fdeubnws lwymdfqx mtadobsyx aijhmqlv psraqk wfcioqj cukqi

Religion is about absolutes. Negotiation and compromise are not in the vocabulary of religion.

Hence, for Arafat's legacy, there is NO OTHER SOLUTION than "Jews-be-gone" and for Ahmadinajab, also, "Bring on the Messiah."

For Al-Qaeda, "Purge the world of infidels."

Now, for the US, while not religious, it is also an absolute: "Iran (and thus Hezbollah and Hamas) MUST NEVER HAVE NUCLEAR KILLING STUFF" - and I agree.

Muslims are being bred from birth via brainwashing to fear "hell" with such all-encompassing fear that they would rather blow themselves and innnocent children into smitherereens than think a thought outside the dicates of Islam. We are generations deep into this sick religion.

So the important thing is to keep nukes out of their hands.

Does no one get that simple fact?

Alternatives to violence: A Comparison of the muslims of the Southern Philippines and the Kurds of Turkey - III

The Role of Institutions and Civil Society

According to Freedom House's rating index on a scale of 1 to 7 with seven as the worse, in 2005 Turkey received a 3 for political rights and a 3 for civil liberties, giving it a status of "partially free." The Philippines received a 2 for political rights and a 3 for civil liberties, so the Philippines received the status of "free." Nevertheless, both suffer from violence that could be alleviated in part by civil institutions.

In the past in the Mindanao region of the Philippines, virtually all contacts between the Muslim minority and the Roman Catholic majority existed at the governmental level. Contacts between individuals or civil society organizations were extremely restricted and as a result, the overall relationship between the two parties suffered at every political level. The government and institutions alone cannot rebuild the peace between the Muslim minority and the Catholic majority in the southern Philippines. The strong non-governmental relationships between the two groups, however, could be highly effective intermediaries of policy and of decision-making, for example, if Muslims and Christians have a strong relationship among universities, religious groups, businesses, cultural organizations, and individuals. Even if political parties disagree, the collaborative relationship could help to reduce the political disagreement. In Alexis de Tocqueville's view, "The health of a democratic society may be measured by the quality of the functions performed by private citizens," so the role of institutions, the civil society, and the government becomes crucial in bringing law, order, justice, and equality to the southern Philippines. The promotion of the institutions and agents of a civil society strengthens the sense of ownership of the people in a country by allowing them to participate in the rebuilding of their own society. It requires a broad scope: reestablishment of rule of law, restoration of the public security based on this rule of law, strong economic development, justice and fairness, educational development, rehabilitation of the communities, reconciliation among those communities, and education--all will play a significant role in the community's relief and development. Because these forces, such as rule of law, are absent in the southern Philippines, they require not just additional assistance but rather necessary initiatives. If civil society organizations and institutions interact and cooperate, they will more easily achieve their common objectives of eradicating the disparity between the two communities and of building an environment where the people live together and enjoy better lives.

According to Thomas Carothers, civil society is not a new phenomenon but can be traced back to ancient Rome and Greece. The modern idea of civil society emerged from the eighteenth century Scottish and continental Enlightenment with Thomas Paine and George Hegel, among many, developing the modern concept of civil society. A conceptual definition of civil society, then is a "domain parallel to but separated from the state where citizens act according to their interests and wishes" (Carothers 1999, p. 18). Falling out of use during the industrial revolution, the term returned after World War II with Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci portraying civil society as a more independent political activity against tyranny. According to Carothers, civil society in the 1990s became a popular term from the president to public and private sector to open up space for civil society to flourish especially in dictatorial countries, and in Western Europe and the United States with their disenchantment with old political parties. Also, the information revolution brought new tools to connect and empower the people. Carothers claims that it is mistake to equate civil society with non-government organizations because civil society is a broader concept including all organizations and associations that exist outside of the state together with political parties and the market. He emphasizes that non-government entities play an important role in developing and non-developing countries by shaping policy, by exerting pressure on the government, and by providing expertise to policy makers. By fostering citizen participation and civic education, these entities train future leadership among young people who want to participate in civic life; however, sometimes in non-democratic countries elite who have little connection with the citizens control the NGOs, as in the case of southern Philippines.

In a democratic government citizens exercise their power by participating in their community rather than being denied that power by the government. Instead, in a truly democratic country it is not enough just to hold the election to choose the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but also the government must make sure those institutions and processes comply with democratic values. The three branches of power must be genuinely independent, and through a system of checks and balances restrain and hold accountable the other branches. Citizens must also be free to express their views, to organize, to assemble, and even to protest, so they too can work on public problems, influence policy, and hold the government accountable. In the Mindanao region of the Philippines, the Muslim people have a misperception of the charities, service-based groups, advocacy agencies, media, and educational institutions because in the past those types of organizations either were absent, were not functioning well, were used with a bias toward the Catholic majority, or were exercised as a tool to convert Muslim to the Catholic religion. For that reason, Muslims have underestimated the effect of those types of organizations. Yet, civil institutions that work together can help solve societal problems.

In a monograph "Social Origins of Civil Society: An Overview," Lester M. Salamon recognizes the growing doubts about the capacity of the state to deal with social welfare in conjunction with developmental and environmental issues (2000, p. 38). He points to civil society organizations as strategically important participants in the search of middle way between sole reliance on the market and sole reliance on the state. As a qualified supporter of civic society, Ali R Abootalebi finds that civic society as indicated by clubs, organizations and groups can act as a buffer between state power and the citizen's life (1998, p. 46). The organizations can deter state power and increase prospects for democratization.

In deeply divided societies like the Kurds in Turkey and the Muslims in the Philippines, where fear and ignorance are often the driving forces behind ethnic conflict, people tend to identify themselves by their ethnic group, the defining characteristic of the society. Such societies can ignite in violence especially when there is inequality among ethnic groups and discrimination against one or more groups, and when discrimination is reinforced by a biased public policy. To avoid violence, political institutions must allow ethnic groups to participate in the political process, and they must protect human rights. Both the Moros and the Kurds lack confidence in the government because the minority and majority do not trust each other. To build confidence among the minorities and the majority and to help them overcome negative stereotypes, the groups must commit to a civil society.

According to Steven Rood, the role of civil society is weak in the southern Philippines; however, but the institutions of civil society that promote peace building should be developed (2005, p. 36). Steven Rood offers some recommendations for developing a civil society, especially a Muslim civil society that interacts with individual Christians as well as with local and national government. He argues that since 1970 faith-based NGOs have been involved to bring the peace in southern Philippines. This area is less developed than its Christian counterpart due to different communal cultural values. Nevertheless, civil society can manage the conflict and bring the peace in the southern Philippines. He argues that civil society already has shown an effect on the peace process by bringing the MILF to the cease-fire table, and the government has praised such efforts. However, peace has not replaced conflict, but the endeavors have an indirect effect on peace in that the mediation allows for a discussion about the roots of the conflict to take place. The parties can ask, "What can be done to achieve peace?" It can provide the political space for the government to maneuver toward settlement. A Muslim civil society needs to be strengthened to rectify Muslim/Christian imbalances. Rood suggests civil society networks to bring the Muslims and Christians together, empirical studies on the various approaches, conflict management involving the government, and civil society organizations working with policy elites and the public (Rood, 2005).

Rood's recommendations would apply to southeastern Turkey as well. Kurdish institutions would help offset the suspicion that surround Turkish delivery mechanisms and also provide for an outlet for grievances that might otherwise be channeled toward secession. Ashutosh Varshney notes, significantly, that civil society builds the bridges and manages the tension an agent of peace, but if a community is organized only along interethnic lines and interconnection with other communities are very weak or even non-existent, then ethnic violence is quite likely (2001, p. 397). Self-policing or intraethnic policing by elders, ethnic associations, or by civic associations will more likely result in intraethnic engagement rather than in violence. Civic networks must operate locally and regionally where the conflict occurs to integrate the citizens locally for participation in government structures. Thus, in Varshney's term "intraethnic," or "intracommunity," organizations would provide networks between the Kurds and Turks to organize with institutional capacity to bring the two groups together for mutually beneficial long-term results. Rood says that "donors must be clear-eyed about the ideological characteristics of civil society" (2005, p.36). Applying his Philippine model to Turkey proves useful. Organizations funded by the Turks for Turkey in general must allow room for Kurdish funded associations. Bridging the gap between local groups' needs and the mainstream needs of the country, ideologically based civil society must provide resources to pursue Kurdish goals for well being. Studies of the most efficient, useful, and conciliatory approach to peace building must be undertaken. Would dialogue between Kurds and Turks change attitudes? What strategies would best work at the community level of perhaps Diyarbakir, Bitlis, and Van? What factors would allay the Kurdish-Turkish mistrust. Conflict management must include local governments, not just the national establishment. Also, the civic society must change the hearts and minds of the majority Turks towards the Kurds allowing them to be larger stakeholders in the peace talks and to have free and open debate, emphasizing cultural preservation for the Kurds. A civil society working for peace could merge the policy elites in Ankara with the local communities and with citizens in the communities in southeastern Turkey (Rood 2005, p. 38).

