regions and one federal capital region) has given the three historic nationalities in the Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia their own statute of autonomy tailored to their particular situation. In each case, the "central" government and the autonomous regions have a range of exclusive powers but also function jointly in several spheres.

A fourth model that could serve as a good example of restructuring the political system is the development in Belgium. Although this model might be regarded as too radical a departure from the Turkish unitary state tradition with its strong distaste for multiple identities and loyalties and with no tradition in negotiating the political order, it should nevertheless be considered as a possibility. The Belgium federation (since 1993) is based on three territorially defined regions (the Flemish Region, Brussels-Capital Region, and Walloon [French] Region), and three non-territorial language-based communities (the Flemish Community, French Community, and German-speaking Community). Distribution of exclusive powers is between the federal government and two other kinds of governments: while the three territorially delineated governments are mainly responsible for regional economic matters, the three non-territorial communities are mainly responsible for linguistic and cultural matters.

Turkey's Kurdish policy could adapt elements of the British, Spanish, or Belgian systems into its own restructured and reformed political system. Under liberal democratic conditions this could be achieved without overtly opting for federalization of the country.

On its way to "a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and non-discrimination," Turkey, like other EU members, is required to implement all reforms that would qualify the country to a membership negotiation. If the reform process accelerates as it did in most Eastern European countries during the early 1990's, a prediction made by French President Jacques Chirac's two days prior to the largest enlargement ceremonies of May 1, 2004, need not come true. In Chirac's opinion Turkey's entry into the EU was not possible in the short term, however, he believed that Turkey could become a member in the long term (which he defined as a period of 10 to 15 years)--need not come true.[23]

Only Turkish decision-makers have the capacity and capability to disappoint President Chirac and those who believe that Turkey cannot fulfill its obligations. Erdogan observed that his country still has much to do, but his government would "continue to fulfill our responsibilities" to qualify for membership. "We trust ourselves to pass this test honorably," he said, while he warned that "it would not only disappoint the Turkish people, it would seriously damage the basic philosophy of the union," because the union is based on "humanitarian values." Erdogan believed that to delay Turkey's membership further would be "wrong and unjust."[24] Alas, exactly the same arguments would be used by the critics of Turkey for the delay in what the Oostlander report calls revolutionary, but essential reforms.[25] The sooner these reforms are carried out, the better chance Turkey will have to cross the threshold from electoral democracy to liberal democracy.

In that case, for example, the Hakkari FM radio station will not be closed again for 30 days because a Kurdish politician expresses his desire to find a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Kurdish parents do not need to wait for court decisions before they give their children the name they prefer.[26]

At that juncture, the European zone of stability and prosperity will also peacefully be extended to Turkey, the way it did to former Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Having managed to shift mentally, institutionally, and constitutionally from a monolithic world view of assimilation, homogenization, and violent military solutions for the Kurdish issue, Turkey's membership in the EU would no doubt transform the fate of the Kurds in Turkey in a dramatically positive way.

Iraq: From mass killings and genocide to federation?
"I don't accept Iraq. I am not 'Iraqi Kurdish.' I am only Kurdish, Kurdistani Kurdish. Throughout its history Iraq has destroyed me, and I'm not crazy or... masochistic enough to call myself 'Iraqi Kurdish.' When Iraq respects me I will respect it. When Iraq loves me I will love it. ...We are no better than any other people, but no other people is better than [my people]. I like to live in equality, not under an Iraqi-Arab hegemony that doesn't respect our culture, (and) that destroyed us culturally and physically."
--Hiner Saleem, Kurdish film-maker.[27]

The genocidal regime of Saddam Hussein created justifiable arguments for the entire reconstruction of the state of Iraq. This complex process started shortly after the Bush administration removed Saddam Hussein's regime from power in April 2003. Whatever one's opinion on the events and its consequences may be, Iraq's different national, ethnic, and religious groups have now initiated a constitutional and institutional process to re-define, negotiate, and re-shape the nature of the state, the division of powers, and the country's collective identity. A new Iraq would federalize on the basis of a legal text called Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed by Iraq's Governing Council on March 8, 2004. If this "transitional constitution" is successfully followed by a permanent constitution, it will lead to the creation of the first case of a negotiated state reconstruction in the region. What is crucial in this context from a Kurdish perspective can be summarized along the following lines.

With the removal of the Ba'thist regime in Iraq, a political system based on several decades of political brutality, genocide, mass killings, systematic oppression, and repression has come to an end. A new era of state reconstruction has started with the signing of the TAL. Despite many shortcomings and the non-democratic nature of the processes that led to the signing of the document, the TAL has created a new ground for political negotiation in Iraq. It is the first time since Iraq's creation as a modern state that representatives of various groups, political parties, and ideologies held meaningful negotiations and managed to agree on a political structure that corresponds to the reality of the country.

