In terms of cause (jus ad bellum or right to war): First, a just war must be the last resort—but it was not. The UN inspectors were still at work and could have been increased.

Second, a just war must come from legitimate authority, but it did not. The Administration mislead the people, the media, and the Senate about the existence of Iraq’s mass-destruction weapons and Iraq’s international terrorist connections. Legitimacy was, therefore, based on mistakes at best and lies at worst. Furthermore, the only truly legitimate authority for invading Iraq would have been a United Nation’s mandate.

Third, a just war must expect greater good than evil to be the result. But there were ample warnings that the result in Iraq would be—and now is—greater instability abroad and greater insecurity at home.

In terms of campaign (jus in bello or right in war). First, a just war must use minimum force, but we operate with a strategy of maximum violence ("Shock and Awe") which alienates even those we “liberate” and who, even wanting “liberation,” may not want it ever from us.

Second, a just war must use discriminatory force, but our actions have made it almost impossible to distinguish armed enemy from unarmed opponent. Furthermore, some of our actions—from prison crimes to torture flights—have moved us into an indiscriminately evil response.

Third, a just war must use proportionate force so that the good obtained outweighs the damage done. But the immoral carelessness of our preparations for nation-(re)building has resulted in a looted capital, and an ever-widening civil war. The result may be not a liberated country and a spreading democracy, but a balkanized country and a spreading insurgency.

In the foreground I hear spin at best, and deceit at worst—“troop surge” rather than troop increase and “benchmarks” rather than deadlines.

But in the background I hear again—after forty years—a certain repeated line from Pete Seeger’s “Waist Deep in the Big Muddy” but now with Mekong morphed into Tigris.