On another level, these questions appear to be asking about ideals, while the credibility of the answers given are likely to measured by reality. Imagine a question like, “How does Christianity reconcile the notion of racial and gender equality with the concept of a white, male divinity?” Or “How does Judaism reconcile the concept of “goyim” with Western notions of tolerance and equality?” Then, imagine how honest, learned, conscientious Jews and Christians would feel if the answers they gave were only met by a list of actions carried out by bigoted, unlearned, and or perhaps barely practicing Jews and Christians as proof of what real Christianity and Judaism teaches.

All religions construct “categories of exclusion,” i.e., ways of distinguishing “us” from “not-us.” And all religions devote significant energy to policing the boundaries of these categories, against both internal and external threats. While it is both fair and reasonable to ask how Muslims think about this enterprise, it would be perhaps more fair and more reasonable to recognize that there is nothing unique about the fact that Islam addresses these issues. And it would be more informative (and perhaps more useful) to know how Islam’s sister religions contemplate these tasks and go about reconciling their self-definitions with contemporary notions of tolerance and equality. Indeed, this might provide a much more level terrain across which to communicate and understand.

Jihad

Jihad has many meanings, ranging from the inward struggle against the self and one’s undisciplined passions to the outward struggle against a military enemy. The focus of the question is, of course, on the latter form, as it is there that the issue of violence becomes relevant. In this regard, Islam sanctions the use of violence as a means of preserving the physical integrity of the Community from mortal threat. It is primarily a defensive mechanism, though under certain circumstances it could take the form of preemptive strike. Here, however, especially given the memory of 9-11, it is exceedingly important to note that the institution of jihad neither sanctions nor implies terrorism. The two are completely unrelated. The former is a legally sanctioned action (and perhaps a duty); the latter is unanimously condemned as a crime.

Terrorism in Islamic law (under the name of hirabah) is publicly directed violence (not just public violence but publicly directed violence), i.e., violence that indiscriminately targets innocent, non-combatant civilians. As for suicide bombings, even leaving aside the question of suicide itself, inasmuch as they target innocent, non-combatant, civilian populations, they are crimes under Islamic law, whether they are carried out against non-Muslim, civilian populations, such as in Israel, or Muslim civilian populations, such as in Iraq. It is true that at least one prominent modern jurist, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has exempted Israel from this judgment, arguing in effect that such bombers are martyrs in a legitimate jihad. But this is not the view of the majority, who find it lacking in scriptural proof, as well as inconsistent with the judgment that even this jurist would apply to identical acts committed elsewhere. As for situations such as Iraq, they really reflect the extent to which the contemporary Muslim reality betrays Islamic ideals. For here the Qur’ân explicitly addresses the Muslims with the following warning: “And whoever intentionally kills a believer, their recompense shall be hell, where they shall abide. God’s anger and curse shall be upon them, and God shall prepare for them a severe punishment.”

Apostasy

Apostasy is the rejection of Islam after having embraced it. It is dealt with at several places in the Qur’ân. In all of these cases, however, the Qur’ân does not prescribe any earthly punishment for apostates; it postpones any punishment due to them until the Day of Judgment, excepting “those who repent and make good after that. For, verily, God is forgiving, merciful.” On this basis, what is developing into the going opinion among modern jurists is that apostasy carries no earthly sanction at all, unless it is engaged in as an act of sedition, where the point is not simply to assert one’s freedom of conscience but to make a political statement with the aim of undermining the basis of Muslim society.

There are, however, in the hadith literature statements attributed to the Prophet that other jurists take as a basis for rendering apostasy a capital offense. This view had wide currency in pre-modern times but has increasingly fallen into disrepute. Today, book upon book with titles like, “No Compulsion in Religion” can be found in bookstores in the Muslim world. According to these jurists, this view is not simply more in step with modern realities and sensibilities, it better reflects the intentions, thrust and world-view of the Qur’ân.

Women’s Rights

The concept of women’s rights in Islam differs most from the concept of rights in the West in that, ultimately, only God can give and only God can take away rights. In this sense, women’s rights in Islam are inalienable, being neither the result of male nor of State prerogative. In addition, women’s rights (like men’s rights) are always negotiated and contemplated in consideration of God’s rights, i.e., women’s (and men’s) responsibilities. It is thorough this balancing enterprise between what God wants and what women (or men) want that women’s (or men's) rights are established.

Of course, all of this is a matter of interpretation. And to the extent that males dominate the interpretive enterprise, their perspectives will have a greater and perhaps even a disproportionate impact on the communal understanding of women’s rights. Yet, there is nothing religious or “Islamic” about this state of affairs. It is purely a matter of culture and history (and we should not assume that the cultures or the histories of Muslim societies always reflect the values of Islam). Gender, at any rate, is not and never has been recognized as a formal impediment to women’s full participation in the interpretation of scripture. Today, there are female muftis in the Muslim world, a good example of one being perhaps Su‘ad Salih of Egypt, who I have even seen on Egyptian television answering questions from callers from around the country on all matters of Islamic law. Time will tell if this will remain an exception or grow into a more general trend.

As for the matter of equality, while Islam recognizes the inherent equality of all believers, male and female, it promotes functional or practical difference between the two. Islam rejects androgyny and insists that males and females both have their own unique and complementary roles to play in society. This does not mean that men and women operate in two totally separate spheres or that the various roles they play are permanently fixed, as opposed to being negotiated and mediated through time, place, culture and circumstance. It does mean, however, that equality as a principle is not sufficient to override the roles, rights and obligations that God specifically assigns to males or females.

And God knows best.