The idea of transforming Iraq from a centralized, discriminating, genocide-prone, and Sunni Arab-dominated state to a federalized system has been one of the strongest Kurdish demands since 1992 and throughout the post-Saddam process. The mere acceptance of this idea in a region with no tradition of negotiation, especially in comparison with the Arab states, is in itself path-breaking.

The TAL recognizes the existence of the Kurdistan Region, despite the uncertainties regarding the precise border and the final status of the region in the permanent constitution. TAL also recognizes the institutions and system the Kurds have developed since 1992, such as the Kurdistan National Assembly and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The articles that guarantee individual human rights, including women's rights, are important achievements in a country where mass graves, summary executions, and disappearances were widespread practices to which the Kurds were the prime victims throughout most of Iraq's modern history.

The agreement that police and internal security in Kurdistan will be within the competence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is a crucial achievement, both due to past central government policies and the fact that the KRG's control of police and security forces will provide assurance for a civilian population that cannot trust any Iraqi armed forces in the near future. The police and security forces would also function as an early warning system for internal border security vis-à-vis Iran, Turkey, and Syria, because these countries are ideologically tempted to undermine institutional consolidations in Kurdistan. Another positive element in the TAL is the decision to confine any future army in Iraq only to external security under strong civilian control.

One of the most controversial paragraphs of the TAL--from the view point of Arab centralizers, non-democratic, and anti-Kurdish neighbors, as well as anti-federal forces in Iraq and the region--is the article in the TAL regarding the ratification process of the final constitution. This gives the Kurds, but also any other people or region with a two-thirds majority in three governorates, to reject a draft constitution. The compromise to see Islam only as one source of legal inspiration could save the Kurds from becoming subjects of a new and feared form of domination, this time by the Shi'a majority, using Islam as a new tool in the political game. The minority rights specified in the TAL would strengthen the democratic experience in Kurdistan, because it will give it a higher standard regarding minority rights and protection. This provision also makes it possible to demand protection for Kurds who live outside the Kurdistan region, such as in Baghdad and other areas. The language rights guaranteed by the TAL will for the first time strengthen the Kurds in a federal Iraq, both by making Kurdish a second official language and providing for Kurdish to be used extensively in the Kurdistan Region.

Despite all its shortcomings, the TAL has provided a necessary condition for Iraq to develop a plurinational, religiously tolerant, and democratic federation. This desired and hopeful outcome can hardly be achieved easily without meeting many favorable and necessary conditions.

Though there are reasons to hope that the promises made in the TAL mentioned above would strengthen a voluntary federal Iraq, it will require addressing the following issues:

--Whether the question of Kirkuk and other Arabized areas can be solved in a peaceful way;

--Whether Kurdistan's taxing capacities can finance expected welfare programs;

--Whether the electoral system would be based on proportional representation in which the Kurds will gain their share of posts and positions;

--Whether shared commerce power would be beneficial for Kurdistan region;

--Whether a post on the presidential council or as prime minister would be allocated to a Kurdish representative;

--Whether the transitional government and parliament manage to set up appropriate mechanisms and processes for constitutional negotiations, new elections for the National Assembly, and appointment of a new government during 2005.

In addition, the TAL warrants several reservations. Conflicts regarding natural resources might arise in the future because of unclear language in the TAL. The question of the second chamber (for regional representation), necessary to create a meaningful federal system, is not mentioned at all. The situation has to be solved in ways accepted by the main constituent peoples of the country. This might lead to deadlocks during the negotiations for a permanent constitution. The question of Kurdish representation in the presidential council and the council of ministries, including the position of the prime minister, might lead to tension between the Kurds and other groups in a future government if no clear mechanisms are found in time.

The KRG might also face conflicting interpretations on the question of its authority over border controls. The final status of Kirkuk might turn out to be much more problematic and difficult to solve than anticipated, particularly if outside powers manage to manipulate different groups either to serve outside interests or by undermining ongoing negotiations at sensitive junctures. Claiming to have the right to act as they wish because they hold a majority might turn out to be a strong card in the hands of various Shi'a politicians, who might be less popular than they imagined. At specific times this "majority game" might be used to undermine liberal rights and guarantees, thereby creating confusion in relation to the role of Islam in politics and inviting outside powers in order to alter delicate internal power balances. Other questions might also arise due to unclear arrangements regarding power-sharing in the federal government.[28]

The elections on January 30, 2005, gave the transformation process in Iraq a new momentum. The turnout in Kurdistan was far better than the rest of Iraq--almost 85 percent. The Kurdistan Alliance List[29] gained 75 seats in Iraq's Transitional Assembly (26 percent of the total seats).[30] Equally important is the fact that the Kurdistan National Democratic List[31] gained 104 out of 111 seats in the Kurdistan National Assembly. (See tables below.)

