It is often easy to overlook the larger picture in reviewing a particular point in history -- some 50 years later and 16 years after the breakdown of the Berlin Wall. But we are now compelled to review the practical aspects of that period and to assess the value of commitments and promises made prior to that historical time. Alas, with hindsight we may find that the bargains struck were faulty.

On 27 October 1956, U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles affirmed America's commitments at Yalta when he declared, "we do not look upon these nations [Hungary and other Warsaw Pact nations] as potential military allies".

Dulles was essentially the chief architect of American foreign policy during the Eisenhower era and was busy searching for a master key to world affairs. He aspired to generally limit communist ideology in Western Europe, economically weaken the post-Stalin USSR, understand the essence of left-leaning Arab nationalists (like the Nasser movement, or Mossadeq and his nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company), and to weigh the significance of the Chinese Revolution, the Taiwan nationalists and the Korean conflict within a global equation.

His Russian counterparts were busy with the effect of the admission of Germany into NATO in 1955, the Austrian State Treaty, and with their own formulation of the Warsaw Pact -- all of which happened within an 8 day period in May of 1955, a mere 2 years after the partitioning of Berlin.

Historians continue to assess Dulles' policies and choices. His grandfather, John W. Foster and his uncle, Robert Lansing were both secretaries of state during World War I. Dulles' experience dated back to the Versailles Peace Conference when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson appointed him as legal counsel to a delegation headed by his uncle. He was a member of the War Industries Board during WWI and a member of the War Reparations Committee. His brother was the first civilian director of the CIA. The family business was foreign policy and he had a good understanding of the military-industrial complex. Dulles also had deep religious convictions from the teachings of his father, a Presbyterian minister. These may have dictated Dulles' practical approach to, and his vision for, a global policy.

The risk of military conflict with the Soviets and domestic realities in America restrained her from intervening in Hungary. A conventional military engagement with the Soviets and her European forces -- three times as large as the American forces in Europe -- would have been unthinkable. America's British and French allies were dealing with the Suez Canal.

And the American economy was growing and retooling for an expanded civilian development and peace dividend. The investment cycle in the Tennessee Valley and the conversion of factory outputs to civilian markets were providing the financial and tax revenues to fund the Marshall Plan, the restart of post-war British and French economies, and the early days of NATO. These were all parts of the ideological race against the communists.

American policy was framed as a peaceful race against other ideologies, rather than a direct military engagement against them. This may well be due to the religious lessons learned by the Dulles brothers.

The pact made at Livadia Palace in Yalta, understandings at the Cairo Conference and the Tehran Conference, and finally the Potsdam Declaration and the U.N. Charter in San Francisco can all be framed within an evolutionary process that was eventually called détente and realpolitik. This strategy led to peaceful and gradual change -- a triumph of logic over violence.