In reality, the West no longer represents the sum of all countries in Western Europe and America. Europeans have detached themselves from blindly following America’s foreign policies and continual readiness to fight. Where necessary – such as in Afghanistan – Europeans join efforts to rid the world of extremists, and do so with steady nerves. And when pushed – such as in Iraq, Lebanon, former Yugoslavia and in engaging Iran – the common foreign policy institutions of the European Union trump the influence of lofty but aimless Washington-brewed schemes.

Europeans and Russians have a deep understanding of war and the disasters that fighting brings. Bitter memories of death and destruction have unified Europe around debate and reason. Despite historical and ethnic differences, Europeans and Russians share a common reluctance to fight. Unlike American leadership, neither maintains an apocalyptic worldview or desires to engage in crusades. A modern desire for peace and cooperation overrules MacKinder’s nightmares about America and Britain, Haushofer’s domination or Spykman’s containment theories.

Europeans and Russians are engaged in realistic business relations of mutual benefit, including the supply of oil and gas, partnership in new pipelines, and the sale of machinery and equipment for modernization and environmental cleanup. Russian companies are finding ways to engage European industries, both as suppliers and customers. Subcontracting for Airbus components is one of many examples.

The oil issue is a fabricated problem. Two European oil companies, BP and Shell, lead European investment in the Russian oil and gas sector while Gazprom competes with European companies to sell natural gas in the British and German markets.

Ukraine, a NATO aspirant, tried to test such concurrence in 2005. It flexed its muscles and shut off natural gas transit to Europe, via Russian-owned pipelines. Europe and Russia simply decided to bypass Ukraine, building a direct alternative route. Russia and Germany are now partners in an underwater gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea. When Belarus tried to block transport of crude oil thru Russian-owned pipelines in 2006, it was warned off by Russia and Europe. Bulgaria and Greece subsequently launched a project to transport Russian crude oil, diversify pipeline routes, and reduce shipping risk and environmental disasters.

The so-called “Iran card” is a confusing notion created in Washington, where fiction is brewed in a state of denial. The naked fact is that Iran is no longer a pawn on the old Cold War chessboard or a creampuff run by a puppet. Washington projects the spectre of an Islamic monster to divert attention from its own failed policies: useless sanctions, defeated containment policies, a bankrupt Oslo Agreement, and a bad bet on Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Tolerating the Taliban and their absurd Sunni extremism, pitting Sunni against Shi’ite, and a habit of calling others “evil” do not constitute cards played by Russia. Iran and Russia should not serve as handy whipping boys for failed American policies in the Middle East.

About 28 years ago, America was fiercely opposed to the construction of a natural gas pipeline from the USSR to Europe, and Washington directed Europe to consume more oil and coal. That shortsighted policy would have translated into greater environmental destruction and more acute global warming for the world. Perhaps we ought to review that lesson, if only for guidance regarding who is picking a fight today.