March toward independence

The Kurds have accomplished a great deal since the Iraqi liberation, and now, better than ever before, the road is cleared to march toward independence. They need to be well prepared so that when opportunity knocks, they can respond nimbly.

More than two years have passed since the Iraqi Liberation. Assessing the situation, one can pronounce the Kurds and Shiites as the major winners, while the Sunni Arabs have been trapped in a wave of violence that they themselves orchestrated. The Kurds have made a major political stride forward toward federalism, which was their short-term objective.

With what has been gained, the Kurds can prepare to realize their erstwhile dream of an independent Kurdistan. This is a golden opportunity for the Kurds; their chance to choose between liberation and oppression, freedom or subjugation.

This gain should not be underestimated. Thanks to the Bush administration's courage to topple Saddam Hussein and a government that rivaled the Turkish government in its brutality, repression, and inhumane treatment of the Kurds. The defeat of such a barbaric leader and his system of government should be credited to President Bush, because if it weren't for him, Saddam would still be ruling with an iron fist.

Everything that could have gone right for the Kurds, did. Right before the Iraqi Liberation, the Turks were offered over twenty-five billion dollars to let America use their country as a base for flying out jets and transporting troops. But the Turks' greed ran high: their counteroffer was double the US's offer, which outraged the Bush administration, and rightfully so. The Turkish counteroffer was refused.

What really happened here was that the unscrupulous Turks were willing to override their strong feelings against the US war with Baghdad if American were willing to pay enough. Ironically, Bush's rejection of the counteroffer eliminated the Kurds' biggest fear. Imagine if the Turks had aligned with America and provided tens of thousands of their own troops to participate in the Iraqi mission. That would have undoubtedly diminished the Kurdish influence and weakened their voice. In short, as the Turks tried to take advantage of the US, their own anti-American sentiments shifted them out of the sphere of the US's favorite allies.

Moreover, when the Turks attempted to cement their relationship with Iran and Syria, their flaming anti-Semitism served to deteriorate their relationship with Israel and to draw even more concern from America over Turks' foreign policies.

The Kurds faced two more opponents of their independence: Syria and Iran, both of which are now on the US's dirty list of states sponsoring terrorism. They have been cornered by the US and have been kept in at bay. Thus the three countries that have opposed an autonomous Kurdish state, or federalism for Iraq, have been prevented from interfering, and the Kurdish road to freedom is unobstructed.

So far, the Kurds have been promised everything they've asked for, thanks to the eagerness of the Shiites to exert full control over the new Iraqi government, and thanks also to the chaos that has plagued the Sunni region. The Sunni's have unwittingly placed the Kurds in a powerful position. Imagine if the Sunnis were to fully participate in the election and to form alliance with their brethren, the Arab Muslim Shiites. If this had happened, there wouldn't have been an easy political deal breaking for the Kurds. Under this scenario, the Shiites and Sunni Arabs together could have had two-thirds of the majority they needed to pass any legislation, and that by itself would have eliminated the Kurds from the bargaining table. Fortunately, however, the Sunni's are out of the political stage, the Kurds have become a viable participant, forcing the Shiite's to bow to their demands, and the future promises to continue in this direction in the face of the growing Kurdish influence both nationally and internationally.

The nations of the world have given high recognition to the Kurds for demonstrating civil and peaceful attributes, for speeding up reconstruction of past destructions, for heeding the voice of their democratic spirit, and for offering civility in the face of past repression. Obviously, the Kurds couldn't have achieved these things if it weren't for their remarkable unity as a nation who stood up with one voice, and for their leaders who, with the sense of humility and compromise, set their personal differences aside for the good of the nation.

So far so good. But there are crucial tasks ahead. The most important issue is that of Kurkuk. Dislocated Kurds during Saddam's Arabization need to be able to return to their birthplace with adequate compensation and regain their confiscated properties. At the same time, the pro-Saddam Arabs who have settled in Kirkuk and elsewhere in Kurdistan must return to their respected places. This is imperative because of Kirkuk's economic significance - Kirkuk can serve as the economic backbone for an autonomous Kurdistan in the beginning and independent Kurdistan in the
future.