Today in America, individuals and groups from all kinds of backgrounds, such as churches, synagogues, or mosques, spend hours giving service to others in efforts to eliminate hunger, homelessness, and domestic violence, or to raise money for research to find cures for cancer, HIV/AIDS, or the like. The U.S. government encourages this service by providing tax incentives for charitable donations. Even without tax breaks, these charitable organizations help. During the Hurricane Katrina FEMA failed to respond quickly to victims of the hurricane. The most help came from churches. Non- governmental organizations, individuals, and private business like Wal-Mart donated millions of dollar to hurricane victims. Even some universities required a certain number of hours for community services to help their community including feeding the elderly, feeding the homeless, collecting donations, teaching English to immigrants, assisting in the relocation of immigrants or refugees, or cleaning parks or highways. This type of service offers not only help but also understanding to those who live in such conditions, usually the minority, so that through this assistance they develop a new perspective and consequently will reconcile much more easily with the majority. Although some problems can be resolved by volunteerism or charitable giving, others require a more systematic approach, perhaps a policy-level solution. People from advocacy or political action groups must convince decision-makers to pass laws, make decisions, or take actions that they believe will solve public problems. Advocacy groups put a lot of effort into educational campaigns to try to convince public officials to come to their point of view. If these efforts fail, education campaigns have another purpose-- to convince other voters to act for the public good. To make the government more responsive to the people, elections ensure that if government failed in its representation, the officials will be more responsive, or in the next election they will find themselves without jobs. These kinds of organization and advocacy groups, however, cannot function properly without free access to investigative reporting.

Consequently, a free and independent press represents the very core of civil society. The public understands that it is difficult for media, since they are answerable to political or business interests, to report honestly on the transactions of their benefactors, but to retain their credibility, media must be independent from political influence and maintain standards of ethics, as well as editorial independence and balance. By doing so, they can help to hold politicians, business interests and other such powerful forces accountable for their actions. The role of civil society is crucial for maintaining balance and fairness. For example, holding elections empowers the people at all level of society to contribute to their society. Advocating roots of fairness and justice broadly gives a stake in their democratic experiment to all citizens. Therefore, civil society and organizations, such as mass media, help keep the government and institutions in check, preventing them for exceeding their power by helping them to maintain democratic principles. Civil society reinforces and guards the government from behaving in undemocratic ways toward the Muslim minority. For those reasons both the government and the people of the Philippines must continue to support the growth and strength of the civil society and institutions.

In the Philippines and in Turkey the boundaries between media and party politics overlap. Political parties control all influential media institutions. This situation needs to change, so that the media is free and objective. As a political tool, the media needs to stimulate independent debate thereby supporting the evolution of civil society. Media indeed plays a special role in regard to democracy since the media has great power to become a modern town hall. Instead in Turkey the government and military control media, propagating nationalistic ideas and reporting only one side of story never bothering to investigate the other side. In Turkey the media is never totally independent. According to Freedom House's rating index, the rating of freedom of press for Turkey is 48, making it partially free on a scale of 1 to 100 with one hundred being the worse. The Philippines received a 37 for freedom of the press and is labeled free. The main obligation of the media is to tell or reveal the truth. Because media is the cornerstone of democracy, if the town hall is not open to public debate and other voices are not heard, it is evident that the dissenters will do their best to make their voice heard elsewhere and in other ways. Sometimes media facilitates conflict. In the case of the Philippines media has contributed a very negative image of the Muslim people. In my interviews with several Muslims students, and leaders they expressed a negative view of media. They confessed, "The trust between Muslims and Christians here is lacking in that both find it hard to accept one another." Media perpetuates this mistrust. In Mindanao, Muslims are making an effort to be independent, and they use every possible way to get their demand. Because of this, Christians started to view Muslims as bandits without understanding first why they want to be independent. Also, Christians do not trust Muslims, in part because of the media's portrayal of them as terrorists. The students agreed that the media did contribute a lot to the destruction of their image. In their view, when a Muslim committed a crime, reporters would say a Muslim killed Pedro, but when a Christians perpetrated such a crime, Christianity would not be mentioned. From their perspective the media is not fair in its reporting. Also, they feel that some Muslims are forced to commit crimes due to the inequality in the southern region and think that it would be better if they do the acts of violence, because after all, their name is already ruined by the media. The Turkish media stereotype the Kurdish people as well. I remember during the war between the PKK and the Turkish military, the Turkish media approached the issue of the Kurds by generalizing about the Kurdish people. It never mentioned the military's destroying of villages, burning houses, kidnapping Kurdish politicians, raping Kurdish women, or forcing the Kurdish people to leave their villages to go another place. We never heard this kind of truth from the Turkish media. When I left the country and got the chance to read the works of foreign academicians and the E.U. human rights groups, the truth emerged. Event tough media has room for to be blame but also, they are the one who cover the most news. It is true Most Muslims are not on the fundamental list, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but the most present-day terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such. Understandably, Muslims complain when the media speaks of terrorist movements and actions as Islamic and ask why the media do not similarly identify terrorists and terrorism as Christian. The answer is because they do not identify themselves as such. The Muslims' complaint is understandable, but it should be addressed to those who make the news, not those who report it (Lewis 2003).

According to Mark E. Warren, civil society might contribute good governance depending on the association mixes, the checks on associations, and the public accountability and public trust of these associations (1999). He argues for a concept of civil society based on a tripartite distinction between market, legal coercion, and association. Therefore, the correlation between civil society and good governance depends on the structure of the civil institutions.

Conclusion

One of the biggest problems in ethnic conflicts is that they are intractable because the conflicts often have been going on for many years and even centuries. For example, the Moros have been fighting for centuries, although the issues have become more complex, with many actors, issues, interests, fears, destruction, and hate toward one another. Some Christians view Muslim as criminals, thieves, and lower-class; many Muslims consider that Christians took their homeland from them, oppressed them, marginalized them, and regard them as thieves and criminals. As in Turkey, for many decades Turks viewed Kurds as a low class, uneducated criminal and called them "mountain Turks." For years the government imposed martial law in southeastern Turkey. Under martial law Turks conducted criminal activities, including raping women, dealing drugs, kidnapping Kurdish men and women, torturing captives, burning the villagers' crops and cattle, and forcing millions of Kurds to leave their villages to go somewhere else without providing them any compensation. In the Kurds' view, Turks are assimilators, fascists, and racists, because of their policies of deprivation and forced assimilation and because they could not practice their cultural rights or speak their language. The military maintains them at gun point, so that they feel that they are in prison, and the government and military are involved in a variety of illegal activities under the martial rule. Even recently the military bombed a Kurdish city without any reason. Creating chaos, it created another scandal in the series of military activities in the southeaster Turkey. On November 9, 2005, in Semdinli, Turkey, a bomb exploded in front of a bookstore owned by a member of the PKK, a group that has fought Turkish security forces since 1984. The bookshop owner and bystanders chased a suspect to a waiting car with two paramilitary police in the car. Authorities have detained at least one sergeant from the paramilitary police allegedly involved in the bombing, reminiscent of security forces' common practice in the early 1990s of carrying out summary executions. When protests broke out on the streets in the southeast and spread to Istanbul and other cities, Prime Minister Erdogan went immediately to Hakkari responding to allegations that undercover paramilitary police carried out the bombing.

The same kind of incident happened in the southern Philippines in August of 2005. There two bombs went off at the Chao King fast food restaurant and injured some people. The Chao King was located next to a police station. When I asked the people in that area who was responsible for the bombing, most people said that the government and military did it, but the government and media reported that Abu Sayyaf was responsible. When I talked to one of the members of the MILF, Professor Sheriff M. Julabbi, chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Bangasamoro Mujahideen Alliance (MILF/BMA), he told me that he did not believe any Muslims were involved in the bombing and that the government and military were doing this kind of criminal act to justify their staying in Moroland, to get more military aid from the US government under the "war on terrorism doctrine," and to show that they were going after terrorism too. Dr. Julabbi claimed that if this kind of incident did not occur, then there would be no terror in southeastern Philippine and the US would stop sending funds, so the military did it to show that the Philippines are really going after terror. When I asked about his view on the Abu Sayyaf terror organization, his response was that he did not have any relationship with them and did not approve of their activities of killing Christians, but he did not criticize the organization either. Consequently with such deep-seated issues and animosities, it is impossible, in a relatively short period of time, to help the parties find quick solutions. Solutions need to be developed slowly over a long time period with many people working independently to bring about the transformation of the conflict from a destructive one to a constructive one, and eventually to resolve the problem (Rummel, 1981, 3.1). By creating room for incremental steps, leaders can involve the government, civil institutions, schools, academia, media, and religious leaders in eliminating violence. If people still hate one another, no matter what policy is developed, even a grassroots one, it will not help, because groups need to know how to trust one another and to live together in peace. Even if the overall conflict cannot be resolved, incremental improvements to the problems can often be made. As agents of change, the leaders can initiate policies and programs that will benefit small parts of the conflict immediately and then can work together to facilitate the transformation of the wider conflict. For example, in 1999, when the earthquake hit Turkey and took thousands of lives, the first aid came from neighboring Greece; the relationship with Greece had been very intensive because of a dispute over an island. When Greece gave support, the next day all the news headlines praised the Greek people, and later Turkish singers gave a concert in Greece, and Greek singers returned the favor, giving a concert in Turkey. Both foreign ministers subsequently had a good relationship. Even now Turkey and Greece are preparing for hosting the next Olympics together. Since that time the relationship between Greece and Turkey has improved. Although it is not perfect, it is not worse either. Also, the negotiation strategy is important in the possibility of success. Some negotiation strategies separate the negotiable items from the non-negotiable ones. For example, leaders should avoid focusing on a need that will take a long time to resolve or on disputes about facts or procedures. Instead of dwelling on serious difficulties that prevent negotiations about more substantive issues from being discussed, the leaders should analyze the procedures or investigate the most important matters. Even though such an analysis is unlikely to resolve the conflict completely, incremental steps have benefits themselves example, mutual understanding of the perceptions, of the situation, and/or the procedures. If enough incremental improvements are initiated, eventually the conflict will subside enough for successful negotiations to take place. The nature of the conflict can be changed substantially even if peace does not come about completely. This complex confluence of factors--leadership free from corruption, governance characterized by transparency and accountability, workable economic and educational development, and civil institutions that usher in rule of law--will offer alternatives to violence in both the cases of the cross-country study of the Moros and the Kurds. Detailed recommendations related to each of these mechanisms are beyond the scope of this paper. Further research applying the consociational and integrative models would demonstrate the reconfiguration of the governments of both the Philippines and Turkey and thus would provide additional insights into the reconciliation process.

APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES

Categories Problems Alternatives

Integrity of leadership Corruption, kinship, abuse of power, influence by others, take advantage of the situations for their self interest, tribalism , there is no way to held accountable sheikh or ustad and, they are supreme assume never being wrong

Honesty and modest, obey the law, maintain high standards of honesties, treat everyone equal with respect and dignity, recognize and respond to the needs of people, try to understand what is best for his people not for him selves, seek creative solutions and negotiations, serve the people not themselves, respect for civic law, select leaders based on charisma and skills.

Government and accountability Exploitation of women and children of minorities, high corruption, social injustice, unequal treatment, resettlement issue, not representative government, heavy military presence, sex drug and weapon smuggler, marginalization, there is no law and order ,violation of human rights, bias government's and bias media, communal violence and cultural genocide

Political and constitutional reforms

Institutionalized political parties, fair representative government, equal treatment, rule of law, transparency, human rights, check and balances, freedom of speech , culture, press and religion, decrease of military presence in predominate minority areas, cultural diversity, government reexamined of history, appreciation for the cultural tolerance and diversity, religious, dialogue, lobbies, advocacy groups

Economic and Educational development

Extreme poverty, illiteracy, lack of infrastructures, malnutrition, lack of development due to violence, agricultural lack of technological development still man power, regional disparity, job opportunities are in the majority areas, high coast transportation by sea from the island the perception from outside instability and unreliability, no perceived competitive advantage for national and international company to invest in Mindanao and south eastern Turkey, traditionalist economic systems, lack of technological access example high internet and etc, gender discrimination, lack role of women in work places, social arena

Education development, affirmative action program for the minorities,

agrarian reform, sustainable agriculture, give incentives to business owner for investment

Loans for minorities to capacity to build business sector, learning course on developing a religious diversity in the workplace program, and in the community, improve small minorities business thru technological transfer, teach special skills and business, rebuild infrastructures, maintain regional economic balances, business management training, leadership development, research and advocacy, eradication of poverty Law and order, management skills, social and agrarian reform, sustainable agriculture, sustainable lively hood systems, mass urbanization, gender opportunity in education and in employment, growth of middle class
Civil Society proliferation of firearms and groups, glorification of military, military presence and corruption, absence of civil institutions, violence and killing civilians, human right violation, huge cost of military ,interim of destroying infrastructures, national treasury, human cost interim explosive devises and dislocation of civilian, life stock and forest damage ,the cultural costs further alienated Muslims and Christians animosity, uncertainty costs in terms loss of business, investments and loss of investment, loss of production, and loss of trade diminished community life style of the Mindanao and south eastern region

Civil disobedience for against the government, non governmental organization NGOs, private voluntary organizations, people's, organizations, civic clubs

community based organizations, trade unions, gender, cultural and religious equality, private and individual charities, social and sports, clubs, cooperatives, universities, professional associations, policy institutions, unbiased media, citizens ending hostility, civil service or community service for military role, occupations, civil disobedience, human rights groups, civilian military relationship

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Alternatives to violence: A comparison of the Muslims of the Southern Philippines and the Kurds of Turkey - II

Economic and Educational Development

Role of Education

Education can alleviate violence almost immediately if the conflict has arisen because of economic, social, or political disparity. Yet, one of the clearest indicators of disparity between the majority and the minority populations is the level of education. In both southeastern Turkey and in the Philippines the illiteracy rate is substantially higher, the quality of education is poorer, and the gender difference is greater. According to the Republic of Turkey's Prime Ministry Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration 2000, most Kurdish villages do not have a primary school. Where one exists, a single teacher is responsible for teaching in Turkish to five classes. The following chart shows the percentages of illiteracy in southeastern Turkey compared to the whole country and the rural to the urban areas. Approximately 80% of the 69,660,559 population are Turks and 20% are Kurds (World Factbook 2005).

Illiteracy Rates in Turkey-Percentage of Population
The general illiteracy rate in Turkey 55%
Kurdish illiteracy

72% Over six years of age were unable to read
The general illiteracy rate in Turkish areas 41%
Southeastern region of Turkey 85.6 %
Southeastern region of Turkey female

illiteracy rate 81.8%

Turkish Areas female illiteracy rate 55.6%,

In1993, Kurdistan had fifty secondary schools, yet schools lacked the resources, teachers, and necessary support to provide an adequate educational system. In the past as part of a nationalist agenda, the Turkish government banned Kurdish language instruction; now a student must sign a petition for the university and the government to take language instruction. Students have appealed for Kurdish lingual instruction and have often been denied this right for fear of harassment and security. In part, this failure to have lingual rights has ignited the Kurdish separatist movement. The state elite view social discontent not as a problem to solve, but rather as a security breach to be repressed. The educational system fails to address such topics as pluralist democracy, good governance, managing change, human rights, rule of law and conflict resolution, and even the discussion of the need for these topics. As a formal candidate to the European Union, Turkey's government and citizenry must meet the Copenhagen Criteria regarding human rights, rule of law, cultural pluralism, and respect for diversity. Even though the government is trying to advance its country, sometimes obstacles to development result from the cultural environment, such cultural or religious norms as the role of women in society.

Many women are not aware of their inalienable rights, and no service informs them about these rights. In Mindanao, I asked Alia, one of the students who got married at an early age, "Why did you get married so young?" She told me that she did not have any other choice, because a female has to marry a person who had touched her because of the chastity laws; otherwise, he or she could end up being subject to an honor killing. Similar cultural barriers and social norms prevent certain groups from gaining access to public services (such as schooling, health, facilities, or job training), so those minorities are blocked from entering universities and public sectors jobs. They may face harassment from the community, including boycotts of their business, physical destruction of properties, or physical threat. There they view the role of the women as taking care of the household and that of the man as working and providing support for the home.

In an interview with Aslinah, the head of the Muslim Student Organization, she explained that many Muslims in the Philippines discourage their kids from getting an education under the Philippine government's curriculum. They consider those schools as Christian schools, but they want to have their children to receive their education from Islamic schools, where they teach mostly religion rather than basic reading, writing, math, or life skills, and the children of the elite have good schools, but the lower level of kids are discouraged from getting an education. When I asked a group of Muslim students from the University of Mindanao, "How does your community view you because you are attending Christian school?" one girl told me that some of them view their going to such a school as a good thing, and some of them view them as being spoiled by loosing their identity, a greater problem for the male students than for the females.

According to the World Factbook 2005 on the Philippines, of the total population (87,857,473) approximately 92.6% of those over fifteen can read and write, with 92.5% males and 92.7% females doing so. The Philippines is the only country in Asia that has the highest literacy rate but among the Muslims (5% of the population compared with 80.9% Roman Catholic) has an illiteracy rate of almost 80 %. This kind of biased policy toward the Muslims has implications for educational values as well. Professor Shariff Julabbi of the MILF/BMA argues that the Spaniard strategy of using a Christian type of education as an instrument to further their imperial ambitions brought serious consequences to the Moros' education system. Therefore, he says that Muslims resist invaders' attempts to establish schools in their areas. Since Spaniards' systems of education were based on their values, the Muslims strongly rejected their institutions and interests. In his view, since then no western type of educational system has been successfully introduced in the Muslim land. In part the stereotypes of hatred and experiences from the past lead the Muslims to illiteracy, backwardness, and stagnation. From my observation, this type of negative experience prevented their getting an education unless they are not in a Muslim school. The society feared that those who attended Christian schools would become Christian even though many Muslims leaders and their children have received their education from the Christian schools. Muslims there believe that not speaking Arabic means a student is not a good Muslim, but do not realize that without speaking Arabic, he or she still can remain a good Muslim by reading the translated scripture from Arabic to English. They do not realize that although it is good to know Arabic, it is not necessary to learn it. Instead many Muslims think that today they are backward because their educational stumbling blocks have roots in the colonial era that created an educational gap between Muslims and Christians in this country. Professor Julabbi admits that the educational advancement achieved by the Christian Filipinos enabled them to develop their socio-economic and political structures more rapidly than Muslims. There are some other reasons for the disparity between majority Christians and minority Muslims in the Philippines. First, because of the Christian settlers to Mindanao, eventually the Muslims felt that they had become a minority in their homeland. As a result of the immigration from the north, the Christians became the dominant political force in the south. In their view, Muslims found themselves again subjected to and ruled by another colonial power. But Muslims felt that Filipinos were subjected to oppression and colonization and instead of helping the Muslims to develop their education, political, and economical infrastructure, they replaced them with their own pattern of leadership and authority incompatible with the Muslim cultural and religious values. The Roman Catholics' legislative and implementation policies to legalize their actions took away their ancestral lands to make way for resettlement projects and agricultural plantations. Even though Americans tried to use education as instrument to integrate them with society, Muslims were not open to western types of education. One Christian student who was doing his masters degree in economics, Joeron Dalisay, explained that the Muslims rejected the Christian teachers and the textbooks because they were written from a colonial view point. Interestingly, no one mentioned that if Muslims set up schools in predominately Christian areas and used their resources, that they would never teach Christian values, yet they expected the Christians to fund education and Islam. Because of their strongly held views, they were afraid that their young would get a distorted picture of their own history and adopt the Christian culture.

