Indeed, Iraq has always been a difficult case. Saddam's Iraq was an economic disaster. It generated an average $10 billion a year in net foreign debt, all back in 1970s and 1980s when a billion dollars was still a lot of money. It was addicted to contributions from friendly Sunni states, sponsoring either its absurd brand of pan-Arabism or its promise to stand up against the Shiite Shah or the post-revolutionary Iran. Iraq's Western and Soviet friends cheered from the sidelines.

In turn, Saddam deported of more than 65,000 Shiites and Jews to Iran to please his Sunni paymasters. It is no wonder that the same paymasters are now funding the insurgents (of the Al Qaeda and other extremists variety) to hold ground in Iraq and provide refuge for Wahabi Jihadis. Saddam is gone, but his old sponsors, and his Kuwaiti enemies, persist.

Iraq's future lies with its economy. Currently, its infrastructure is very brittle if not destroyed. After 10 years under a sanctions regime and 4 years of war, precious little is left.

Realistically, an estimated direct investment of more than half a trillion dollars is needed to start rebuilding Iraq. That is 100,000 U.S. dollars per Iraqi household, over the next 3-5 years. And this is merely to jumpstart the Iraqi economy. (At current production rates and oil prices, this means about 14 years of Iraqi oil revenues). This excludes the funds needed for a new army, security system, education, healthcare, and electricity.

At these prices, it is no wonder that Washington wants to continue to fight its $1 billion-a-week war. It is unlikely for American taxpayers to fund the reconstruction of Iraq. Denial, and deflecting blame on Iran and Syria, is proving to be much cheaper (albeit short-sighted and absurd).

However, the biggest problems lie in other parts of the region and not Iraq. Over the next 10 years, the young population of the Middle East will face significant unemployment problems. More than 22 million jobs must be created in the region over the next 10 years merely to sustain current rates of employment. Saudi Arabia will have more than 10 million additional young people in the job market, but without work. This is very fertile ground for the recruitment of yet more radical Wahhabi extremists.

As such, Iraq (be it in one or three pieces) will be part of a much larger and more difficult economic, and thus political, earthquake in the region.

All regional players must engage in a serious, meaningful dialogue about Iraq. Otherwise, the volcano of that country may erupt, serving as the catalyst for a much larger explosion across the region. Those in Washington that are still waiting to be received as liberators of Iraq must take note and join in the discussions.