Trade rounds have often collapsed in the past and then been resurrected when the political winds have changed. This was notably true of the previous major round of liberalization, the so-called Uruguay round, which took eight years to complete instead of the planned four. But just because resurrection has happened before does not guarantee that it will always happen. And the political climate in which this collapse has occurred does threaten to make things more dangerous this time.

The reason begins with American politics and the American economy. I begin there not to blame America for the collapse, but rather to stress its important role in setting the tone for the politics of globalization. The Bush administration has dug its heels in on Doha because Congress has become skeptical of trade and globalization in general, despite rapid, continued American economic growth and high employment levels. Just imagine what could happen if the economy slows -- indeed, look at that much slower second-quarter GDP figure just out last week -- and if unemployment begins to rise. Then what has been a niggling anti-China movement could well turn into something much more aggressive.

Now look at the state of America's relations with the other main protagonists in trade: the European Union, China, Brazil, India, Japan. Trust in American leadership remains strong in Japan and, thanks to the nuclear deal, is on the rise in India. But that is not true of the EU, China or Brazil. There, willingness to wait for American political storms to blow over is distinctly frail. In China's case, there may well be some instinct to exploit American weakness by making its own deals, as over energy and aid. Politics in Europe may, as Moises says, turn more favorable next year with a new French president and a new British prime minister. Yet while I am confident that Gordon Brown will remain firmly in favor of globalization, the same cannot necessarily be said of either Nicholas Sarkozy or Segolene Royal, the likeliest candidates in France. Both are likely to preach reform, but they might well seek to use protectionism as a way to buy time, by pandering to domestic special interests.

Finally, there is the raw state of international politics generally: bad blood, and terrible bloodshed, over the Middle East, Iran, North Korea, Iraq and more. So far, that has had no effect on the booming world economy or on trade relationships. But it might: a wider war, a new terrorist atrocity, some other explosion, all could turn politics in a new direction which could be away from further globalisation.

Or not, of course. It might all be a blip, just a missed opportunity rather than a true disaster. Let us hope so. But Doha's collapse leaves the world vulnerable to something worse, while we wait for resurrection to occur.