The Muslims in Mindanao saw this kind of Catholic educational systems as attempting cultural suicide. Therefore, they refused any kind of western style of education, keeping them in a state of relative backwardness, having neither the economic resources nor the political strength to develop an alternative to educational systems relevant to the realities or the cultural and religious values of their society. This condemned them to backwardness and to the status of uneducated people, subjecting them to more exploitation and oppression. Because their lack of education undermined their socio- economic development, they could not compete with the Christians because the Christians were better equipped, had a better education, and consequently could get better jobs, leading them to a good income, status, and wealth while the Muslims became extremely poor, except for the religious and political Muslim leaders and their children who were well educated and wealthy also. When compared to their neighboring Christians in terms of roads, electricity, health center, irrigation, government schools, buildings, and drinking water, this kind of policy neglect was aggravated by the long years of civil disturbance as well as the continuous political instability of the region. On the other hand, a student, Joeron Dalisay, said that today even though the Philippine government and western companies wanted to invest in the southern Philippines, because of the lack of law and order, they declined. Muslims first have to make sure that there is rule of law and security, so that westerners will be willing to invest in the Muslims' land. As a result of disorder, corruption, and violence, mostly Muslims pay the price and live under harsh conditions. Also a Catholic priest, Father Boyer, explained that the Muslim leaders do not get along and do not want peace; therefore, the Muslims should also be blamed as well, not just the government, because Muslims failed to bring peace and order in the region and mostly remain corrupt.

When I talked to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Marciano Melchor, and a faculty member in the College of Engineering, Lilia Panchito, at the University of Mindanao, both were for a federalism solution for Mindanao because Mindanao has rich resources; yet, all the resources go to Manila, so that nothing is left for the Mindanao people. Also, both agreed that there must be a greater integrative process, not just economic development, because the importance of education should be pressed upon those community leaders.

Economic Development to Reduce Violence

Economic development policies can weaken local support for violence activities. These polices can contribute to the expansion of a new middle class in communities that have traditionally tended to support violent groups. For example, in the southern Philippines, I meet a Muslim, Nacier Saripmacmod, who is an ex-rebel who has fought in the jungle, but now he has his own businesses, the Universal Nursing and Physical Therapy Review School and the Zenith Davao Review Center for Marine Engineering. During our conversation, he told me that if the government promised to create jobs for the rebels who are in the jungle, he could get all rebels out of the jungle. He said that people are literally starving. They have no jobs, and as illiterate, unskilled Muslims, they have no other alternative to violence. In his words he called the policy "stomach development." He said, "If I had enough money to feed those people, they wouldn't go live in the jungle." He told me that he had lived there. "It is a terrible place," he said, and he confessed that he did not achieve anything and knows he wasted his time. Now, he is happy, running a preparatory center for those who want to get an accountant license, and he is very successful; he plans to open a Muslim school in Mindanao because he sees an urgent need for good education in the Muslim communities. He explained that it is easy to teach how to pull the trigger on a gun, but it is hard to teach to how to read and write; nevertheless, he is now advocating a pen instead of a gun solution. With significant insight, he revealed that pulling the trigger is the easiest skill that a leader can offer deprived people. It is true that poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance are like a disease in both communities of the Muslims and of the Kurds. If we eliminated illiteracy, the other two conditions would eliminate themselves. It is common sense that if a person has a good education, he will have a good job and a middle income. The income will increase the social status of the person, and as a result of a good social status, that individual will be a productive citizen of both the community and country, more likely participating in politics and civic activities.

Also, economic development can discourage recruits from joining terrorist groups. Many terrorist organizations attract new members from communities with those who are marginalized rather than integrated, and those who are oppressed, illiterate, unskilled people. For example, in Turkey, the government considered Kurds as "mountain Turks." There was clear social and political injustice between minority Kurdish and majority Turkish population areas, but for many years no one bothered to address the issues. Consequently, it was easy for the PKK to recruit many young men and women to join the organization. Before Abdullah Ocalan was captured, I happened to meet a young Kurdish lady, who did not have a good job, and her house had been destroyed. Her family fled because the military forced them to leave their villages, so most of them sought refuge in large cities like Istanbul, but there they lived in a shanty house with no water, no sanitation, and no electricity. (Usually they just find empty property and construct a building without any government permit). She told me that she did not like the government and sympathized more with the PKK than the Turkish military. She said, "The Turkish military destroyed my house, the Turkish government destroyed my house, so I want to destroy theirs. They forced me to live like this." A PKK member could easily recruit that young lady whose own government destroyed her hope and future. Therefore, the lack of social and economical development can assist the terrorists in their recruitment because terrorist groups offer recruits financial incentives and family support. Economic development policies can help to reduce the vulnerability of potential recruits by reducing their needs and by providing those people with viable alternatives to violence. For example, my interview with the founder of the banana plantation and ex-mayor of the Muslim Autonomous Region (ARM), Datu Ibrahim "Toto" Pendatun Paglas III, a grant recipient of the Wilson Fellowship Award confirmed this point. Toto had recently run for governor but was defeated. As the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, Business, and Peace Program, and the Presidential Assistant for the GRP-MILF Peace Process, he speaks with authority on local issues. He explains that economic development has been particularly effective in providing economic alternatives to communities that have traditionally received support from the violent groups. He also said during our conversation that private investment has had a positive effect on unemployment and transferred the area known as "field for killer" into a peaceful good community. Of course, not all terrorist recruits come from the poor families; recruitment depends on the region and nature of the conflict. Terrorists can just as easily come from the middle or upper class as the poor section of society. In both Turkey and the Philippines recruits come from across the class spectrum with general support from local communities. Also, sometimes the government fails to keep their promise and fails to implement development initiatives due to lack of sufficient financial support. It erroneously inflates the hopes and aspirations of local communities, and then when those expectations are not met, an intense backfiring occurs, triggering resentment and creating the likelihood of violence.

Countries that have budgeted revenue for the underprivileged areas have met with significant success in reducing the violence. For example, Ireland has directed both national and international funds toward Northern Ireland to target impoverished areas that provide recruits for the Irish Republic Army. The following chart compares expenditures over a five-year period in Northern Ireland and in Mindanao. While it is true that other factors may contribute to the peace, the investment in social and economic development makes a significant contribution as noted in the chart below (Cragin & Chalk, 2002).

Social and Economic Development in Northern Ireland and Mindanao.
Economic Support Northern Ireland

1997-2001 Mindanao

1996-2001
Central Government 515 2
International Community 28 4
Total 543 6
(Annual per capital in U.S. dollars)

Thus, in Northern Ireland, public expenditures have been set aside to target social needs. Since 1997, the United Kingdom has spent an average 515 million dollars annually on these efforts. In addition to that, the European Union has contributed 28 million annually, a generation of a total aid package of $543 per person per year (see the table above). According to Cragin and Chalk, the main focus of this investment has been on dealing with education, health, housing, infrastructure, and urban development. As a result of this funding, there is not much difference between the Catholics and the Protestants in terms of access to schools, hospitals, and suitable domiciles. But the figures provide a negative example for Mindanao in the Philippines, where the social and economic aid totaled $ 6 person per year. (See the table above). This comparison helps us to explain the dismal failure of most development policies instituted in Mindanao that do not inhibit support for terrorism, because most of the money was channeled to the Roman Catholic populated areas. The differential increases the already existing wealth differences between the Catholic majority and the Muslim minorities. The combined effect has helped intensify the support for the local insurgent and terrorist groups. Consequently, it is vitally important to implement aid polices to ensure that the aid ends up in the hands of those who needs it. In the case of the aid distribution in north Ireland, the EU administrated its programs in such a way as to avoid bias and hatred by letting local residents be involved in the design of specific projects and by including them in the distribution and oversight of the system. The local Catholic and Protestant representatives were held accountable for implementing the projects jointly with members of the opposing community with the results being generally good. By contrast, the Philippines have failed to meet the local needs, and the funds have ended up in the hands of corrupt people. The central government also failed to establish adequate mechanisms to ensure accountability for the development aid that was transferred to Mindanao.

Also, the economic development policies initiated because of extra-national organizations intervention can be used as a carrot to encourage the people not to be recruited easily. For example, in pursuance of EU membership, the Turkish government has issued a series of bold reforms. These reforms include the advancement of Kurdish cultural rights, the southeastern economic development called "Villager Rehabilitation Program," and other programs which have attracted private investment and the emergence of infrastructure to support development. However, success in these programs will boost entrepreneurship and investment. The Justice Development Party's (AK) platform decided to avoid Islam and to express support for the French laicism model, as a fundamental requirement for the democracy, at least nominally supporting, "the state's impartiality toward every form of religious belief and philosophical conviction," meaning that "the state, rather than the individual, is restricted and limited to the idea of 'neo-Ottomans' as part of this administration's guiding policies." The state's role in the confederation would be to guarantee each community's autonomy. As a consequence of this pluralist policy, the Kurds have felt increasingly attracted to the AK party's openness and ethnic diversity. This system allows for an envisaged, decentralized, pluralist political system of "multiple legal orders" under laws (White, 2002).