The second task is to deal with the Peshmarga, the security force. Since their elimination will leave the Kurds vulnerable and threatened, it is imperative that the Peshmarga not only stay, but that their power should be further enhanced through training and that they should be armed with heavy war machinery to combat any future battles. The Peshmarga, along with other intelligence agencies, have been a deciding force in maintaining peace and stability in Kurdistan and in protecting Iraq's borders with Syria, Iran and Turkey, thus preventing the infiltration of terrorists and being a helping hand to the coalition forces in Iraq. Moreover, the Kurdish leaders have a moral responsibility to cleanse their ranks from shameful corruptions that have plagued their circle of leadership.

The Kurds have accomplished a great deal since the Iraqi liberation, and now, better than ever before, the road is cleared to march toward independence. Knowing that the opportunity will soon come for the Kurds to declare their sovereignty, they need to be well prepared so that when opportunity knocks, they can respond nimbly

www.law.qub.ac.uk/humanrts/video/HPIM0708.JPG

Hope the url of the map comes through, but you may know it anyway, what are 100 years?

Why the Kurds are miserable and asking for an independent Kurdish state?

Not even a modicum of the crimes, atrocities and genocides perpetrated against the Kurdish civilian have been documented, revealed or even recognized. One of the reasons is probably most people are unaware of them since they were never allowed to be exposed. I will try to briefly point to some them for readers information.

1. 10,000 ( Ten Thousands) dead and 5,000 ( Five Thousands)injured in a single day in a Kurdish city named Halabja. Saddam attacked this small city by the most devastating weapons. Internationally prohibited chemical weapons were applied.

2. 8,000 (Eight Thousands) male members belonging to a clan named" Barzaniis" were arrested and disappeared. For more than 23 long years, there were no sign of them. Their destiny was unknown totally. Their families meekly remained in anticipation. With no income and supervision. Waiting all these elongated years hoping that someday they may reunite together. They had been found, all of them had been massacred and buried alive by Saddam dictator regime. The bodies of 512 were just retrieved few months ago.

3. More than 4,000 (four Thousands) Kurdish villages and town have been reduced to rubble and entirely ruined.

4. In an operation named "Anfal", 182,000 One Hundred Eight thousands Kurds were expelled out of their homes, misplaced and executed by Saddam.

5. Iranian, Turkish and Syrian prisons are filled with Kurdish political dissents, activists and writers. Just during last three months, 3 Kurdish political prisoners were tortured to death by Iranian authorities. Their pictures were posted on numerous Kurdish website.

6. Turkey continues to kill innocent Kurdish civilians under the pretext of dislodging and disarming a Kurdish group "PKK ". No matter for whatsoever reason, the killing of innocent people can not be justified. According to some estimates, 8000 members of PKK or other Kurdish political groups are serving indefinite terms in Turkish prisons. No access for Human Rights Groups.

7. 500,000 ( Five Hundreds thousand ) Kurds living in Syria and having been born in that country have been refused citizenship and recognition. The most primary and basic right of every citizens.

What has happened to the stateless Kurds has never and ever happened or had distinctiveness in the relating of any country, people or nation. That is why they are struggling for an independent Kurdish state.

This is not a relevant question any longer for Americans to make.
Bush et al, have screwed the pooch. They have lost their chance for injecting larger numbers of American troops into Iraq to help stabilize the situation. Our chances are all used up. All we need is hollow tough talking Joe Biden to say: "we've only got six more months to 'make this work ... 'we've only got six more months to 'get this right ... get this right ... get this right ... get this right.'"
Hey, George; Dic; Don; Condi; Joe Biden and Joe Lieberman:
you're ALL full of cow dung up to your eyeballs.
The Americans are simply not entitled to discuss partition. It will have to be an Iraqi decision.
We need to get out within the year. Sooner, if I have my way.
If the combat in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, as well as Lebanon continue to escalate, or if the U.N. actually establishes sanctions against Iran, expect a forment of Shi'a inspired acts across the region.
Simply stepping up the number of patrol boats launched by the Iranians in the Straits of Hormuz could raise the cost of a barrel of oil by .50. And that's all that needs to happen. Heavily armed patrol boats being told by the U.S. Navy "do not approach."
The threat of 140,000 American military, and perhaps 50,000 other Americans getting cut off in Iraq is possible, short term.
The U.S. would level any opposition to pulling Americans out of Iraq, but the scene of Americans moving to ships with their faces pointed INTO Iraq ... well, that's the end of the game for the U.S.
I favor withdrawal, and giving the Iraqi people the dignity they deserve to decide their own fate.
Establishing some kind of enclaves would be akin to the way this region was divided up after WW I by the British and French.
It's no longer any of our business.
God Bless Iraq. God protect Iraqis. God save Americans as they leave, in disgrace. Justifiably so.
They were never meant to be in Iraq.
Only an idiot would have thought he heard God telling him to "invade Iraq," in the Name of Jesus Christ!!!

