Death of the Islamic Republic in 5 Acts
ISLAM AND THE WEST
By Daniel Brumberg
The Islamic Republic of Iran is dying a sad, angry death. In its place, we will probably get what one cleric has called the "Islamic Government" of Iran.
The difference is not merely semantic. The genius of the Islamic Republic -if we may call it that -- was that it blended competing notions of legitimacy, as well as a myriad of competing institutions. Unelected authorities, the most important of whom was the Leader, co-existed with quasi-democratic bodies such as the parliament (majles) and the office of the President. The latter was the only nationally elected leader, and from the outset the President's popular authority suggested a potential conflict with the authority of the un-elected Leader.
That conflict emerged in 1980, when Iran's first president, Abdolhassan Bani Sadr, collided with the hardline clerics. After Bani Sadr fled Iran, successive presidents became partners with the Islamic Republic's founding Leader-- Imam Khomeini.
Things began to unravel with Khomeini's death in 1989. In part through his own charisma, Khomeini had obscured the political system's many internal tensions. But with his passing, a struggle emerged within the revolutionary ruling family over whether the Islamic Republic should be more Islamic and clerical or more republican and popular. This struggle constituted Act 1 in a prolonged drama.
Those who came to favor more democratic values had a paradoxical pedigree. Hailing from the "Islamic Left," this group of clerics and lay leaders favored an eclectic vision that was part Marxist, part existentialist, part Islamic, and part democratic. Led by then Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, the Islamic Leftists angered then President Ali Khamane'i by advocating a quasi-socialist economic agenda. Elevated in 1989 to the position of Leader, and with the backing of then President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in 1991 Khamane'i and his allies in the Clerical Right purged the government of many Islamic Leftists. Among them was a fairly unknown intellectual named Mohammed Khatami.
Shift to 1997. Having paid a high cost for associating himself with the heavy-handed actions of the Clerical Right, Rafsanjani encouraged Mousavi to run for president. He declined, and in Mousavi's place, Khatami launched a bid for the presidency.
So begins Act II. During and after his campaign, Khatami boldly advocated more democratic values. Moreover, he attracted a reawakened, if disparate and politically un-experienced, movement of young people. Suddenly, the president became a vehicle for a mass movement that however "reformist" in its tactics, was from the vantage point of the Clerical Right, strategically oriented to a revolutionary agenda of democratic change.
This was totally unacceptable to Iran's self-appointed guardians. From 1998 through early 2005, the Clerical Right moved to shut down the Reformist movement.
Act III began in 2005 with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadenejad as President. Mayor of Tehran, a PhD in Traffic Management, and, most notably, a security operative from the Revolutionary Guard, he spoke for a counter-elite of urban and rural poor, war veterans and state supported thugs in the mass based, basiji or mobilization forces.
All of these groups--who constitute Iran's New Right-- hated the more Western-oriented middle class students, private sector businessmen and urban professionals who constitute the Reformist movement. Attaching themselves to a wing of the clerical establishment that shared these resentments, and fueled by rising oil revenues, Ahmadenejad's allies sought to purge the state of all clerical and lay forces that advocated the mix of Islamic and democratic rule that had once defined the Islamic Republic.
Act IV came on Saturday June 12, 2009 when Ahmadenejad filched the election from Mousavi. Let's be clear: the election had to be stolen because otherwise Iran's New Rightists would have been confronted by a democratically elected president determined to revive republican values and institutions. The only remaining option was the Big Lie, i.e. that it was Ahmadenejad who had secured more than 60% of the vote, and who thus had the "people's mandate."
There has been a lot of talk in the Western media of the power of the "mullahs." But the New Rightists hate most clerics because they have the capacity to wield independent authority. That is why Ahmadenejad must be delighted that Khamane'i has thrown his support behind the New Right. In doing so, the Leader has antagonized many of his turbaned allies, including Rafsanjani. But no matter: what Khamane'i gets (or thinks he gets), is something close to absolute power.
Every revolution ends up devouring its children. In this case, the menu includes many grandchildren as well. In the coming days we will probably see the Final Act: a systematic purge of anyone who opposes Iran's new Caesar. Ahmadenejad has promised as much, and he is bound to deliver. After all, he has the people's support!