The Philippines and Turkey are capitalist-statist economies, yet both the Muslim-majority provinces in the Philippines and the Kurdish-majority regions in Turkey lag behind their counterparts in most economic development indicators. In the Philippines the economic and political development suffers under mismanagement of public revenues, widespread corruption, and insurgencies, in spite of its having been one of the wealthiest countries in Southeast Asia prior to the 1960s. Even with President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, a U.S. trained economist, boosting tax revenues by cracking down on tax evasion and stabilizing budget deficits, the chronic corruption and rampant crime has plagued the country, affecting the poor disproportionately (Freedom House 2005, p. 504). The Philippines loses approximately 10% of its gross domestic product (7l6 billion) because of tax evasion affecting its budget deficit and in turn the funds for education, infrastructure, and health care. Further, the conflict between the government and the MILF has created economic hardship for fifteen million Filipinos in southern Mindanao. With the New People's Army, Abu Sayyaf, and the MILF kidnapping the foreign and the wealthy, attacking Christian villages, and executing those captured, investors are reluctant to set up businesses in the region. By contrast, Turkey has had incentives to develop economic initiatives for the southeast. In its bid for membership, the EU has granted it "market economy status," boosting domestic and foreign investors' confidence in the economy. However, the Kurdish region continues to suffer in the aftermath of the government's destruction of over four thousand villages and forced mass movement and has failed to benefit from Turkey's intermittent upswings in economic growth. Likewise, the violence against the Turkish military, and in some cases civilians, has deterred economic growth. For a variety of reasons, the economic disparity between the Muslim region and the rest of the Philippines and between southeastern Turkey and the rest of the country is both visible and measurable.

The Kurdish people in Turkey traditionally base their economy on farming. Particularly in the emirates, a feudal relation dominated. Peasant farmers worked land controlled by powerful lords. Both urban merchants and rural agha invested in the land. So the Kurds shared their labor with lords giving them a portion of the crops. Only the agha could distribute the land he owned. For the most part, the Kurds did not develop an indigenous mercantile, industrial, or proletariat (in the classical Marxist sense) system with a historical mission to destroy tribal and feudal economic structures, at least not until today. Sometimes the agha and sheiks and a new class of urban and usually non- Kurdish landlords, or even sometimes the government, used impoverished rural agha as their local overseers, so the process could be corrupt and brutal. By nature tribalism is socially conservative and remained in place until recently. According to anthropologist Thomas Bois, the traditional Kurdish tribesman lived in small inwardly oriented, outwardly defensive cultures (1966). Tribal life was rooted in traditional behavior, traditional relationship, traditional activities, and obligations between members. Traditional economy is an economic system in which decisions such as who, how, what, and for whom are all made on the basis of customs, belief, religion, and habits ("Economy" 2000). Economic development relates to tradition particularly if that tradition restricts individual initiative and lacks advanced goods, new technology, and growth because those of that tradition think that they have no needs for those advancements. Instead they hold the notion that "this is what my grandfather did and what his grandfather did."

The Kurdish areas of Turkey are far less developed economically than the western provinces. There are far fewer vehicles, poorer roads, and almost no industrialization. Human development levels in the southeastern Kurdish region lag behind national levels, while the incidence of human poverty remains much higher, and migration out of the region continues. The region faces development challenges in terms of income level, educational opportunities, gender equality, and socio-economic opportunities and facilities. Migration away from the rural areas increases the population of the urban areas considerably, and this creates additional challenges to provide public services. According to the United Nations development program, as a result of high fertility in the Kurdish region, 41% of the regional population is younger than 14 and 23% are aged between 15 and 24 years. Children and young people are the most disadvantage and vulnerable groups that suffer from the lower socio-economic status of the region. In conditions of poverty, having large numbers of children increases the household costs, so that poor families require their children to work, sometimes in poor conditions. In some families in which parents are unemployed, children work in the streets as the only breadwinners in the family. These children are open to various social and health risks such as substance addiction, alcohol, delinquency, pick pocketing, seriously affecting each child's development and the future of the next generation. In addition to the problems resulting from working in the streets, young Kurdish people aged between fifteen and twenty-five have their own social and economic problems that arise from lack of education, unemployment, and inability to express themselves. Also, many of the Kurds who are forced by the military to leave their home and villages settle in the western provinces and live in shanty houses in worse conditions than before. In their new location they have integration problems as well. Women of the Kurdish region also suffer from gender inequality; women in the southeastern Kurdish region do not have economic opportunities or an equal share of public welfare. Most of the women are uneducated, traditionally the young girls do not equally benefit from educational opportunities, and their economic capacity is quite limited. Besides the high illiteracy rate among the women, they are sometimes subjected to violence and threatened by honor killings if they have sexual improprieties.

David Horowitz posits that ethnic groups tend to measure disadvantage in terms of deviation from some concept of proportionality in relation to the population (1985; p. 191) and, as a result of that disadvantage, are more likely to initiate a secession movement. In his study he differentiates among the advanced and backward groups in advanced and backwards regional economies, making four combinations to determine the effect of economic, political, and status. In his schema the Moros in the Philippines are a backward group in a backward regional economy, the same as he lists the Kurds in Iraq, a group that fares better than its counterpart in Turkey. "Relative regional position is a causal element in the emergence of secession not because it predicts separatism in any straightforward way but because it conditions the claims that ethnic groups make and their responses to the rejection of those claims (p. 172). The backward regions voice dissatisfaction based on revenue expenditures of the center if their per capita income is less even if their contribution to the revenue is less. Implications from secessionist movements are significant in that a greater number of secessionist movements come from backward regions that are less capable of sustaining themselves because of a lack of administrative capacity and personnel, experiencing "post-secession difficulties." He concludes that ethnic separatism depends on the early or late secession with the latter having time to prepare for the independence. They are often more cohesive, better organized, and conducted under the auspices of a political party. Likewise, late secessions allows for work on alternative policies to avert secession (p.195).

Michael Hechter's theory on internal colonialism (1975, 1999) and Ted R. Gurr's theory on relative deprivation use a framework to study the causes and consequences of ethnic conflict. Introducing the idea of permanent deprivation, the framework suggests that once an ethnic group perceives that the state has permanently deprived it either of class, status, power, or any combination of the three, it will organize a separatist movement. According to Hechter, when a group attains the status of an "internal colony" and the state consequently subjects it to intense, systematic, and deliberate discrimination in terms of its political, economic, and social relations with other groups within the state, a separatist movement begins. After Ted Gurr conducted a study of various forms of political violence across several nation-states, he concluded that both long-term economic factors and perceptions of regime illegitimacy play a role in explaining political strife or violence. His theory failed to explain how perceptions of economic deprivation (relative to a group's expectation about the economy compared to the rest of the economy and hence the label "relative deprivation") and perceptions of illegitimacy of power together caused people to resort to violence (1971). The reality of economic disparity, however, combines with the perception of a permanent status to cause the deprived to see violence as the only option. The Muslims of the southern Philippines experience an economic disparity and consider themselves relatively deprived. Their history chronicles a record of subjugation and thus depravation. Islamic traders and missionaries plied their goods from China to India by way of Malaysia to the Sulu Archipelago in the ninth and tenth century, finally settling in the city of Jolo by the thirteenth and fourteenth century and beginning the vigorous Islamization of the southern islands (Yeger 2002, p. 185). From Sulu the Muslim traders and missionaries spread to the southern coast of Mindanao and were followed by a stream of Malay Muslim clerics from Sumatra, who subsequently brought the Filipinos under the Muslim sultan. The indigenous people, a heterogeneous group, thus became unified under Islam. Ninety percent or more of the Muslims in the Philippines now inhabit the four main communities: the Tausug and the Samal of the Sulu Archipelago and the Zamboanga region, the Maguindanao of Cotabato region and part of Zamboagna, and the Maranao of the Lanao Lake region. The remaining nine or ten percent are dispersed in the Zamboanga region, Bukidnon, Davao, and Palawan (187). Consequently, having come under the Sultanate, the region resisted the central Spanish government in Manila in 1565 when the Spaniards arrived, and when the United States took over the Philippines from Spain in 1899, they maintained their right to autonomy. The Tausug most aggressively fought for secession. Adamantly refusing to cooperate with the Christian Filipinos in Luzon and the Visayas who controlled the bureaucracy, the Muslims in the region maintained their political and ideological identity. When the Philippines attained Commonwealth and then independence, the Manila government implemented a policy of assimilation and integration. For the purposes of nation building, the government encouraged the migration of Catholic settlers from the Northern provinces to the areas of Mindanao. This resettlement policy deprived the Moros of a substantial amount of territory and of means of livelihood. The Moros continued separatist struggle from 1968 to the present resulted from the dispute over territorial claims, attacks from both civil and state parties, a climate of hate, and particularly the declaration of martial law. A new, young, educated, and radical leadership emerged among the Moros in the mid 1960s further deepening the cleavage and intensifying the violence. In conclusion, ethnic conflict in a country subjected to first Islamic, second Spanish, third Japanese, and finally American colonialism remains seemingly intractable. Overcoming the perception of permanent deprivation requires democratic rather than authoritarian leadership, government free from corruption, education, and cooperation among the local, regional, and national governments as well as non-governmental institutions that will assist in ushering in a civil society with rule of law.

The economic deprivation among the Muslims in the Philippines remains a significant cause of violence. When I interviewed a former Muslim National Liberation Front (MNLF) fighter, Datu Ibrahim "Toto" Pendatun Paglas informed me about the criminal system in Mindanao. There are two Muslim rebel groups: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf. These two groups fight for secession, but a criminal faction kidnaps locals and foreigners, demands extortion, sells drugs, and commits other sorts of illegal activities. When the government chases the criminal group, the criminals seek refuge in the jungle and essentially join either one of the other groups, so that in the end three groups work together and share the profits and spoils. He argued that teaching the youth and bringing economic development are the most vital steps for bringing peace and order in the order-less land. He claims that the government does not sincerely try to solve the problem of Mindanao. He believes that sometimes even the military smuggles the weapons into the heavily Muslims populated areas and then later will go after them and put them in jail. Like many others in the region, he believed the government conspiracy theory that the government wanted to keep a presence in Mindanao and needed to have reason to be there. In his mind he assumed that the government tried to create trouble to provide an excuse to be there.