Kurdish Question, Turkey and the European Union

Salah Bayaziddi

In the so called post-Cold War era, the spread of nationalism and the rise of ethnic conflicts appears to be the major source of insecurity and instability in the world. Considering the multi-ethnic structure of the most Third World countries and given their persisting economic crisis, uneven economic development, and acute socio-political difficulties, a further intensification of ethnic conflicts seems very likely in the future. At the moment it seems that the most probable scenario for ethnic conflict lies in the dissatisfaction of stateless nationalism from the present international order. Indeed, factors that govern the degree and depth of the danger posed by the revival of these types of nationalism clearly indicate that they are a major threat to international peace because their accommodation require greater and more disruptive geographical change. Since the present international system is not favourable to dramatic changes, stateless nationalism can produce war of secession, which in turn could develop into major international wars.

The Kurdish question, a chronic source of instability in the Middle Eastern politics, is one of the most significant case studies of ethnic conflicts in the world today. The Kurdish modern history has been emerged as one of constant revolts, bloody repression, massacres, and deportations. Numbering over 30 million, the Kurds are one of the largest non-state nation in the world, well able to pursue separatist ambitious. Ever since the old principalities of Kurdistan were forcibly divided between the two powerful Ottoman and Persian empires in the seventeenth century, they have not been able to build an independent Kurdish state. Indeed, the Kurds have continually been made to suffer for being denied their historical opportunities. In 1920, following the end of the First World war, the victorious allies gave their approval to the creation of the Kurdish state in the Treaty of Sevres. But that promise was not kept, and the rise of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish nationalist leader, and factional division among the Kurds shattered the independence of Kurdistan. The Treaty of Sevres was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, which divided Kurdistan between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria (the four most powerful political entities in western Asia) and the former Soviet Union. Since then, the Kurds have constantly been caught up in regional rivalries, repeated staged rebellions against their home governments and abandoned by their erstwhile allies whenever suited the latter. Clearly, the importance of NATO and the general sensitivity of the Middle East following the collapse of monarchy (the Shah) in Iran and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and fear of losing oil-rich Arab clients mean that the independence of Kurdistan is not viewed with sympathy by the United States and the major powers. In recent years, although the Kurdish question has moved to the centre of the stage in a troubled area of global significance, the great powers see the Kurdish nationalism as another destabilizing feature of the most strategic and oil-rich regions of the world.

This paper aims to concentrate mainly on the Kurdish question in Turkey (the importance of the new developments following the abduction of the P.K.K. leader by Turkish government in 1999). The Turkish state has been attempting to eradicate Kurdish uprisings since the establishment of the republic in 1923. Ever since, Turkey has often used a combination of policies including military repression, forced assimilation, and deportation. The Kurdish problem seemed isolated and under control for decades, but the ramifications of this bitter struggle in the post-Cold war made it Turkey's most salient internal as well as external crisis for the coming years. The problem is on the doorstep of the Europe, involving the most valuable ally of the West among the Muslim countries and the largest ethnic group in the world without a state of its own. It has finally become apparent that the Kurdish national question in Turkey characterized by a dimension that crosses borders and endangers peace. This paper seeks to examine significant obstacles to resolving Turkey's Kurdish problem including the specific characteristic of the conflict, the Kemalist (the essential characteristic of Turkish state ideology) concept of nation, the causes of conflict, various interests of the conflicting parties, and the pre-eminent role of military in the Turkish politics.
This paper also aims to analyse the crucial role of the European Union for finding a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Turkey's ambition to join Europe in the sense of full membership in the EU suffered repeated setbacks in the 1990s (mostly due to the massive abuse of human rights), and has only recently been restored with the formal acceptence of Turkey's status as a candidate for membership at the EU's December 1999 Helsinki summit. Ever since Turkey was accepted as a candidate in the EU membership, all conditions put forward by Brussels in its "Accession Partnership Argument" document seemed achievable including such thorny issues as settling the Cyprus problem. All that is, except one: Kurdistan and the Kurds. Indeed, for Turkey, the Kurdish question lies beyond the realm of wills and intentions. It is intimately connected to the very roots of Kemalist ideology, and touches on such sensitive matters as the nature of the Turkish nation state was established in 1923 to replace the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. In this context, the Kurds are only seen as an integral part of the Turkish people. Turkey is indeed standing on the threshold of a new era if Turkey is really serious in its efforts to join the EU and to be part of the European system of values that recognizes the cultural, and political rights of minorities.

