The Current Discussion: The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan. Rather than sending more troops, is it time to negotiate a truce there?
Back when the Americans began the invasion of Afghanistan, if someone would have said that one day they would have to negotiate with the Taliban, he or she would have been called mad and such an event would be considered an impossibility. While formal discussions for a truce may not be on the cards just yet, there are a number of local Taliban commanders who have negotiated settlements with the government of Hamad Karzai. The reality of Afghanistan is not about the Taliban; it’s about how this war-ravaged country has sought internal order, and steeped in the history of resisting occupation. After the defeat of the Soviet Union, it became apparent that the warring Mujahideen factions, without exception, had agendas supported by countries in the region and were perhaps the single most-decisive factor that encouraged the growth of the Taliban who were fiercely independent of others, even though Pakistan may be encouraged their formation.
While the Taliban model for society is not realistically in tune with modernism and progress and has severe social implications, especially for women, the inability of the Americans and Hamad Karzai to create feasible alternates within Afghan society has meant that the hold of the Taliban has a strong hold at the village and district level. A combination of force, money and tribal alliances make the Taliban prosper, and in some cases, even cut off the region from the Afghan government who may wish to develop projects there. On the other hand, some would argue that Hamad Karzai's government has received huge sums of money for development aid, against which there has been little development to speak off.
If there is to be a solution for this unfortunate war-torn country then it must come from within, and, unfortunately, this might mean the Taliban will bargain hard for control. In contrast, Hamad Karzai must create a viable government and bring progress to the people; a task at which he seems to have failed. Even though I would admit there is no alternate to him and his government, personally the thought of the Taliban making a comeback is rather scary. The Taliban may have changed their political dimensions, especially those who now are negotiating with the government, as they resist foreign presence, both of Americans and even al-Qadea, the reality is that should the Taliban share power it shall not be long before they will have established more effective control than was intended to be shared with them.
If the aim of the negotiation is to bring peace in some areas this can be encouraged, but the dividend of this peace has to be development of the area for the good of the people and the use of the tribal system to wrest control from the Taliban of these regions. If the aim is to induce the Taliban into a power sharing framework then the consequences will be quite disastrous in the long run. In short, this is not an easy or comfortable situation. It is further complicated by the fact that if the Americans are to leave then I would see the Karzai government collapsing either politically or by the eruption of a civil war. The only bet is to get progress into the villages, win the hearts of the people – and then there is a chance.
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