A major feature of this framework is the tendency to assume that religion, and therefore Islam, invariably aims to translate its every moral sensibility into laws and policies. On this understanding, if we know a religion’s moral judgments, we can assume that we know its legal/political ones.

This understanding, however, is not consistent with the perspective of Traditional – to be distinguished in many ways from Modern – Islam. Simply put, before its encounter with the vision of the modern nation state, Islam was pluralistic: neither law nor politics, i.e., the applied legal order, was a zero-sum game.

One Islamic school held a substance to be unlawful; another held it to be harmless; neither, however, could bind the other to its view. Muslims unanimously condemned pork and wine consumption as immoral; but they did not deny this to Christians or others whose religious values allowed it.

In short, Islam did not seek to translate its every moral value or sensibility into a political order consisting of rules to be imposed on the entire society.

As for the specific issue of homosexuality – and I limit myself here to homosexual acts not tendencies (adultery, e.g., is only a crime if it is acted upon, not if it is simply desired) – Islam unanimously condemned it as a moral abomination, imposing stiff sanctions against it. Generally speaking, however, these applied only to Muslims.

As for non-Muslims whose religious traditions sanctioned homosexuality, many jurists, perhaps a majority, would place them under the general provision that left religious minorities to their own discretion, at least in the private realm (marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.). This is the general position to which I subscribe.

As for gay unions, Islamic law would no more sanction them than it would homosexual acts. Again, however, this applies to Muslims.

As for non-Muslims, there is, as mentioned, a tradition within Islamic orthodoxy that leaves them to their own moral order, at least in the private realm.

In this light, I have serious misgivings about a constitutional amendment that would ban gay unions across the board, not because I support or even condone homosexuality but because I believe that marriage is essentially a religious institution whose definition should be left to religious communities.

The state should be limited to the role of executor, just as it does in the case of the bylaws of professional organizations or the terms of multinational contracts.

In other words, if a religious community (e.g., the Episcopalians) deems gay unions to be consistent with Christianity, the state should only act to curtail their religious freedom for a compelling state or public interest. Otherwise, the political value of religious freedom should trump the moral perspective of the state. The matter, in other words, is not one of morality but one of religious freedom in a pluralistic society.

To be sure, many gays (and others) will deem even this to fall short of full recognition of homosexuality. They are right, of course.

I would only add that, as a Muslim, I should be no more compelled to accept their moral vision than they are to accept mine. They do not accept the prophethood of Muhammad. I should not have to accept the morality of homosexuality. Nor should it be assumed, on the other hand, that because I reject homosexuality on moral grounds I reduce a person’s entire worth as a human being to his or her sexual orientation.

And God knows best.