The EU criticizes Turkey on the grounds that it has resorted to the military option over the Kurdish issue, and not attempted a political solution. The Union also criticize Turkey for not applying to the Kurdish minority the Copenhagen criteria regarding the protection of minorities. The Turkish approach to the Kurdish issue seems to have been incompatible with the Copenhagen criteria, which require that Turkey should fully recognize cultural identity and cultural diversity, not least in the case of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. Indeed, the EU asks Turkey to remove any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their own mother tongue on TV and in radio broadcasts, to lift the state of emergency in the south-east (Kurdish region) and to respect the cultural rights of all her citizens, irrespective of ethnic origin, in education and other fields (Arikan, 2003: 24-25). Turkey, however, takes the view that there is no need to grant minority status to people of different ethnic origin within the country, except for cases mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey acknowledges the existence of different ethnic groups, including the Kurds. But it denies them the legal status of a minority. According to the Turkish view, all the country's ethnic groups together constitute Turkish nation and are first-class citizens enjoying equal rights. This paper argues that Turkey's human rights system, part of her legal system and her constitution, and especially its policy of Kurdish issues all far short from of the standards outlined in the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership.

As a primary step, this paper sees that it is crucial to analysis the legal and actual status of the Kurds with respect to domestic and international law. "In states with ethnic, religious, or language minorities, members of such minorities must not be denied the right, along with other members of their group, to cultivate their own cultural life, to practice their own language, or to speak and learn own language." (International Agreement On Civil And Political Rights, Art. 27). "We declare that the ethnic, cultural, language, and religious identity of national minorities must be protected and that members of national minorities have the right to express, protect, and further develop their identity in full equality and without discrimination." (Paris Charter). The Turkish republic is a member of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the CSCE. It is signatory to all the above-mentioned declarations, pacts, and agreements. The important question: what is the legal and actual status of the Kurds in Turkey with reference to these international agreements?

According to these Turkish laws: 1) It is forbidden for Kurds to give their children Kurdish names. 2) Kurds may not use Kurdish place names for cities and villages. 3) Kurds may not express their thoughts in their native language, Kurdish. 4) The language of the Kurds is Turkish, not Kurdish. Kurds may not open any schools or course, which offer instruction in Kurdish. 5) No one in Turkey may claim that Kurds exist as a separate people or minority. 6) Kurds in Turkey cannot produce publications in the form of newspapers and magazines, nor may import publications `about the Kurds, which have published in other countries. 7) Kurds in Turkey may not form a political party to defend their rights (Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Art. 28 Sections 5-11). As the laws discussed in this paper clearly show, there is a de jure and de facto system in Turkey which denies the identity of the Kurdish people This denial hasn't just been the policy of the last few years, rather it is part of an unbroken 80-year tradition. As a cursory look at the Turkish legal system will show, from the beginning all laws were drafted in such a way so as to prevent there being any loopholes which the Kurds could make use of, and special regulations were enacted to ensure that Kurds, people with a Kurdish identity, could not enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms. One example, all but 22 of the 177 Articles of the Turkish Constitution insure that the Kurds are not allowed to possess their fundamental rights and freedoms. Of course, neither the Constitution nor the Criminal Code makes use of the word "Kurd"; rather Kurdish nationality and Kurdish identity are covered by the notion of that which "violates the territorial and national integrity of the state" (Schultz, 1994: 2-3).
The fact is, that Turkish government ignores international agreements and treaties. In addition to this refusal to recognize the existence of its Kurdish minority, the Turkish government is not even prepared to guarantee conditions for the Kurdish people which comply with the "Universal Declaration On Human Rights". This is clearly evident if one compares sections of international agreements to sections of Turkish law. Furthermore, a comparison between international and domestic Turkish law clearly shows that the Turkish government is practicing a racist form of assimilation policies with respect to the Kurds. This practice is unique in the world. Indeed, the Turkish government can sum up its policies with respect to the Kurds in Turkey with the following sentence: Destroy the militants and assimilate the rest. In other words, destroy the Kurds and kill all those who resist, the rest can be dealt with through the process of assimilation. Those that remain will be Turkified and will no longer have a Kurdish identity. Then there will no longer be a Kurdish problem. That is the foundation of Turkey's policies against the Kurds.