Like the jungles for the Moros, the mountain and landscape have impacted the Kurdish social organization because they are often poverty stricken, usually isolated in their mountain valleys, and almost always resentful of their powerful neighbors. Not uncommonly Kurdish people commit highway robbery or smuggle things from a neighboring country, seeing it as legitimate economic income. Also, the armed guerrilla branch of the PKK perpetrates violence against Kurds as well as against the Turkish military. These activities affect the perceptions that the majority has of these minorities and intensify already negative stereotypes.

In the Philippines many Roman Catholics adopted stereotypes and prejudices toward the Muslims from the earlier Spaniards as well as from news reports on the activities of the radicals in the southern region. I was talking to a group of college students in Manila who were Christian and asked them what their view of Muslims was. They answered that Muslims were uncivilized, brutal, and treacherous bandits and pirates, impressions gleaned from media reports of murders, kidnappings, and beheadings in the southern Philippines and the continued actions of some Tausug who among the sources of livelihood of agriculture, fishing, and local commerce, continue to engage in piracy and smuggling (Yegar 188). I also asked a group of Muslim students the same question but about their views of Christians. They answered that they see Christians as the most extremely ethnocentric people, who do not appreciate the Muslim culture and traditions and who, if they could, would destroy Islam. Also, they see Christians as land hungry occupiers who use the army effectively to drive the Muslims out of their homeland. The students do not base their views on personal relationships but on generally held perceptions. According to a member of the MILF, Professor Julabbi, the economic set back of the Muslims in the Philippines goes back to during the period of confrontation with the Spaniards. In an interview he presented his rationale for why the Muslims are more economically disadvantaged than the majority Christians. In his view, to weaken the resistance, the colonizers systematically destroyed the Moro plantations, fields, and orchards and as well as their flourishing trade and commerce with other neighbor countries. In addition, he claimed that they destroyed the Muslims vessels preventing them from doing business with neighboring countries. Since then the Mindanao Muslims' have never developed their land; instead it has remained the most economically backward land in the country. These communal memories underpin his view of the majority today.

From 1980 onward, Turkey directed its economy to allow greater integration in world markets. The economy became more diversified and thus supplied a much broader range of goods and services. By 1985, the industrial sector accounted for 33% of GDP, while agriculture, including forestry and fisheries, was 20%. The Kurdish economy, however, is stagnant in Turkey even with its great resources. Kurdistan's main economic activity is agriculture with animal breeding as the most important component. Agriculture makes up and estimated 65% of the national income in Kurdistan (30% crops and 35% livestock production); industry, including petroleum, accounts for 25%; and the other sectors (construction, light industries, transport, and commerce) constitute the remaining 10%. Because they lack veterinary services, diseases sometimes wipe out whole herds and flocks. Also, the Turkish government banned the use of plateaus for grazing livestock in the southeaster region, leaving many Kurds without a means of livelihood. In addition, because of the military's historical devastation of Kurdish homes and lives, quite a large segment of Kurds resettled in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, and Adana for economic purposes. Although southeastern Turkey's Kurdish region provides the primary energy resources' including water, oil, natural gas, hydropower, coal, solar energy, and other unexploded minerals, such as uranium, the Kurds remain below the poverty line. Water and oil have traditionally great import in the economy of the neighboring countries dividing the Kurds. The southeast Anatolia project, however, not only provides water for Turkey, but it may also give Turkey control of the water from the Euphrates and from the Tigris, the two rivers that flow from Kurdistan to the Arab territories, for example, Syria and Iraq. The Euphrates carries about 31 billion cubic meters of water per year into Syria where it flows into Iraq; the Tigris takes about 17 billion cubic meters of water per year directly into Iraq. The Turkish project will cut the flow of the Tigris by at least one fifth and that of the Euphrates by even more, becoming a powerful political tool. For example in a 1999 incident, when Syria was giving safe haven to the leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan, Ankara demanded that he be returned to Turkey. When the Syrian's government denied extradition of Ocalan to Turkey, the government threatened to shut down the water to Syria, introducing the motto during the crisis, "We have water and you need it." Turkey hopes one day to become the regional power in the Middle East by building a "water pipeline" to carry about 2.2 billion cubic meters of water per year from two other rivers farther west, the Siyhan and the Ceyhan, which will go via Syria and Jordan to western Saudi Arabia, eventually via Kuwait to the Gulf States. Even some scholars argue that this water could bring the peace in Middle East. Turkey is planning to pipe the water and sell it to countries where the water for survival is scarce, for example, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Gulf countries. Further, the oil-rich states of Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf States trade with European markets making Kurdistan a route for the heavy traffic with the potential for significant development in the region.

However, at present each of the Philippines and the Turkish governments has failed to attend to the economic disparity because of its roles in economic development. It must identify and finance the high priority infrastructure projects, and make the needed infrastructure and social services available to the whole population, not just to a select few or to the majority. The government and tribe leaders must create an environment conducive to investment by private business. Further, both Manila and Ankara must make sure that corruption and bribery do not take place as well as secure the safety of the citizenry. When the government fails in any of these tasks leaving huge gaps in the infrastructure, raising corruption to levels that impair economic activities, or failing to ensure internal security and domestic peace, the economy surely will decline and most significantly among the already impoverished. When the various levels of governments are unable to perform the most basic function, state failure occurs and that failure causes an increase in rebellion, violence, and efforts for secession and violence.

To further complicate the economic disparity, gender relations and ethnic or religious divisions result in cultural and gender barriers for economic equity. Even though a government may try to advance its country, the religious environment or cultural and gender barriers may retard economic development. For example, the role of women in the Kurdish and Muslim societies denies women their rights and an education and therefore results in cascading problems. The demographic transition from high fertility to low fertility, present in most modern societies, is delayed or blocked. The .poor household continues to have eight or nine children because the woman's role is one of as children-rearing, and her lack of education means that she has few option or no option at all in the labor force. In this setting women often lack basic economic security and legal rights when they are widows; their circumstances become more dramatic and dreadful; they are left completely impoverished without hope. For example, when I visited Muslim families in the southern Philippines, one family had twelve children, and the husband was the only person working at a job, while his wife took care of the household. The mother or father both lacked an education, and they could not afford to send their children to school. Cultural barriers, religious barriers, and social norms prevented Muslim men and women from having access to public schools, as mentioned above, because they think their children will be exposed to western and thus bad culture and will affect their social norms.

Economic development itself does not eliminate the violence, although social and economic development, when properly supported and equally implemented, can inhibit the violence, but development alone cannot eliminate the violence. The causes of the conflict grow in complexity over time. Nevertheless, economic development is a strong and effective tool when it is incorporated into multiple approaches, including integrity of leadership, good governance, participatory of civil society, and stronger political, military, and community relationships.

Alternatives to violence: A Comparison of the muslims of the Southern Philippines and the Kurds of Turkey - I

As a step toward redressing conflicts among ethnic minorities and state majorities, this study compares the Moros Muslims of the southern Philippines with the Kurds of Turkey. This paper examines mechanisms to ameliorate violence perpetrated by separatists and by states. Such alternatives would improve the living standards of those socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged by their minority status. While accepting that the current stratification seems intractable, this paper suggests that improved ethnic-state relations would result from leadership characterized by integrity rather than by corruption, governance modeled on a consociational system in the Philippines and an integrative system in the Turkey, economic and educational development, and civic institutions.

Introduction:

Ethnic violence in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century has resulted in genocides, razing of villages, disappearances, displacement, and militarization of homelands. Often both the state and the ethnic group perpetrate the violence. To the minority affected by a disparity in economic and social conditions apparently based on their ethnicity or religion, they have seemingly no recourse but violence against the government. To the state, the maintenance of security, order, and national integrity depends on suppression of "the guerrillas." Yet, violence breeds more violence. Long periods of impoverishment, unemployment, and debasement of identity remove hope for a better life. However, rather than a government alleviating the suffering, it sometimes increases the resentment and anger by its policies of assimilation, suppression, cruelty, torture, and militarism. A comparative study of two cases--the Muslims in the southern Philippines and the Kurds in Turkey--offers a partial answer to the question, "What policies would decrease the violence and increase the standard of living for the ethnic minority?"

The similarities in the cases provide rich comparative analysis, but the distinctions yield nuanced conditions that require carefully considered policies. Both the Kurds and the Moros are indigenous people asking for self-determination because of social, political, cultural, and economical deprivation. Both have high illiteracy rates. In fact, the Philippines have the highest literacy rate among the Asians countries, but by contrast the Muslims in the southern region have the highest illiteracy rate in the Philippines. The Kurds also have the highest illiteracy rate in Turkey, especially among the Kurdish women. Both cultures maintain the social pressure on women to marry early and to submit to a forced or arranged marriage as well as continue the tradition of bride money extended for the exchange of a wife between families. For both Kurds and Moros the couples face the threat of violence against women if they transgress the limits on sexual behavior as imposed by tradition. Customs and religious practices support some of these control mechanisms. Problems resulting from regional differences in socio- economic conditions seriously affect women of both minorities. Socio-economic conditions for both women and men progressively worsen as an observer moves from west to east in Turkey and from the heavily populated Catholic areas to the Muslim populated areas in the Philippines.

Terrain affects both minorities. Commonly repeated, the Kurds have no friends but the mountains and often retreat into them for protection and for operations. Likewise, the Muslims have good friends in the jungle. With a history of being an indigenous ethnic group dominated by a nation state, both balance a past and a distinctive culture rooted in their own identity that led to conflict, particularly in the early 1970s. Marxist ideology and nationalism drives both. In the 1980s, however, the Philippines' minority was fueled by those who studied in Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt and who returned with a fundamentalism intensifying the violence. The tribes and tribal confederations provide both Muslims and Kurds an organizational structure with chiefs (datu), sultans, or ustad--those who study Islam abroad--among the Filipinos and agha and shaik among the Kurds. For the state, in Turkey and in the Philippines, nationalism has led to policies of assimilation and integration that brought about martial law when the minorities resisted. Also, in both cases the government has imposed policies of civilian displacement.