Daniel Brumberg is acting director of U.S. Institute of Peace's Muslim World Initiative and associate professor at Georgetown University.
By Daniel Brumberg |
June 16, 2009; 12:50 AM ET
| Category:
Islam and the West
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Posted by: Farnaz1Mansouri1 | June 17, 2009 7:29 PM
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Comments should always be anchored in unbiased background information.
e.g. for a starting point for information about Mir-Hossein Mousavi see:
http://www.answers.com/topic/mir-hossein-mousavi?method=26&initiator=CANS
Posted by: ccnl1 | June 17, 2009 8:32 AM
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"Just who is an Islamist?"
Here is one definition. Similar definitions are available through google. If you don't know anything about IRan or Mousavi, and it appears that you don't, try doing some research before ranting.
Is·lam·ism (s-lämzm, z-, sl-, z-)
n.
1. An Islamic revivalist movement, often characterized by moral conservatism, literalism, and the attempt to implement Islamic values in all spheres of life.
Posted by: Farnaz1Mansouri1 | June 16, 2009 10:51 PM
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Franaz:
I do not know much about Iran except what I read in newspapers or watch on T.V.
You used the word "Islamist". What do you mean by it?
If a Muslim accepts that there is only one God, prays five times a day, fasts during Ramadan, gives 2.5% of his/her savings to the poor, goes for Hajj once in lifetime, Is he an Islamist?
Just who is an Islamist? Are people demanding that Muslims not practice their religion? You claim that you are an atheistic Jew. Do you expect others to be like you?
Posted by: zebra4 | June 16, 2009 9:05 PM
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Be careful with investing too much confidence in Mousavi. He is an Islamist. There is still a distinction to be made between left and right in Iran, but he is an Islamist. His sudden embrace of secular freedoms is, therefore, to be questioned. Whether, Islamist "in his heart" would have mattered in the long run, we shall probably not know.
In the meantime, it is worth mentioning that in the weeks preceding the election the clown PM threw money at the poor in such large sums as to terrify Iranian economists. Money, not politics, is the issue du jour in Iran. Let us remember that the extent to which the first election of
Ahmadenejad reflected the will of the people is the extent to which he promised widespread economic reform. Jew-hating was not the reason he won the first go round Jew-hating does not put bread on the table, Muslim or otherwise.
During his first reign, the economy of Iran, which should have been among the best in the Middle East, took a nose dive. As was constantly reported in Iranian web sites, there were worker demonstration after work demonstration, with the thug PM beating up and jailing protestors, while suppressing news of the demonstrations.
Until there are legitimate elections, highly unlikely while Homeini, with the army's support, runs the country, highly unlikely without external election-monitoring throughout the country, Iranians will starve and Jew-haters will bluster.
Posted by: Farnaz1Mansouri1 | June 16, 2009 3:49 PM
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The URL posted by CCNL1 does not suggest that Mousavi is what Farnaz claims him to be.
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You are very wrong about me, and indeed I'm surprised to read your comment since you have read my posts. It is true that I am a secularist, in that i believe religion and government do not mix. However that Mousavi is an observant Muslim bothers me not a whit.
What troubles me is that he was a vibrant part of the Islamic Revolution, that the Wikipedia entry on him has suddenly been modified to omit this fact, along with his ongoing support of Khomeini and other relevant information.
I do not care how many times he prays every day any more than I care how many times Metanyahu prays or Obama goes to Church. I am Iranian. I know who and what Mousavi is. What I care about is the welfare of my native country. Find someone who can translate Farsi for you or use a web translator and read the Iranian sites.
What is going on in Iran is very complex. Khomeini had started to cut Ahmedinejad loose, under increasing pressure from both economists and politicians. The economy which should be among the best in the region is a disaster. There surely were shenanigans at some voting booths, but the current Jew-hating buffoon leader surely got some votes.
As I said in my earlier posting, what Mousavi would/will turn out to be is hard to predict. He is smart, despite what the current popular web sites say NOT a man of the people in the sense that the current buffoon leader claimed to be, not the Abe Lincoln of Iran. However, given the current circumstances, the great need to deal with the west, the fact that the man has a brain and some support from highly literate elements in Iran, it is hard to see how things could get worse with him as president. Hard to see, but not impossible, I'm afraid. Cry the beloved country.