It is also crucial to mention here that Turkish elite and public that have grown accustomed to a more vigorous assertion of Turkish nationalism---often in opposition to European preference--now find themselves with a renewed European perspective. This perspective is appealing to Western-oriented Ataturkists and to an increasingly materialistic middle class. It is also appealing to those traditionally on the margins of Turkish society and politics, especially the Kurds who see in Europe the possibility of more tolerance and freedom of action for their own views. So far, Turkey's leadership and society have not had to confront the dilemma posed by a strong nationalist tradition and a powerful attachment to state sovereignty, on the other hand, with the prospect of integration in a sovereignty-diluting Europe, on the other hand.

The Kurds present an intriguing case study of frustrated nationalism. They are often cited as the largest ethnic group, at least in the Middle East that has failed to gain statehood in the late twentieth century. They are also an outstanding example of translates ethnicity. Yet, this nation is in formation, and especially its Turkish segment, which apparently accounts for the largest numbers, has not received much scholarly attention until quite recently. Many books dealing with the Kurds take the form of advocacy, sometimes in impassionated terms. In part this reflects the effects of the Kurds on Western publics, especially since the Gulf War, in the aftermath of which hundred of thousands of them fled from Iraq into Iran and turkey. Dispassionate scholars familiar with the Kurds are hard to find. As an organized Kurdish insurrection and revival of Kurdish nationalism within Turkey drags into its twentieth years, however, this is beginning to change. Thus, this paper has tried to use as much possible to use those recent scholarly studies on the revival of Kurdish nationalism within Turkey.

A strong sense of Turkish nationalism was always imbedded within the Ataturkist vision, and was closely tied to the modernization and Westernization of the country. The basic assumptions underpinning Ataturkism and the Turkish sense of nationalism have been widely shared among Turkish elites in the period of the Turkish Republic. Most importantly, the decade of the 1990s saw the emergence of independent Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, and stimulated a lively debate in Turkey over the prospects foe new ties based on ethnic affinity in the Caucasus and Central Asia, even embracing a large region, from the Balkans to Western China. This pan-Turkish potential was taken up by fringe elements on the nationalist right, and was embraced in milder form, emphasizing trade and cultural ties, by mainstream parties as well as Turkey's active business community (Lusstick, 1998: 30-34). In this same period, the emergence of an increasingly violent Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Anatolia, led by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and a more general rise in Kurdish political activism encouraged a nationalist reaction across the political spectrum. This reaction continues today, despite the waning of the PKK challenge, and was evident in the wake of the capture and trial of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. The Ocalan affair, in particular, served as a rallying point for those who have been directly affected by the war against the PKK, which may have claimed, as many as 40,000 victims (mostly Kurds) on all sides.
The primary internal cause of Kurdish problem is the strict application of the Kemalit concept of nation in Turkey, which defines the Turkish nation as a sum of citizens without consideration of ethnic minorities. Thus on the basis of the Kemalist definition of the Turkish nation and the resulting principle of equality, any expression of Kurdish identity is forbidden and persecuted. In his book, Ataturk's Children: Turkey and the Kurds, John Simpson has pointed out that "more than half century after the death of Mustafa Kemal "Ataturk" (Father of the Turks), it is still illegal in Turkey to broadcast Kurdish, teach Kurdish, or set up an explicitly Kurdish political party. In the name of defending Ataturk's authoritarian legacy, Kurdish nationalists, dissident Turkish intellectuals have been imprisoned for crimes of thought on the Kurdish issue, and in the name of a war against terrorism thousands of Kurdish settlements have been emptied and often burned down" (Simpson, 1996:19). The Turkish government claims that as members of the Turkish nation, the Kurds have rights in all aspects however, the right to care for and to develop their ethnicity, culture and language is not included in the understanding of equality. As a result, one can assert that nation-building could be especially problematic when within the same state distinct groups continued to exist. Thus, this paper seems that it is essential to examine the process of state-building and the establishment of a modern Turkish Republic following the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World war in 1918.

The authoritarian tradition (especially the Ottoman legacy) has proved an important factor in preventing the Turkish government from finding a peaceful and democratic solution for its present Kurdish problem. In line with this argument, Michael M. Gunter, contends that "the modern Republic of Turkey, which Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) proclaimed on October 29, 1923, from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, can be fully understood with reference to its political, cultural, and historical antecedents, as well as its own unique experiences. The absolutism of the Ottoman Sultan and the related concept of "oriental despotism" are not pillars upon which a modern western democracy can be readily built" (Gunter, 1997:3). According to the "Millet" system of the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim communities such as Greeks, Armenians, Jews allowed a means of self-government, but the Muslim inhabitants were considered to be united as members of what the Sultan called "nation of Islam". The Kurds, along with the Arabs, Albanians, and the Turks and other Muslim communities, were grouped together within the single nation of Islam. Therefore, the obstinate refusal in the modern republic of Turkey to admit that its citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage constitute a minority can be understood in light of the old Ottoman principle that Islam took precedence over nationality among Muslims could hold some type of officially recognized minority status.