Review of Literature

A review of the literature shows that no comparative study between the ethno nationalist groups of the Moros in the southern Philippines and the Kurds in southeastern Turkey exists. Filling this lacuna in the research may provide valuable insights into the causes of social, political, and economic deprivation that results in resistance, secession movements, or terrorism as well as the state's responses to ensure the safety of the citizenry and the integration of its borders. Current literature on civil conflict and civil wars notes chiefly the social variables of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fragmentation. For example, in Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr's seminal research on deprivation theory argues that relative deprivation leads to aggression dependent on "an actor's perception of the discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities" (1970, p. 24). J.C. Davies studied the frustration-aggression mechanism to connect deprivation to violence but also noted a reversal in gratification, so that deprivation can lead to nonaggression and even to cooperation (1973, p. 248). R.J. Rummel devised a conflict helix to explain an adjustment based on perception. Describing injustice vectors--the moral sense of deprivation relative to others, Rummel extends Gurr's explanation of the link between subjective wants and perceived justice versus perceived capabilities. Rummel argues that the situation involves the balance of power an individual perceives between himself and others theorizing about what happens after manifest conflict or violence (1977, 3.1). He concludes that if one group acts, such as through government coercion, forcing its definition of social justice on another, a balance in interests, capabilities, and wills may settle the conflict. Chaim Kaufmann contends that even the will of the international community cannot solve ethnic conflicts by aid or by sanctions but that "the costs of military intervention in ethnic wars are lower, the feasibility higher, and the alternatives fewer" (1996, p. 175). In his view, humanitarian aid proves helpful only if the world community recognizes that some ethnic wars can be solved only by more drastic means such as population transfers, separation, or partitioning, but at minimum the defensible security of the ethnic people (Kaufmann, p. 175). Jonathan Fox broadens the perspectives on ethnic conflict by questioning Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory from the points of view of the West and Islam, using states with internal conflict between the minority and the majority (2003, p. 283). Fox concludes that separatism, and by proxy nationalism, best explains identity for ethnic minorities' rebellion (p. 293). Jay Rothman and Marie Olson examine the salience of identity on intractable civil conflict, noting that deeply rooted, protracted social conflict makes moving from brutal conflict to settlement difficult under interest based and resource based approaches (2001, p. 289). More recent studies note that rebels seizing power may operate from greed, opportunism, as well as differences in the nature of Islamist politics in the region and social and political alienation. Contrasting minority conflicts that resulted in settlements with those that led to genocide and/or long-term oppression suggests that particularly the indicators of a strong civic participation and a sense ownership of democratic processes increase settlements (Wright-Neville 2004, p. 43).

Focusing on ethnic strife, Gevork Ter-Gabrielian from the Center for World Indigenous Studies categorizes the four players: the state, ethnic groups, intergovernmental organizations that divide functions and powers among the indigenous groups, and non-governmental actors (1999, p. 1). The state and intergovernmental organizations may respond to ethnic conflict by strategies of confrontation, such as removal, or by strategies of accommodation, such as setting up a federation or consociation, for power sharing among the state government and the minority separatists, such as the Moros and the Kurds. The ethnic groups may comply or resist the expectations of the state. Compliance on the part of the ethnic group and accommodation by the state, particularly using non-governmental actors and intergovernmental agencies, may reduce the chance of escalation. Ter-Gabrielian argues that ethnic conflict results from "the inability and inflexibility of nation states' framework in guaranteeing a fair distribution of power and rights among all the significant groups' actors and the state" (1999, p. 4). Instead, mechanisms that preclude escalation must be implemented incrementally, and transparency must characterize the government. In his view, two-track diplomacy, preventative diplomacy, peace-building strategies, and effective use of non-governmental organizations may give recognition to ethnic groups' sovereignty in regard to their culture, history, territory, education, and the like, while not posing threats to the state in the form of rebellion, secession, or independence. Looking at Mindanao, Patricio Abinales addresses the Philippines' state making from the complexity of ideology, ethnicity, warlordism, world war, foreign occupancy but argues that the conflict between central and regional power--particularly through powerful leaders and strong men-- affected the outcome of the political landscape (2000).

Methodology

Gleaning from a review of literature on minority conflicts, this study uses exclusive interviews with government officials, academics, members of the separatist groups, as well as historical records, databanks, and field-based research in the southern Philippines in conjunction with ethnographic studies of the Kurds in southeastern Turkey for comparative analysis to find alternatives to violence. This study qualitatively examines the dependent variable of the status of the Moros and of the Kurds and the independent variables of (1) integrity of leadership, (2) government and accountability, (3) economic and educational development, and (4) civil society and institutions such as non-governmental organizations for the purposes of determining alternatives to violence by and against the minorities. The dichotomy of the two groups studied incorporates arguments from the marginalized perspective and from the nationalist perspective. This cross-country research considers a confluence of factors that contributes to violence, factors that must be addressed to provide alternatives.

Hypothesis:

By establishing leadership with integrity, an accountable and transparent government, economic and educational development, and a civil society with non-governmental institutions and other civic associations, the states of the Philippines and Turkey could improve the social and economic status of the Moros and Kurds, respectively, and thereby reduce the violence perpetrated by both actors.

Background of Two Cases

This study examines the proposed mechanisms and tests the hypothesis using two cases of Muslims--those in the southern Philippines and the Kurds in Turkey. The juxtaposition of minorities in the Philippines with those in Turkey utilizes the similarities and differences of systems design (see Appendix A) to determine alternatives to violence. Both states obtained independence after the world wars. Both have adopted democratic systems. Both countries approached their minority issues with strong military solutions rather than with democratic solutions. Military officers in both countries have ruled the same periods in the early 70's and 80's under strong centralized governments. The Muslims in the Philippines believe that the root of ethnic conflict in the Philippines goes back to Spanish colonialism. The Kurds date their suppression to the presidency of Kemal Atatürk, who founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Curiously, both the Moros and the Kurds in Turkey (under the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the PKK) started rebellions against the government early in the 70's, and both were driven by socialist ideas. Both claimed to be indigenous people and demanded greater autonomy. The Philippines with a majority of Roman Catholics and a minority of Muslims contrasts to Turkey with a majority of Sunni Muslims, the same religious orientation as the Kurds. The Moros emigrated from the Malay racial stock as other Filipinos and are distinguished by cultural and religious rather than by physical differences. Not being from the same racial stock as Turks, the Kurds, however, are ethnically and thus physically, as well as culturally and socially differentiated from the Turks. Muslims in the Philippines constitute 10 to 20 % (according to the Muslims) or 5% (according to the CIA Factbook) of Philippines's population, and the Kurds constitute 20 % of Turkey's population.. Also, in the case of the Philippines, their neighboring countries are mostly Muslims and therefore unified in their antagonism toward those seemingly treating their brothers differently. As Alain-Gerard Marsot points out, an Islamic resurgence in Asia has had political consequences with the severity of the results depending on geography, historical background, relative size of the Muslim community, and government policy (1992, p. 157). Islam became a political force in the intertwining of religious and political questions. The adoption of the Arabic language of the conquering Muslims and of the Qur'an, the "fusion of spiritual and temporal powers in the caliphate," the leadership system from the Turks of Central Asia, and the subsequent syncretism of pre-existing beliefs and customs brought about the current Muslim dominance in the Malay world. Like the Muslims in Thailand, those in the Philippines constitute a minority and are concentrated in a particular geographic area. Marsot posits, "Policies of either benign neglect or semi-forced assimilation have radicalized the Muslims' resistance, leading to insurgency, often supported from outside" and have been radicalized by their affinities with the more political Malaysia (Marsot, p. 169). The political fundamentalist Islam resurgence has spearheaded a "cultural dewesternization" (Marsot, p. 169). In the case of the Kurds, the Kurds are divided among neighboring countries and, as Kurds, share the same policy about Kurdish issues, particularly in their desire for autonomy. By contrast to the Philippines, the strong nations neighboring Turkey, although also Muslim, play the strategic Kurdish card to retain their power in the region.

The two case studies differ in the willingness of each state to negotiate. Proving more receptive to the Moros, the Philippines' government negotiated with the Muslim rebels and in 1989 gave them an autonomous region to run their internal affairs. The Philippines has proved much more receptive to the Moros and, as a consequence, they have achieved an autonomous region. During President V. Ramos' administration, the government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Army (MNLF) signed a peace pact and as a result, the government granted an autonomous region for Muslim minorities in the southern Philippines, known as the Muslim Autonomous Region (ARM). By contrast, the Turks consistently denied the Kurds their identity, referring to them as "Mountain Turks." Consequently, the state never directly negotiated with the Kurdish rebels known as Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). For the Turkish government, until the presidential administration of the Turgut Özal in the late and 1980's and early 1990's, the Kurds simply did not exist as a distinct ethnic and linguistic population within the state. Özal opened the door slightly for possible negotiations with Kurdish representatives but also he gave the Turkish military more power to take offensive action in the Kurdish provinces. In addition, he continued to maintain his predecessor's opinion of the PKK as a terrorist organization.

