The Blair/Annan plan will be futile and hollow if it is merely a sequel to another landing of American marines in Lebanon. The indigenous population believed in the 1980s that the U.N. peacekeepers were a thinly veiled protection force for General Sharon's famous adventures in southern Lebanon. It led to a grassroots resistance force -- Hezbollah.

An effective foreign military force must have a broad vision and an ability to firmly govern (or veto) routine politics in all countries. Lessons from other peacekeeping projects can guide us. Peacekeeping missions in Germany and Japan after World War II were very successful, even against the histories and proud traditions of those nations. That success is essentially owed to the comprehensive presence of foreign troops (and demilitarization of the countries themselves) as part of a mandated transition to democracy and market economies. No time was wasted to apportion blame or look back at the past.

After three decades of status quo, Cypriot winds of change are noticed -- but only after elections on both sides of that conflict have become routine and, especially, when EU membership and its economic promises appear on the horizon. Bosnia is gaining speed, mainly on the democratic track.

Hamas, Hezbollah and Israeli politicians are elected in their own countries. None can afford the political price of capitulation and none is deportable from their home. It is unlikely that one will be able to another into submission. All sides have demonstrated that they are incapable of governing their affairs without relapse to violence, if only to bolster their respective personality cults.

At the price of limiting the sovereignty of all sides, foreign forces must enforce a strong plan on both sides of these fragile borders until such time as all sides prove themselves worthy peacemakers.