A combination of internal and external pressures prompted the fragmentation of the original Christian "Millets" system during the early years of the nineteen century, with these now developing a stronger ethnic identity (Karpat 1988: 46-47). It is generally accepted that these developments signalled the beginnings of serious nationalism among these communities. These changes associated with the introduction and spread of capitalist economic relations, and other concomitant developments like larger-scale demographic shifts beginning in the 1860s, qualitatively transformed the Ottoman Empire during the last half of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman state became radically changed from an ethno-political entity into a territorial state that was still Muslim in character. The significance of this should not be underestimated; individual subjects' allegiances were transformed from Sultan "to an impersonal national Muslim state (Karpat, 1988, 49). The transformed Ottoman Empire took Islam as it social glue and Turkish as its official language. The empire was also supposed to be Islamic; it was not long, however, before its rulers began a drive to remove clerical political influence. Secular nationalism could not function as a social glue in the same way as the old Ottoman ethno-religious policy had, in this diverse empire containing several incipient nations. The result was inevitable, if not predictable: the empire was fragmented into a number of separate nation-states.

The history of the development by the Kurds of their national distinctiveness and the consequent emergence of a Kurdish national movement is a long-drawn-out one. Many scholars of Kurdish history consider that Sheikh Ubaydallah's rebellions in 1879-81 marked the emergence of a genuine Kurdish national movement (Olson, 1989:15). One distinguished Kurdologist even goes as far as the period of unplanned revolts and riots beginning in 1806, in seeking to trace the genesis of Kurdish nationalism. At least two scholars - Bsile Nikitine and Robert Olson -- have attempted to classify the history of Kurdish nationalism into distinct stages beginning respectively at 1806 and 1881. Robert Olson is indeed, correct in classifying Sheikh Ubeydallah's rebellion as the first authentic nationalist movement. Even so, however, this particular rebellion had a pre-history in what could be termed the preceding proto-nationalist uprisings and the events hundred years earlier, which divided Kurdistan into enclaves subservient to foreign domination. If the pre-history were taken into consideration, a schematic chronological typology of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey from its earliest murmurings right up to the present day would be as follows:

-1514-1879: the period from division to Sheikh Ubaydallah rebellions
- 1879-1908: the period from the defeat of Ubaydallah to the Young Turk rebellion
-1908-1925: the period from the Young Turk rebellion to the Sheikh Said rebellion
-1925-1938: the period from Sheikh Said's rebellion to Dersim
-1938-1965: the period from the Dersim rebellion to the dawn of modern national movement
-1965-the present: the period of the modern national movement

The historic division of the Kurds following the battle of Caldiran in 1514 had already been mentioned above, together with the face that this political division has persisted up until the present, with the Kurds being divided up between Turkish and non-Turkish overlords.

The rebellion of 1879 led by Sheikh Ubaydallah represents the emergence of a genuine Kurdish national movement. He was a combination of a religious and a nationalist political leader. As the most powerful individual Kurdish leader of his day, the Ottomans appointed Ubaydallah commander of the Kurdish forces, during the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish war (Olson, 1989: 215). The decades of squabbling between rival Kurdish chieftains since the crushing of the autonomous principalities had already caused much suffering to the Kurdish population; the ravages of this new war brought 'unprecedented social and economic dislocation' on top of this. The Ottoman authorities were unable to relieve this situation; meanwhile, they had destroyed the power and authority of the autonomous princes who would previously have rallied the Kurds in the face of such adversity. Into the leadership vacuum caused by the Ottomans, Sheikh Ubaydallah stepped - his own authority, in part at least, an Ottoman creation (Olson, 1989: 4-5). Wielding both the position thrust upon him by the Ottomans and the religious authority that he had inherited, Ubaydallah stepped into breach.

Ubaydallah responded both politically and military. Politically, he formed the Kurdish Tribal League, the first Kurdish alliance of its kind (Olson, 1989: 5-6), which initiated negotiations with the British, warning them of the consequences of promoting Armenian and Nestorian interests at the expense of the Kurds. In July 1880, Sheikh Ubaydullah himself wrote to the British vice-consul in Baskale