The two states have made different attempts to make peace with the separatists with different outcomes for the Moros and the Kurds. In the Philippines after countless violations of the agreement by both the government and of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) forces in July 1997, the Philippine government and the MILF peace talks started to tackle the issues in October 1999. Responding to breaches of the cease fire agreement, President Joseph Estrada declared an all out war against the MILF in March 2000. A few days later in the wake of the capture of the MILF's main camp, the leader of the group called a jihad against the Manila government. By comparison, the Turkish government has brushed aside the PKK's offers of a peace, and the government's responsibility for lack of negotiations is on public record. Initially, the PKK's public statement and policies early in 1992 attempted to establish an autonomous, independent Kurdistan. Later, however, even the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan made an announcement that he was not demanding an independent Kurdish state, but rather broader recognition of Kurdish people. Nevertheless, the Turkish government never agreed to sit in negotiations with any organization intended to establish an independent state or semi independent state within Turkey.

The Philippines experienced the Spanish and American colonialism in her pre and post world wars' political history, before becoming a democracy. In addition, Filipinos suffered from the Japanese occupation from 1941-1945, and lost over a million lives before being liberated by the Americans under General MacArthur in September of 1945 with Americans losing 60,628 men. The Republic was founded on the fourth of July 1946. On the other hand, Turkey initially experienced a democratic development, directed and heavily influenced by the military, democratization, economic development, institutions, and urbanization--all leading to the weakening of tribal systems in the Kurdish regions, described below, and thereby giving opportunities to challenge the existing tribal leaders. In regard to leadership, the Kurdish political leaders became radicalized after 1980 when they did not receive fair treatment from the government or could not find political representation in the government. In the Philippines, the patronage was distributed through religious administrative structures. This study tries to utilize the most similar systems design to identify variables that explain the overall level of disparity for minorities between those two countries. However, because of the contrasts, a one-to-one comparison of the two countries cannot be strictly followed. My theory suggests that providing patronage goods for the disadvantaged will not prevent potential ethnic conflict and will not resolve existing problems. Rather, the state must adopt institutional reforms to ensure a balanced distribution within an ethnic minority and a participatory government with proportional representation in the state. Leaders with integrity, transparent and accountable government, economic and educational development, and functional civil institutions -- goals desired for many developing countries-- will yield a desirable outcome.

The Integrity of Leadership

While a shift has occurred in the conceptual definition from seeing that kinship, guild, caste, church, and family in the past have provided the main sources of association and authority (Dion, 1968: 2), today's leaders emerge in giant corporations, non-governmental organizations, and communications industries. Studies show that leadership results from personal characteristics (Schoenfeld 1948, p. 391), field structure or environment (Cox 1974, p. 141), positions of power (Kezar 2000, p. 722), functional behavior (Lord 1977, p.144), and leadership style (Shea 1999, p. 407). Dion found that "mutual understanding and acceptance create a climate which permits the replacement of external coercion by internal persuasion as a motivation for conforming to the leaders' expectations" (Dion, 1969:16). Leaders who engage in participatory, two-way exchanges showing responsiveness and a willingness to listen and who demonstrate a self-efficacy play an important mediating role in the relationship between leadership and performance. In a recent lecture at a Texas university, General Tommy Franks explained that an effective leader surrounds himself with intelligent advisors, listens to opposing views, and makes decisions based on the collective wisdom of the wise consultants and his own experience (2005). This type of leadership required in the complexity of the modern world contrasts greatly with the system of leadership under a configuration of tribes--the historical and residual style of leadership of both the Moros and the Kurds. The system of residual tribalism retains a leadership style that lends itself to assuming complete allegiance and to enflaming violence.

Tribalism

Contrasting to globalism and to nationalism, tribalism--the initial social system in human history--divides groups into small roughly independent subgroups, usually by locality and often follows a patrilineal system. This social system often lacks any organizational level beyond that of the local tribe, has a relatively well-bounded group, and usually gives authority to a chief, shiek, (or sheikh), who rules sometimes by coercion, though it is often minimal (Evans-Pritchard 1940). The role of tribalism from a political standpoint is very crucial for the Muslims in Mindanao because of the indigenous peoples' struggle for self-determination and for recognition as a distinct nation that can effectively participate in the current discourse on political options for Mindanao. However, they need to revisit their own form of political leadership and governance, consolidate it within and among the different tribes, and subsequently propose a more unified and clearer political option for them in the mainstream governance. Muslims come together only when there is a common enemy, but otherwise it is hard to unify them. To unify with the nation, they need strong institutions of law, that which has held America together for almost three centuries despite so many ethnicities and nationalities. Not all Americans share the same belief, philosophy or ideologies, but the political structure that underpins America is its unique constitution based on the framers' suspicions. The founders believed that since human beings are not perfect, they are therefore capable of abuse of power and need checks to curb that power. In both Moroland and Turkey, the factions caused by tribalism compound the conflicts. Internal fighting within Islam pits the traditionalists (those who believe everything should be interpreted according to the Qur'anic text) and modernists (those who consider the time period and blend the twenty-first century with the sixth century). Within the Kurdish and the Muslim cultures, the group takes precedence over the individual with loyalty to the group becoming a powerful obligation. Bonds between friends, neighbors, and distant cousins can develop ties as strong as those between close family members. These social relationships sometimes deny, fabricate, and manipulate kinship. Because of this tribalism, the Kurds and Moros have survived as individuals as well as retained their sense of identity as people, and often have resorted to violence as a result of their independence, but sometimes to their detriment. In Turkey, with the uprising of the Kurdish revolt of the 1920's through 1930's, Ankara largely succeeded in exterminating the Kurdish tribes, except in the most remote reaches of the country. By the military forcing the tribal leaders to relocate or by executing them, the detribalization of Turkish Kurdistan was initiated. The policy also affected the state's economic and bureaucratic modernization, although other Kurdish people remain largely tribal. By contrast, the Philippines remain more primitive like their ancestors and have only the precursory of modern polities. The Manila government did not detribalize the Muslim Moros.

In Muslim and Kurdish societies, every tribe has a chief or ruling class of the most powerful and respected family in the tribe. Traditionally Kurdish agha rule through a combination of deference, power, and custom. The reputation of the agha relies on knowledge, wisdom or courage, and the command of their tribesmen. Their activities depend on the kind of economic activity or administrative duties they undertake, such as maintaining systems or irrigations, running smugglers' operation, or conducting raids against others tribes, state forces, or trading caravans because the agha has enormous political and economic power. He owns all the land and villages, and the people work for him. The agha settles disputes and can extend the death penalty as well. His subjects consider the tribal chief's ruling right and just, and no subordinate refute his ideas or opinion. If someone comes as a guest to the village, the agha will keep the guest in his guest house, providing food and shelter during the night until the traveler continues on his journey the next day. In Turkey many agha or tribal leaders assume the role of politicians and administrators. Most of them will help only their relatives or kinship. Also, they generally will be corrupt, getting richer and manipulating uneducated people. By not encouraging the young to go to school and not opening their tribe to the new world, they hope not to lose control of them However, generations have changed, and most of the young Kurds go to school and have a desire to become educated, resulting in the agha's gradual loss of credibility and control.

Sheiks were either members of the Naqshabandi or Qadiri. The dervish is an Islamic mystical or Sufi brotherhood with similarities to the Catholic monastic orders. With their ecstatic communion with God and their segregation of themselves from human society, the dervish gained a reputation for wisdom and holiness. As they attracted disciples and followers as well as took on power, they claimed that they descended from of the prophet Muhammad and therefore could also play the role of mullah. This cultural heritage underpins the leadership for the Kurds, albeit only as an echo of the past. Tribalism through the agha and sheiks, even in the residual form, lends itself to group mentality and absolute allegiance to the cause they deem appropriate.

Corruption

The effectiveness and efficiency of the leaders depend on their freedom from corruption because such practices as procurement of earmarked funds, misappropriations, mismanagement of loans, fraud, graft, granting contracts to cronies, and even embezzlement of government monies siphon off the public resources that leaders with integrity could have used to reduce poverty, provide education, and build infrastructure. Corruption is like a disease in the Philippines. From its independence until the 1990's, bureaucratic corruption has permeated the entire Philippine bureaucracy. An extensive network of corruption operates from the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy, to the mid-level officials misusing their positions, and to the elite engaged in corrupt transactions, but whose positions and powerful connections render them almost immune from the legal authorities (Alfiler 1979, p. 347). In 2000, President Joseph Estrada was impeached for bribery, corruption, betraying public trust, and violating the constitution. Today the husband of the current president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been charged with corruption and cheating as well.

Not only are the government and local officials corrupt, but also some Muslim leaders or imams. These leaders, and their relatives, are often rich while their followers are poor. Sadly, corruption becomes part of the younger generation's education and, like a virus, damages and endangers the country's social, economic and political life, particularly if their imams and spiritual leaders siphon off funds. If children come to believe that personal effort and merit do not count and that success comes though manipulation, favoritism, and bribery, then the very foundation of society is shaken. In addition, the consequences of corruption are particularly harsh for the poor, who have no way to escape from extreme poverty, and for the children, who have no access to education and no alternatives but a low quality of education--the madrasah schools.

The Berlin-based Transparency International defines corruption as the "abuse of public office for private gain" (Transparency International 2004). The term "transparency" refers to the concept that all information concerning the state revenues and spending as well as income of politicians and their financial situation must be open to the citizenry in the state (Transparency International 2004). However, in the sensitive spending areas of defense or security, a parliamentary commission may oversee the expenditures. Likewise, the state should make public all the sources or revenues, its expenses, and the account managers. The following chart shows the transparence index, that is the perception of corruption, in Turkey and in the Philippines.

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2004

Table 14: National institutions and sectors - corrupt or clean: To what extend do you perceive the following the sectors in this / territory to be affected by corruption?

(1: not at all corrupt, 5: extremely corrupt)

Country - Political Parties - Parliamentary or Legislature - Legal Systems Judiciary - Police - Military
Turkey - 4.0 - 3.8 - 3.9 - 4.0 - 3.1
Philippines - 4.1 - 4.1 - 3.6 - 4.2 -3.